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(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be based on or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: GUATEMALA

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]

2. SUBJECT: (U) Military Assistance Study

9. DATE OF REPORT: 6 January 1966

10. NO. OF PAGES: Two

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: January 1966

12. ORIGIN:

5. PLACE AND DATE OF:

6. EVALUATION:

7. SOURCE:

13. SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information concerning military assistance to GUATEMALA by third countries.

1. [REDACTED] Table 1 lists Guatemalan officers who have been selected and have departed for schooling offered by a third country. This is in addition to what has already been reported. Table 1 appears on page 2.

COMMENTS [REDACTED]: Officers going to school in foreign countries receive extra monies, normally \$300 for Captains, \$400 for Majors, and \$450 for Colonels. This is in addition to their regular base pay. The government pays only for their own transportation; if they desire to have their families join them, then it is at their own expense.

FIELD COORDINATION: None.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

J2 USSOUTHCOM (1 cy)
G2 USARSO (1 cy)

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

NONE

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

NONE

(Leave)

104223-04, 11
806100-11

337000 -11
335300 -11

RANK	NAME	COUNTRY IN WHICH ATTENDING SCHOOL	TYPE COURSE	LENGTH OF COURSE	STARTING TIME (APPROX)
Colonel	Chester REYES Carrera M.	El Salvador	Command & General Staff Level	2 years	Feb 1966
Major	Oscar Humberto MEJIA V.	Mexico	Command & General Staff Level	3 years	Jan 1966
Major	Carlos A. MOREIRA Lopez	West Germany	Command & General Staff Level	1 year	Jan 1966
Captain	Arturo Guillermo DE LA CRUZ Gelpcke	West Germany	Command & General Staff Level	1 year	Jan 1966

(NOTE: Above two attending school in West Germany will first attend a six-months' language school in West Germany. There are also 21 Guatemalan civilians departing for West Germany for a variety of courses related to civilian industry; lengths of courses vary from 12 months to better than two years).

Captain	Oscar Rodolfo CUYUN Medina	Italy	Advanced Infantry and Command & General Staff	2 years	Oct 65
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TABLE 1

CONTINUATION SHEET

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]
PAGE 2 OF 2
ORIGINATOR [REDACTED]

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POL 23-7 GUAT

XR POL 23-10 MEX

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

23-7

Origin

Info

Distrib.
only toARA
DOD
CIA
NSC
S/S

ACTION: Amembassy MEXICO CITY IMMEDIATE 1618

INFO: Amembassy GUATEMALA 434

LIMDIS DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR BY 0800 MARCH 5

MAR 4 6 59 PM '66

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

1. In discussion of LAPC contingency plan on Guatemala question arose whether Mexican Government would cooperate in closing its border with Guatemala to prevent movement subversives across border into Guatemala. Question arose in discussion of contingency that political ~~xxx~~ situation in Guatemala might deteriorate to a point where there is widespread violence which depends in part for its continuance on outside support.

2. Embassy comments ~~xxx~~ are requested on a) whether Mexican Government would cooperate and b) whether cooperation would be effective.

GP-1

RUSK

END

Drafted by:

ARA/RMSayre:pat 3/4/66

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

ARA - Mr. Sayre

Clearances:

CEN - Amb. Burrows

SECRET

Classification

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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(Classification and Control Markings)

(b)(2)

1. COUNTRY: MEXICO

8. REPORT NUMBER:

2. SUBJECT: (U) Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots

9. DATE OF REPORT: 15 August 1968

10. NO. OF PAGES:

(b)(2)

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES:

(b)(2)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION:

12. ORIGINATOR:

5. PLACE AND DATE OF AC:

13. PREPARED BY:

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE:

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

7. SOURCE: Local Pres:

DIA FOIA B1

(b)(3)

15. SUMMARY:

(C) Report furnishes information concerning use of Mexican Army troops to bring under control student riots which occurred in Mexico City the week of 29 July 1968. Information concerning riot control equipment and training of Mexican Army also is furnished.

(Leave Blank)

1. (U) Mexican Army units stationed in Mexico City were utilized to assist police and riot police (Granaderos) in breaking up student riots which got out of control in Mexico City during the week commencing 29 July 1968. Troops were first used at about 0030 hours, 30 July, when the Paratroop Battalion and elements of The Infantry Brigade, stationed at Military Camp Number 1 in Mexico City, dispersed rioting students in Mexico City's central square (Zocalo) in a sharp action that lasted only about 30 minutes. Groups of students, including many in their early teens, gathered during the day of 29 July and violence began in the city's central area about 2100. Students threw stones and Molotov cocktails and set fire to buses which they had confiscated earlier and used to barricade streets. Federal and district police, federal security police, secret service and the Corps of Granaderos, using tear gas and night sticks, gave battle to the students, but were unable to control the

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

~~Group Three~~

~~Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified.~~

1 Enclosure

(U) Envelope containing clippings, Mexico City press, covering period 30 Jul - 14 Aug 1968

REQUEST ENC FROM DIA AP-10A

(b)(2)

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DD FORM 1396

1 SEP 62

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962 O-581193

REPLACES DA FORM 1048, 1 AUG 60, OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61), AF FORM 512, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

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Encl. 3

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situation. Students barricaded themselves in several buildings, mostly schools, in the area and there was talk of them raiding nearby civilian armories to obtain arms. Assistance of Army troops was requested by Mexico City Mayor Alfonso Corona del Rosal.

(Leave Blank)

2. (U) After the skirmish in the Zocalo, in which Army troops used fixed bayonets and armored recon vehicles, students were routed from schools in the area, and the buildings and grounds were occupied by soldiers. A bazooka was used to blast the door of a school where some students had barricaded themselves.

3. (U) During 30 July, student disorders continued, but in scattered locations and involving small groups of students who commandeered buses and used them to block streets and to attempt to reach downtown Mexico City. Troops and police were transported around the city to locations where trouble appeared to be brewing. Late in the day, most of the troops were returned to their barracks where they remained on the alert. The Secretary of Defense, Lt Gen Marcelino Garcia Barragan issued a public statement, declaring that the military was ready "to repel any aggression" and would act "with all energy and force necessary". Troops found 300 Molotov cocktails, 250 liters of gas and many empty bottles, plus knives, stones and chains in the buildings from which students were dislodged. One rifle also reportedly was confiscated.

4. (U) Student representatives met with Mayor Corona del Rosal on 30 July and presented seven demands, as follows:

a. Removal from jobs of Federal District Police Chief (Army Lt Gen Luis Cueto Ramirez) and his assistant.

b. Firing of those responsible for injuries to students and damage to facilities at Vocational School #5.

c. Payment of indemnity to students injured.

d. Changes in law pertaining to intervention of authorities during disorders.

e. Destruction of police dossiers opened on students arrested.

f. Release of detained students.

g. Immediate withdrawal of police and federal troops from all school properties.

5. (U) On 31 July 1968, about 20,000 National University (UNAM) students, led by the rector, Javier Barros Sierra, held an orderly meeting on the university grounds to protest the violation by police and troops of the university's autonomy. (No police or troops actually occupied the university's buildings or grounds in the southern part of Mexico City, but did occupy several schools affiliated with the university in the center of the city.) During the demonstration, a number of Army reconnaissance vehicles appeared at the Zocalo in the center of town, but left after a few minutes when word was received that the students were to remain at the university. During the day, Army troops were withdrawn from all but two schools. Military patrols were continued in troubled areas and helicopters were used to spot potential trouble spots. Also on 31 July, the mayor responded to the demands submitted by student representatives the preceding day. Through a spokesman, the mayor granted five of the seven demands and promised to take under study the remaining two. It was promised that detained students would be released, unless they had broken the law; that troops and police would be withdrawn from all schools; that police dossiers would not be opened on students detained unless they had committed a crime; and that indemnity payments would be made to injured students where investigation indicated such payment was justified. It also was promised that student ideas regarding changes in regulations and laws pertaining to intervention in disorders would be considered. Taken under study by the mayor was the discharge of the police chief and his assistant, and the firing of those responsible for injuries to students and damage to facilities at Vocational School #5.

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DD FORM 1396c

1 SEP 62

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1962 O-465193

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60 AND DA FORM 606, 1 AUG 60 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

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REPORT NO. [REDACTED]
PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES
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6. (U) On 1 August 1968, an estimated 40,000 students (some estimates of participants went as high as 85,000) held a demonstration and march, again led by the rector, from the UNAM grounds up Insurgentes Avenue several kilometers, and then circling back to the campus. Most of the students were from UNAM, but they were joined by students and faculty members from the National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) and several other schools. Purpose of the march again was to protest violation of autonomy of Mexican educational institutions, and to demand release of students detained during the riots. There had been reports that the students might extend their march to the city's center, and Army troops were stationed at the Zocalo and at a "prudent" distance (about 1 kilometer) from the line of march. When the march and demonstration ended peacefully, the Secretary of Defense issued a statement congratulating the students. Heavy rains soaked the march participants. During the day of 1 August, all Army personnel and police were withdrawn from the last two schools they had been occupying. During the night, there was scattered disorder in the downtown area. Several thousand students gathered at the Monument to the Revolution after the UNAM march, but riot police and Army troops on the scene deterred any violence.

(Leave Blank)

7. (U) From 1-13 August, the situation was relatively quiet but volatile, with newspaper exchange of charges and countercharges. This often involved the placing of large newspaper advertisements (up to full-page in size). The official government line seemed to be to blame the disorders on "foreign" influences, particularly on leftists, communists and Trotskyites. President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, visiting the States of Colima and Jalisco, was out of Mexico City during the violence. On 1 August, he made a plea for national unity in a speech at the Mexican Air Force's Air College near Guadalajara, where he was attending graduation exercises. This prompted a rash of newspaper ads, many full-page, paid for by governmental entities and organizations, supporting the president. (Secretary of Defense Lt Gen Garcia Barragan had been scheduled to accompany the presidential party during the visit, but cancelled out at the last minute, undoubtedly due to the student situation.) On 8 August, Mayor Corona del Rosal proposed that a joint commission, composed of governmental, student and faculty representatives, be established to investigate the various charges and versions of what had happened and who was to blame, to include rumors of student deaths during the violence. Student reaction to this was mixed, with some adhering to their demands for the firing of the police chief and his assistant. They called for a student strike until their demands were met, and classes at UNAM and IPN continued suspended. The CIA and FBI even drew the blame of the Federation of Technical Students, who charged that some faculty members and students were agitating under orders from these two U.S. agencies, and that "persons allied" to the agencies were trying to institute a "military dictatorship to serve U.S. ends".

8. (U) The situation reached a new climax during the late afternoon and early evening of 13 August when thousands of students (estimates ranged up to 180,000 with the best average appearing to be between 80,000 and 100,000) staged a protest demonstration through Mexico City's downtown streets, ending at the Zocalo where speeches were heard. Although noisy, the demonstration was without incident and ended with a display of the Mexican flag and singing of the national anthem. Obviously under orders, police were absent from the streets (but were alerted and ready for action). Students participating were from the National Polytechnic Institute (IPN), National University (UNAM), the Normal School, and the Chapingo School of Agriculture. Members of the faculties led the contingents from each school. Placards carried by the students praised Cuba and Che Guevara and denounced the police, Granaderos, Mexico City officials and even President Diaz Ordaz.

9. (U) On 14 August 1968, [REDACTED] said that the Mexican Army had no function in connection with the 13 August demonstration (but units in Mexico City had been alerted). He said that no official permission had been granted for the student march of the day before. When asked what the students might do next, he replied that no one knew, but "maybe they will just stay on strike". Also on 14 August, at least one Mexico City Spanish-language daily newspaper carried a front-page interview with Secretary of Defense Lt Gen Garcia Barragan, in which he was quoted as saying that

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Mexico's small force was an "army of peace", and had nothing against any group of individual in the country, especially the students. He said that most members of the Army had children who were students, many of whom attended IPN and UNAM.

(Leave Blank)

10. (S) While the Mexican Army did not become involved in countering the riots until the week of 29 July, the student difficulties were traced back into the preceding week. On 22 and 23 July, clashes between students of two IPN preparatory schools and a private school brought intervention by regular police and riot police and student charges of police brutality. The National Federation of Technical Students (FNET) received permission to hold a demonstration on 26 July to protest police methods. Leftist elements attempted to deflect the march away from its planned course to the city's central square (Zocalo). The march started to get out of hand when the FNET group was met by a smaller group of communists and leftists celebrating the anniversary of Castro's "26th of July Movement". The radicals succeeded in redirecting the march towards the Zocalo and enroute buses were commandeered, windows broken and stores looted. Police and riot police arrested many, including Mexican Communist Party (PCM) members. Police also raided PCM headquarters and the party's newspaper, La Voz de Mexico, confiscating files and propaganda. July 27 and 28 were relatively quiet, but 29 July brought more violence and, ultimately, the intervention by Army troops at the mayor's request.

11. (S) It is impossible to obtain an accurate estimate of the numbers of students involved in the actual violence. Best estimate for the 26 July disorder is about 3,000, with possibly an equal number in the 29-30 July disorder. (The subsequent peaceful demonstrations at UNAM included estimated 20,000 and 40,000 participants and the 13 August downtown demonstration 80,000). During the period of disorders, estimates of number of persons detained went as high as 1,600, many of whom were subsequently released; many of those detained were non-students and, reportedly, a number of foreigners. [redacted] received reports [redacted] that there were four students killed and about 200 wounded. Students claim that up to 48 were killed. There has been no public confirmation of any fatalities, and all government officials continue to deny emphatically that there were any deaths.

COMMENTS:

1. (S) By all accounts, the Mexican military performed creditably in helping to quell the disorders. The main engagement involving troops was during the night of 29-30 July when they dispersed students in the Zocalo in a clash lasting only about 30 minutes. Some eye-witness accounts indicate they may have acted a little too firmly, and it is apparent that, once deployed, they acted with little hesitation. There has been little press criticism of the military's role in the riots and the students have selected the Granaderos (riot police) and regular police for most of their anger. Private comment of "over-reaction" by the Army has been heard, however.

2. (S) [redacted]

The troops were formed into a Task Force put under the command of Brig Gen Crisóforo Mazon Pineda, whose regular assignment is Commanding General of the Infantry Brigade. Second in command of the Task Force was Brig Gen Mario Ballesteros Prieto, regularly assigned as Chief of Staff of the Secretariat of National Defense. Military personnel assigned to Defense Headquarters and units in the Mexico City area were put on full alert (restricted to offices and installations) on 29 July. This was dropped to a partial alert on 7 August and this condition remains in effect as of the date of this report.

3. (S) [redacted] received a report from [redacted] who visited Acapulco during the week of 5 August 1968 in connection with Olympic matters

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DD FORM 1396c

1 SEP 62

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60 AND DA FORM 804, 1 AUG 60 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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indicating that casual conversation with Mexican Navy officers there indicated considerable support for the students in Mexico City and some criticism of their harsh treatment. However, [redacted] instructor at the Mexican Superior War College in Mexico City, reports that his conversations with Army and Air Force officers at the college indicates full support for the government action and use of troops. One Mexican officer at the War College who has a relative assigned as a platoon leader in one of the units used to control the student situation, related that this relative told him the following story: The young officer's platoon was assigned to duty at one of the schools where students were demonstrating. The soldiers were standing on guard duty surrounding the school and were subjected to considerable name-calling and taunting by the students, some of whom spat on the soldiers. Finally, a superior officer came around to the school and issued instructions to the platoon leader to straighten the matter out. Immediately, the soldiers went into action and dispersed the students, many of whom they apprehended. These were taken inside the school building (out of sight from the public) where they were then subjected by the soldiers to the hazing that students at the Military Academy (Heroico Academia Militar) receive.

(Leave Blank)

DIA FOIA B1

4. ~~(C)~~ Participation of the Mexican Army units in the actions to quell the student riots was discussed [redacted]

The Task Force headed by Brig Gen Mazon Pineda reported directly to the Secretariat of Defense, and did not come under the command or direction of the Mexico City Chief of Police (as had been largely assumed to be the case). He said that the Army had responded to the mayor's request for assistance and he stressed (the official government line) that there had been no deaths. He said that all persons taken into custody by the military were turned over as soon as possible to civil authorities. All troops used were from the Mexico City area. [redacted] as he saw it, the police and Army troops did not violate the "autonomy" of the educational institutions, but had really protected it, since the schools were being "victimized" by outside agitators. He said that the intent of autonomy was to guarantee freedom of instruction and exposure of students to all current theories and teachings, but not to give a free hand to leftists agitators who had ulterior motives. Asked about riot control equipment and training, [redacted] that the Military Police Battalion (assigned to the 1st Military Zone) had such equipment similar to that of the Granaderos (tear gas grenades, grenade launchers, gas masks and long "billy clubs"). Also, the MP Battalion received special training on riot control. No other Mexican Army units have any special riot control equipment, but all units do receive "some" riot control training. (This is believed to consist of little more than normal basic training of the soldier in extended order drill and use of the bayonet.)

DIA FOIA B1

(b)(1)

5. ~~(C)~~ A Mexican Army officer [redacted] stated at a social function on [redacted] that the Mexican Government has "fairly well established" that the student riots were planned by "leftists and communists" who wanted to bring "discredit" on Mexico City shortly before the Olympic Games scheduled to start in October 1968. Reflecting growing concern of Mexican authorities concerning possible further disorders during or before the Olympics, [redacted]

[redacted] visited [redacted] requesting training material on the subject of riot control. (An expedited requisition has been dispatched.)

6. ~~(C)~~ If the joint commission proposed by the mayor (or any other authoritative body) establishes that there were in fact a number of student deaths and/or that the Granaderos and/or Army units were overly brutal, there may be further repercussions. Following the large 13 August demonstration and march, further student action can only be guesswork. It is believed that continued demonstrations, and particularly any further violence, will endanger the success of the Olympics.

7. ~~(C)~~ Attached to this report is a selection of photographs appearing in Mexico City newspapers showing Army troops and Granaderos "in action" during the riots. A study of the photos shows the soldiers with only their normal helmets, rifles and bayonets, while the Granaderos have gas masks, tear gas grenade launchers and billy clubs.

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DD FORM 1396c

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962 O-635193

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60,
AND DA FORM 606, 1 AUG 60 WHICH
MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 65.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]
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ORIGINATOR [REDACTED]

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(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

1 SEP 62 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1962 O-663183

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60
AND DA FORM 606, 1 AUG 60 WHICH
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1. COUNTRY: MEXICO

2. SUBJECT: (U) Army Intervenes on Additional Occasions in Mexico City Student Situation

3. ISC NUMBER:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION:

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ORIGIN:

6. EVALUATION:

7. SOURCE:

8. REPORT NUMBER:

9. DATE OF REPORT: 24 September 1968

10. NO. OF PAGES: 5

11. PREPARED BY:

12. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

13. SUMMARY:

(U) Report furnishes information concerning use of Mexican Army troops on additional occasions in the simmering student situation in Mexico City. The military had first become involved in student disorders during the week beginning 29 July 1968. For ease of comprehension, information is given in chronological order, beginning 16 August 1968.

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1. (U) The period 16-26 August 1968 was relatively quiet, with much public and press discussion and speculation concerning the possibility of talks between the government and student representatives. Mexico City's Mayor Alfonso Corona del Rosal previously had suggested the formulation of a committee, to be composed of student, faculty, government representatives as well as "impartial" observers, to investigate student charges of police brutality in the July encounters. Students of the National Autonomous University (UNAM) and National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) remained on strike. It appeared several times that a solution to the impasse might be in the offing, but each time some obstacle arose. It was obvious that student leadership was fractionalized, with some wanting to take a moderate course and return to classes. A "National Strike Council" was formed, made up of more militant students, which claimed to speak for the entire student body. The

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

None

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

~~Group Three~~
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~DOWNGRADED AT 12-YEAR INTERVALS~~
~~NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED~~
~~DD FORM 5500-10~~

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18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

1 Enclosure
(U) News Clippings

REQUEST ENC FROM DIAAP-104

ENCLOSURE HAS NOT BEEN REPRODUCED

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strike leaders claimed that 32 students were injured or missing as a result of the July disorders, and several lists of missing students were produced, one containing 25 names. Much publicity was given the results of "investigations" which indicated that many of the names on the lists were fictitious, were not bonafide students, or had simply moved or died of natural causes. On 20 August students held a rally in University City (home of UNAM) in southern Mexico City near the Olympic Village. Estimates of attendance averaged around 20,000. Mexican legislators had been invited to attend to engage in "public debate"; none appeared. Following speeches, the students made plans for another demonstration to be held in downtown Mexico City on 27 August 1968.

2. (N) Based on the possibility of trouble during the 27 August student demonstration, Mexican Army troops in the Mexico City area, who had been taken off partial alert status on 22 August, were placed back on full alert on the 27th. The march, which began at 1600, proceeded from Chapultepec Park near the Museum of Anthropology, down the Paseo de la Reforma, past the American Embassy and on to the central square (Zocalo) in the heart of the city. It was estimated that there were about 100,000 persons in the Zocalo, mostly students of IPN and UNAM. They removed the Mexican flag from the flagpole in the center of the Zocalo and replaced it with a black and red student "strike flag", painted slogans on the walls of the National Palace, and turned on the lights and rang the bells of the Metropolitan Cathedral (acts which caused much subsequent adverse press comment). At the conclusion of the demonstration several thousand students attempted to remain in the Zocalo with the announced intention of camping there until the student conflict was resolved. At 0100, 28 August, Army troops were called in to disperse these students, which was accomplished without serious incident. Involved in the operation were the Paratroop Battalion, two Infantry Battalions of the Infantry Brigade, 12 armored cars of the Presidential Guards, firemen, police and traffic police. For concern of possible violence directed at the American Embassy (the route of march of the demonstrators took them immediately in front of the Embassy on the Paseo de la Reforma), Army troops were deployed around the building, in addition to police. For this, two infantry platoons of 33 men each were used, along with ten armored cars, each with a crew of four and with two caliber 30 machine guns and a 37 millimeter gun. There were no incidents in or around the Embassy, although some epithets were shouted as the students passed by. (Troops were also deployed around the Soviet Embassy.)

3. (U) About mid-day on 28 August, several thousand pro-government workers and farmers gathered in the Zocalo to show their loyalty to the Mexican Government. Later, about 3,000 students also gathered in the square. The pro-government group removed the strike flag put up by the students the previous day and raised the flag of Mexico. The workers attempted to burn the strike flag, but it was recovered by the students. Stones began to fly. About 1355 hours, Army troops and armored cars appeared to disperse the students; at one point, soldiers fired into the air. At about 1415, a man appeared on a balcony (some accounts said four men) over Madero Street and fired a rifle into the air; soldiers responded. The man who had fired the rifle, identified as a jeweler, was detained. Later, other shots were fired at another downtown intersection. During the remainder of the afternoon and into the evening, troops and police had a number of encounters with students who were trying to form groups in the center of the city. Students barricaded the entrances to University City with autobuses which they commandeered. Throughout the night, Army troops, using primarily armored cars, patrolled the city where trouble might develop and some remained stationed in front of the National Palace in the Zocalo. Number of injured in the day's action was not clear, with some sources reporting four injured from rifle fire, and others none.

4. (U) On 29 and 30 August, Army elements and police continued their patrols of potential hot spots in Mexico City. Students attempting to organize in groups were dispersed, and helicopters kept watch from the air. A reduced force of foot troops remained on guard at the American Embassy, but the armored cars had disappeared. Mexico City newspapers of 29 August carried a statement by Secretary of

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Defense Lt Gen Marcelino Garcia Barragan in which he stressed the Army's support of President Diaz Ordaz and declared that the military did not want a dictatorship of any kind in Mexico--civil or military. Slogans critical of President Diaz Ordaz were observed on walls and buses. Students reported rumors of government plans to use military troops to occupy buildings and grounds of UNAM and IPN in a move to deny the students marshalling areas.

5. (U) Mexico City was calm but a little tense over the weekend of 31 August-3 September. On 31 August, Army troops, accompanied occasionally by armored cars, were stationed in sensitive areas and patrolled school areas. Several small student groups were dispersed. Army troops in the Mexico City area remained on full alert--restricted to offices and barracks, extending to include the Santa Lucia Air Base about 40 kilometers northeast of the city. President Diaz Ordaz delivered his fourth annual Informe (State of the Union Message) on 1 September. He devoted over one hour of his three-hour speech to the student situation, offering some concessions, with the general tone being one of firmness. The military guard lining the streets as the President moved by vehicle from the National Palace to the Chamber of Deputies (where the speech was delivered) was believed by some observers to be heavier than usual, possibly because of rumors circulating that an attempt might be made on the life of the President. The customary mounted honor guard of military cadets preceded and followed the presidential vehicle. Soldiers in vehicles were spotted on instant alert in various locations in the city. Except for the arrest of 11 students who were distributing handbills, the day was without incident. At the annual military breakfast honoring the President, held on 2 September and attended by military leaders from all over the country, the principal speaker, Maj Gen Abel J. Orozco, Commander of the 16th Military Zone, pledged the full support of the military to the President. The student strike council declared itself dissatisfied with the contents of the President's Informe, and promised student action on the streets would continue until a public debate of the issues was held and security forces were withdrawn from school areas. On 3 September, newspapers headlined stories with photographs concerning unknown would-be saboteurs who taped 26 sticks of dynamite to a high-tension electrical line tower north of Mexico City. The dynamite failed to explode because of a faulty connection with the timing mechanism. Had it exploded it would have deprived electricity from much of Mexico City. It was speculated that the dynamite, which was discovered on 1 September, was planted with the idea of blacking out President Diaz Ordaz' State of the Union Message which was carried nationwide by radio and television.

6. (U) Through the first two and one-half weeks of September, the situation remained relatively calm. Mexico City began preparing for the annual Independence Celebrations, to begin 12 September and culminating with the traditional "Grito" ceremony at the National Palace on the night of 15 September, followed by the military parade on 16 September. The UNAM Rector, Javier Barros Sierra, issued a call for a return to normalcy and announced that UNAM classes would resume 17 September. During the late afternoon and evening of 13 September, the students (estimated to number about 24,000) staged a "silent march" (some with their lips taped shut), again from Chapultepec Park, down Paseo de la Reforma, ending at the Zocalo. The demonstration was entirely without incident and ended peacefully in the Zocalo at about 2200 hours with the singing of the national anthem. The guard of foot-soldiers, which had disappeared from the American Embassy on 9 September, reappeared on 13 September before the demonstration which again passed immediately in front of the Embassy. Mexico City moved through the Independence Celebrations without incident. There were rumors that students would boo soldiers during the military parade on 16 September, but nothing materialized.

7. (U) At 2200 hours, 18 September, the picture changed. In a sudden move, Army troops occupied the buildings and grounds of University City, detaining 6-700 persons (highest figure seen was 765). Most of these were students, but some

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parents and a few faculty members were included. The operation required only about 30 minutes; students offered no resistance and there were no casualties reported. Timed with the action of the military, the government released a statement declaring that the move was taken because of student threats to sabotage the Olympic Games to be held in Mexico City in October. The announcement said that the UNAM buildings, which are public property, had been seized and used illegally since late July by students and non-students who were planning anti-social and possibly criminal activities. The announcement continued that UNAM's autonomy was violated by student strikers who interfered in its normal work, and troops were sent in to restore order. The federal government has the constitutional right and duty of maintaining the general order, which includes domestic universities, the announcement declared. The soldiers who evacuated the UNAM buildings found "half a room full" of propaganda, some imported from Cuba and some with a Chinese communist slant. Posters on classroom walls criticized the Mexican Government and its leaders; included were pictures of Che Guevara and Mao. A quantity of Molotov cocktails also was found. Students were marched out of the buildings with their hands in the air, escorted by soldiers. Some were forced to lie prone, guarded by armed soldiers.

8. (U) During the period 19-24 September, student groups roamed Mexico City, aroused by the military occupation of UNAM. There were many clashes with police and several with troops who remained on duty at University City and streets leading to it. In at least one clash, a student group momentarily beat back police with stones, but Granaderos (riot police) dispersed them. Tear gas was used by police in several encounters. Many students were arrested. The UNAM rector issued a statement criticizing the action as an unwarranted, "excessive" use of force. Secretary of Defense Garcia Barragan stated that the Army had no interest in remaining in the UNAM buildings and that they would be turned over to university authorities as soon as requested by them and authorized by presidential order. He said the military would take over the buildings and grounds of IPN installations "only if warranted by circumstances". On 19 September the military guard at the American Embassy was withdrawn.

9. (U) In one clash beginning during the evening of 21 September and lasting into the early morning hours of 22 September, police and riot police for a number of hours were unable to subdue and disperse a group of students in the Mexico City area of Tlatelolco, near the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Molotov cocktails hurled by students caused damages to an apartment building and to the Foreign Ministry itself. One Granadero (riot policeman) was killed, and estimates of the number of injured went into the hundreds. Scattered gunfire was heard and students roamed the area, seizing buses and painting signs on walls. At about 0140 hours, 22 September, about 500 soldiers led by a group of tanks arrived on the scene. The situation was largely under control and the troops patrolled the area. Ironically, an off-duty Army lieutenant, identified as Felix Benjamin Uribe Barron, was charged with killing the Granadero. The lieutenant claimed the Granaderos abused his mother and tried to arrest her. According to press accounts, after the encounter, the lieutenant went to his home, changed into his uniform, and gave himself up to police authorities. The District Attorney's office said 500 persons had been arrested in the 21-22 September disorders. On 22 September the UNAM Rector, Javier Barros Sierra, announced his resignation, citing verbal attacks against him by leaders of the government Revolutionary Party (PRI), and the possibility of "all kinds of pressure" against the University.

10. (U) Again during the night of 23-24 September, the violence continued in many areas of Mexico City. Three Granaderos reportedly were killed in flames when students fired what was described as a homemade bazooka from a school. At least one student was reported dead in the night's violence and an unknown number of police, students and other injured. Over 40 buses were seized by students to use as barricades and over a dozen set afire. Fighting spread outside the Federal District and into Tlalnapantla in the State of Mexico on the city's northern edge. Police fought snipers firing from rooftops in the area of Vocational School No 7

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in Tlatelolco and there was considerable gunfire on the northwestern side of the city around the vocational school at Casco de Santo Thomas. Additional injuries and/or deaths were reported in this last affray. Molotov cocktails were thrown at police vehicles from rooftops. During 23 September, there was at least one additional attack by gunfire on a preparatory school by unidentified gunmen. Early in the morning of 24 September, Army units were reported patrolling in the area of Zacatenco in the northeastern part of the city, and in other troubled areas in the city's center.

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COMMENTS:

1. (S) Estimates of the number of troops utilized in the 18 September occupation of University City went as high as 10,000. This figure is believed very high, and better estimated probably would be about one-half this figure. Units involved were not publicly identified, but they are presumed to be elements of the Infantry Brigade, augmented by some personnel of the Presidential Guards and Paratroop Battalion. On 23 September 1968, Brig Gen Alonso Aguirre Ramos, Chief of the Second Section, Secretariat of National Defense, said that press accounts of up to 10,000 troops used were "much too high" (but he did not quote a figure). He said that a Task Force organization had been used again, and again was commanded by Maj Gen Crisoforo Mazon Pineda, Commander, The Infantry Brigade.

2. (S) Press accounts said that Colonel Javier Vazquez Felix commanded the battalion of troops used in the Tlatelolco area during the night of 21-22 September. Colonel Vazquez is CO of the 43d Infantry Battalion with headquarters at Toluca, State of Mexico (part of the 22d Military Zone). This marked the first known involvement of troops from outside the immediate Mexico City area and gives an indication of the growing seriousness of the situation.

4. (S) A Defensa representative said on 20 September that all Army units, including Rurales, from outside the area which had come to participate in the 16 September parade had departed for their home stations.

5. (S) The occupation of University City by soldiers signifies a new phase in the Mexican Government's hardening attitude towards the students. Cries of "violation" of the university's "autonomy" are certain to increase; this was a student-unifying factor after the disorders in late July. It also might increase student support from outside Mexico City, not an important factor thus far, and there were rumblings of student support from Cuernavaca, Puebla, Oaxaca and increased support from Monterrey where students continued their strike in support of Mexico City area.

7. (U) A selection of newspaper photographs from Mexico City papers showing Army personnel and vehicles involved in actions described in this report is attached.

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1. COUNTRY: MEXICO
 2. SUBJECT: (U) Army Participation in Student Situation, Mexico City
 3. ISC NUMBER:
 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 24 September - 18 October 1968
 5. PLACE:
 6. ELEMENT:
 7.
 8. REPORT NUMBER:
 9. DATE OF REPORT: 18 October 1968
 10. NO. OF PAGES: 9
 11.
 12. ORIGINAL:
 13. PREPARED BY:
 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

15. SUMMARY:

(U) Stressing military participation, this report outlines the situation concerning student disorders in Mexico City during the period 24 September 1968 to 18 October 1968. Information is furnished in chronological order.

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1. (U) On 24 September 1968, the bulk of Mexican Army troops withdrew from the buildings of the Instituto Polytechnico Nacional (IPN) in the Casco de Santo Tomas and Zacatenco areas of Mexico City. Soldiers had moved into the buildings in the early morning hours of the same day. Army patrols also remained in the vicinity. After troops had dislodged students from the Casco de Santo Tomas buildings (about 300 were detained), an "arsenal" of 40 pistols, small-calibre rifles, shotguns, knives, bicycle chains, pipe-lengths and over 1,000 Molotov cocktails, was found and removed. Also found was a quantity of propaganda and several police uniforms which, it was opined, were for student use to permit them to move freely to gather information. Reportedly, four persons died, three were seriously injured and many others slightly injured in the hours-long battle between students and police in the Casco de Santo Tomas area, prior to use of Army troops. Also on 24 September,

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

None

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

1 Enclosure
 (U) News Clippings

ENCLOSURE 1 HAS NOT BEEN REPRODUCED

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

DD FORM 1396

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963 OF-315-211

REPLACES DA FORM 148, 1 AUG 60, OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61), AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

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troops of the 35th Military Zone, accompanied by Judicial Police, cordoned off the Autonomous University of Guerrero in Chilpancingo as a "precautionary measure". Students there held meetings to determine if they would go on strike to support the Mexico City students. Similar action was taken at the Normal School in Iguala, Guerrero, where soldiers also were stopping cars at the city's edge to check passengers.

2. (U) In scattered outbursts of violence on 25 September, students in different areas of Mexico City burned buses, streetcars and other vehicles (total of 13). It was reported that one person was killed and two wounded by gunfire and many others slightly injured in other ways. About 700 soldiers and 25 vehicles, including armored cars, were used in the afternoon to break up a group of students on the Paseo de la Reforma near the Museum of Anthropology where they were trying to organize a march. The governing body of the National Autonomous University (UNAM) voted unanimously not to accept the "irrevocable" resignation of Rector Javier Barros Sierra. The Rector had announced his resignation on 22 September because of verbal attacks on him by members of the Revolutionary Party (PRI).

3. (U) On 26 September, violence in the city decreased, with only seven vehicles reported burned. Troops found the body of a student in an IPN building at Casco de Santo Tomas; apparently he had been killed the night of 23 September. Military and police patrols were continued in the sensitive areas. Rector Barros Sierra agreed to continue in his post at UNAM, calling for withdrawal of federal forces from all university properties and reestablishment of order. One Mexico City Spanish-language newspaper published the following statistics, which were said to represent total losses since the beginning of the student disorders on 26 July (no mention was made of deaths or injuries):

- a. Total monetary losses: 100,273,000 pesos (about US \$8,022,240)
- b. 863 public transit units (primarily buses) damaged; small percent completely destroyed. (This large figure probably included buses on which students painted slogans)
- c. Thirty million pesos (about US \$2,400,000) business losses, including broken windows and looted property)
- d. Ten streetcars burned and partially destroyed
- e. Four ambulances burned
- f. 12 trucks belonging to Federal District partially destroyed
- g. Eight police panel trucks burned
- h. 16 motorcycles of traffic police burned
- i. Nine jeeps belonging to Federal District damaged.
- j. Six police radio patrol cars burned
- k. Damages to many street signs and traffic signals

4. (U) On 27 September the Mexican Government announced that Army troops would be withdrawn from the UNAM campus at University City as soon as competent university authorities requested such action. Troops had been occupying the campus and buildings since the 13 September takeover. Student reaction was mixed, with the militants of the National Strike Council (CNE) declaring the fight would continue. The Mexican Youth Confederation called for a truce and cooling-off period to last at least through the Olympics. Mexico City was quiet. About 3,000 students held an orderly rally at the Plaza of Three Cultures in the Tlatelolco-Manaolco area. There

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several speakers addressed the group from a balcony of one of the surrounding apartment buildings. The general tone of the speeches called for a continuation of the student strike.

5. (U) On 28 September, Rector Barros Sierra issued a statement asking troops to leave UNAM grounds and buildings in University City. The University Council met to discuss a date for classes to resume. President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz appeared at the annual military graduation ceremony which was held in Military Camp #1 instead of the usual Campo Marte, which is located just off the Paseo de la Reforma. (NOTE: This switch of location for the ceremony very possibly was due to the fact that Campo Marte has been prepared for use of equestrian events during the Olympics.) The situation in the city was quiet and it began to look as though progress was being made for a settlement of the student problem.

6. 29 September was another quiet day. Troops remained at UNAM and, according to a statement from a representative of the Secretary of Defense, were engaged in cleaning the buildings and grounds preparatory to turning them over as soon as proper university authorities came forward to accept them. Troops also remained at the IPN campus at Casco de Santo Tomas. Faculty members and representatives of the board of governors of UNAM met to discuss ways and means of returning the university to normalcy.

a. The students' National Strike Council (CNE) announced plans for a silent "mothers' march" on 1 October to be staged from the mothers' monument at Sullivan Park just off Paseo de la Reforma to the Chamber of Deputies. The march was to be made up of "mothers" to protest the detention by authorities of their children. According to CNE plans, this was to be followed on 2 October by a meeting of students at the Plaza of Three Cultures in the Tlatelolco area.

b. In Poza Rica, Veracruz, a preparatory student died of gunshot wounds in a skirmish with police.

c. Police authorities continued apprehending leaders of the student movement for whom warrants were outstanding. Press accounts said that charges were placed against 67 arrested in connection with the violence at Casco de Santo Tomas.

7. At about 1230, 30 September, the 1,300 soldiers (including the Paratroop Battalion) and 25 military vehicles left UNAM and officially turned the campus and grounds over to university authorities. The military contingent was under the command of Brig Gen Jose Hernandez Toledo. Troops had been at UNAM since they occupied University City on 18 September. With the withdrawal of troops from UNAM, federal forces remained at IPN installations in Casco de Santo Tomas and Vocational Schools 5 and 7. Within hours of the military evacuation of UNAM, CNE leaders moved in, declaring that students not only would continue their strike, but would step up the pace of the fight and increase their demands on the government. CNE leaders said at a press conference, attended by representatives of the foreign press, that no talks would be held with the Mexican Government until all school buildings had been evacuated by police and troops, all students released who had been detained since the disorders began in July and all "repressors" of students by authorities stopped. They declared they would insist not only on their original demands, but would fight to end "all crisis and poverty" suffered by the people. Regarding the 2 October demonstration, the leaders said students would gather at the Plaza of the Three Cultures and march to Casco de Santo Tomas to demand withdrawal of authorities from IPN installations there.

a. Meanwhile, also on 30 September, the pre-announced "mothers' march" was held as scheduled, with about one thousand women, mostly dressed in black, proceeding from the Monument to Motherhood at Sullivan Park, just off the Paseo de la Reforma, to the Chamber of Deputies. Several thousand other persons joined in the march. The Chamber doors were shut tight when they arrived. Granaderos (riot police) were stationed along the route of march, but there was no disorder.

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b. It was learned that the Secretariat of National Defense had issued instructions giving authority to all Military Zone Commanders to move against student disturbances throughout Mexico without awaiting instructions from Mexico City.

3. (U) On 1 October, the CNH held two rallies at UNAM, each with several thousand participants and not leaving the university grounds. Speakers urged the students to attend the 2 October rally at the Plaza of Three Cultures to march to the Santo Tomas IPN campus.

a. UNAM officials said classes and examinations would begin in November after the Olympics, but CNH representatives declared nothing would return to normal until the government gives satisfaction to the six original student demands, plus the three new ones.

b. In Poza Rica, several thousand students marched in the second day of protests against the killing of a student by a policeman. Students at the University of Sonora and the University of Monterrey announced a stoppage of classes to support Mexico City students. Students at the University of Morelos, however, voted to return to classes.

c. Four youths, reportedly two Guatemalans, one Mexican and one Canadian, were arrested by police in Mexico City for having in their apartment one sub-machinegun, rifles and grenades.

d. The approaching Olympics began to push student affairs off the front pages of Mexico City newspapers.

e. A new high in violence in the student disorders was struck on 2 October when the student meeting at the Plaza of the Three Cultures, Tlatelolco, degenerated into a shooting match between student snipers and police and Army troops. Early "official" figures indicated 22 dead and 37 wounded, but other figures published indicated 40 dead and 120 wounded. Among the wounded were several representatives of the foreign press, including an Italian woman correspondent. Also wounded seriously was Brig Gen Jose Hernandez Toledo, CO of the Paratroop Battalion, who had been in charge of troops occupying UNAM.

a. The student meeting at the plaza, with 3-5,000 in attendance and many others (including curious residents) watching from windows and balconies of the apartment buildings surrounding the plaza, started at about 1730. At about 1815, as student leaders were making speeches from a balcony of one of the buildings, Army troops and police moved in. Reportedly, the students were to be informed they would not be allowed to march to IPN buildings at Cerco de Santo Tomas. Other reports indicated that students already had decided not to try the march in view of the presence of police and Army troops. An accurate account of what happened for the next few minutes after troops started to move in probably will never be known. Most accounts say a shot was heard, source unknown, shortly after which a flare (some sources reported several) appeared in the sky. Some observers thought the flare came from a helicopter circling overhead; others thought it came from a location on the ground. At any rate, the battle was on.

b. Most accounts indicate that Army personnel first fired into the air and that snipers in and on the surrounding modernistic apartment buildings fired on troops and police and, apparently, at least occasionally, indiscriminately into the crowd, members of which were frantically trying to leave the plaza, but were hampered (and some were trampled) by encircling foot soldiers and recon vehicles. Troops and police fired into the three or four apartment buildings from which fire was directed at them. Some police representatives, in plain clothes, were inside the buildings with the objective of arresting CNH leaders. Several fires were

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started in the apartment buildings, apparently caused by tracers from automatic weapons fired from the motor vehicles. There were reports of a group (probably police), identified by white gloves on the left hand, moving in the buildings and in the plaza with the apparent purpose of apprehending GUE leaders.

c. Troops cordoned off the Tlatelolco Housing Development while others advanced with fixed bayonets through a 20 square-block area around the development. Student bands roared surrounding areas, burning buses and trolleys.

d. The fire fight, which started about 1815 hours, was intense for over an hour, died down and then started up again at about 2255. By midnight, the military was in control. By 0240 hours, troops had searched (apparently not too well) the buildings from which snipers had fired. Large quantities of small arms and ammunition were found in the apartment building "Chihuahua". It was reported that, besides Army elements, riot police, Federal Security Police, Federal and District Judicial Police, Secret Service, Special Services Police and even cadets of the Police Academy were involved in the operation.

e. One of the first wounded (and the first to reach the Central Military Hospital) was Brig Gen Hernandez Toledo, who apparently entered the plaza at the head of the troops.

f. Estimates of the number of persons detained went as high as several thousand. A number of the detainees had been arrested in previous disorders and released. Among the captured were a number of the GUE leaders including Socrates Carron Lerus, described as a Trotskyite.

g. Secretary of Defense Lt Gen Marcelino Garcia Barragan held a press conference after the situation had quieted and declared that student snipers had fired first and used submachineguns. He urged parents to control their children to prevent more violence. He declared the Army would permit no repetition of the disorders.

h. The wounded were taken to a number of civilian hospitals in Mexico City and some civilians were taken to the Military Hospital, along with wounded soldiers. A large percentage of the detainees were taken to Military Camp #1, probably as a matter of convenience and because of lack of room in civilian jails.

10. [REDACTED] On 3 October, recon vehicles, foot troops and police patrolled the Tlatelolco area of the previous night's fighting. 'Official' figures went up to 32 soldiers and civilians killed, over 100 wounded (some figures indicated up to 500 were wounded), and "hundreds" detained. Soldiers and police continued searching the apartment buildings surrounding the Plaza of Three Cultures looking for weapons and students, some of whom reportedly were aided by residents in hiding from authorities. Police claimed that a group of "guerrillas" had participated in the shooting of the previous night to "create chaos".

a. Mexico City newspapers headlined a statement by Avery Brundage, President of the International Olympics Committee, that, despite the violence, the Olympics would go on as scheduled. Brundage said he had been assured by the Mexican Government that nothing would interfere with the peaceful entrance of the Olympic flame into the stadium nor with the games to follow.

b. Small demonstrations were staged by students in Guernavaca, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Aguascalientes and Poza Rica in protest against the Mexico City events of 2 October. Students in Monterrey took over the rectory of the university there.

11. (U) At about 1215 on 4 October, a sniper began firing on troops and police at the Tlatelolco subdivision. The firing came from about the 19th floor of the ISSTE building. Troops and police answered the fire. One passerby was killed and another wounded, bringing the "official" death toll up to 34 during and subsequent

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to the 2 October affray. The fate of the lone sniper was never announced. Several students were arrested by police after they set off a bomb near the Viaducto Aleman with the apparent intent of sabotaging an aqueduct. Only minimum damage caused.

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12. [REDACTED] On 5 October, authorities continued their interrogation of these detained during and after the 2 October fight. Newspaper accounts indicated a total of 755 had been released after questioning. Several statements made by student leaders were released to the press and made headlines. In his statement, CNE leader Socrates Amado Campos Lemus implicated several former political leaders in the student situation. He said that he and several other students had met writer Elena Garro and were told by her that the student movement was gaining popular support and needed a leader of national prominence, for which job she suggested Carlos Madrazo (former president of the PRI and former governor of Tabasco), apparently also indicating his availability to assist the movement through his former secretary, Angel Veraza. Campos Lemus said the offer was turned down because it was believed the movement should be led by students. He also said that paper and stencils (for student propaganda) had been supplied by Braulio Maldonado, ex-governor of Baja California, and that Humberto Romero, private secretary to former President Lopez Mateos, had been mentioned as providing money and material help to the students. Campos Lemus, who said he had visited Cuba in 1966 on a "training trip", revealed that the student strike leadership (CNE) was divided into a moderate element which favored seeking settlement with the government, and an ultra-hard element which wanted to overturn the government. He said that the hard element had formed five armed "security columns" for the 2 October meeting at the Plaza of Three Cultures, purpose of which was to protect strike leaders and to fire on police and Army elements when they arrived.

a. The CNE (less those arrested) met with the press on 5 October and issued a call for students to renounce violence and cease street demonstrations. The leadership said that no violence was planned during the Olympic games, but the students would not renounce their constitutional rights, Olympics or no Olympics. It was also claimed that students did not start the violence on 2 October, but an armed group whose members identified themselves by a gloved left hand started firing, thus providing a pretext for Army elements to start firing.

b. Ex-President General Lazaro Cardenas issued a public statement urging Mexicans to preserve their "national integrity". He declared he was convinced that there existed "anti-national and foreign elements" who had entered the Mexican scene and, employing arms and terror, were taking advantage of internal conflicts "which only Mexicans could solve".

13. [REDACTED] On 6 October, the persons named by Campos Lemus in his statement as being involved in the student situation issued vigorous public denials. The interrogation of the detainees continued. Those detained included 14 foreigners, including one American. One IPN professor, Ajax Segura Garrido, corroborated the statement by Campos Lemus of there existing in the student movement leadership two sectors: a moderate one which wanted only satisfaction of the six original demands; and a hard-line one which wanted to change the Mexican Government for one along communist lines. He said that the hard-liners planned violence and had formed "action columns" which had confronted the Army and police on 2 October. He said they also planned other violence, including the bombing of the newspaper El Sol, which was not a popular newspaper with the students. (This newspaper actually was bombed during the night of 13 October.)

a. News photographers were permitted to photograph the "arsenal" of weapons and ammunition found in the "Chihuahua" apartment building after the 2 October shooting match. Included were three submachineguns, 14 rifles, several with telescopic sights, five shotguns, four carbines, 31 pistols of various calibers, 5,000 cartridges, and also equipment for refilling cartridges and a radio.

b. Newspapers announced that five Mexicans captured in the State of Veracruz had planned to carry out guerrilla warfare in Tabasco. Considerable publicity also was given to Argentine woman Silvia Olivares who hijacked a Mexican commercial

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aircraft to take her to Cuba, reportedly telling the pilot she was fleeing Mexico to escape prosecution for involvement in the 2 October fighting.

14. (U) On 7 October, quiet prevailed in Mexico City. The interrogation of students and others detained continued by federal and District officials at Military Camp #1. CNI leaders said they were turning the student movement into a "constitutional struggle" which could last a long time, and large meetings and clashes with authorities would be avoided. It was stated that, in the future, all CNI members would be screened to keep out those inclined to violence.

15. [REDACTED] On 8 October, a small contingent of Army personnel remained at the Tlatelolco area. A small student disturbance in Puebla was brought under control by police and troops of the 25th Military Zone, with one student being injured. It was learned from a representative of the Secretariat of National Defense that Brig Gen Hernandez Toledo, injured in the 2 October fighting, was recovering satisfactorily at the Central Military Hospital.

16. (U) Army troops continued on 9 October with a reduced guard at the Tlatelolco area. Statements of two CNI leaders detained at Military Camp #1 were released. Carlos Martin del Campo Ponce de Leon and Servando Jose Davila Jimenez both said in their statements that the Army troops did not fire first in the 2 October clash and that dynamite was taken to the Plaza of Three Cultures on 2 October to use against Army tanks. It was not used for fear of a "massacre" in the crowd, but some was subsequently used in the bombing near the Viaducto Icaran. Martin del Campo said that in 1967 Socrates Amado Campos Lemus invited him to take guerrilla training in the State of Puebla under Army Captain Lorenzo Gordenas Barajas. The group (he mentioned six persons) took training in weapons firing and mountain climbing with the idea of forming a guerrilla group to operate in the Puebla mountains. He said he dropped out of the group after a brief interval because he couldn't get along with the Army captain.

a. In Zacatecas, troops of the 11th Military Zone were reported to be checking autos searching for weapons after reports were received indicating students were attempting to converge on the state capital for a meeting.

17. [REDACTED] On 10 October, it was learned from a representative of the Secretariat of National Defense that Army elements in the Mexico City area were no longer on full alert, but were in ~~partial~~ alert status under which they had to check with their parent unit or office at intervals during non-duty hours. Press accounts indicated that the Commanding General of the 25th Military Zone in Puebla had announced the arrest by soldiers in the area of Huauchinango of ten persons (including one American) on charges of agitation. The ten were sent to Mexico City. The Zone Commander said demonstrations would not be permitted in Puebla. He also denied that there existed in the State of Puebla a school for guerrillas as student Martin del Campo declared in his Mexico City statement.

a. CNI leaders said at a meeting in Casa del Lago that a dialogue had commenced between students and representatives of the Mexican Government and that the representatives had offered to stop the apprehension of students if they continued their movement in a legal manner, the removal of Army and police from student buildings and minimum penalties for students arrested and found guilty of crimes. The leaders still blamed the Mexican Government for the situation, and said that their three demands must be met (cessation of all police and Army "repression", the withdrawal of police and troops from all school buildings, and the freeing of all persons arrested in connection with the student disorders) before a public dialogue with government representatives would be opened.

b. A total of 128 persons arrested on and after 2 October were formally charged: the charges included inciting to rebellion, sedition, property damage, homicide, resisting authorities, robbery, illicit carrying of arms and criminal association.

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60
AND DA FORM 806, 1 AUG 60 WHICH

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

PAGE

8

OF 9

PAGES

ORIGINATOR [REDACTED]

(Classification and Control Markings)

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19. (U) On 11 October, students held a number of meetings in various locations throughout Mexico City in which they claimed progress was being made in talks with government representatives. They said that when their three added demands were met, they would engage in a public dialogue with the government over their six original demands. Mexico City remained quiet, except for an unconfirmed report of the attempted burning of a bus used for transporting of Olympic athletes, all of whom left the bus without incident.

19. [REDACTED] On 12 October, despite a few rumors of possible trouble, the ceremony officially opening the 1968 Olympics was held in Olympic Stadium in Mexico City without incident. Some foreign press accounts indicated the military was very much in evidence around the stadium, but [REDACTED] Embassy personnel who attended the ceremonies said most of the military personnel observed apparently were members of the Olympic Battalion, formed by the Mexican Army to assist in security and other matters in the conduct of the games. Unarmed, uniformed National Military Service (SMN) 18-year-olds also were used to keep back crowds along the route used by runners to take the Olympic flame to the stadium. According to newspaper accounts, committees at UNAM and IPN (including some CNH members) stated that all student actions would be avoided which would hinder the Olympics. Press accounts also reported that all persons who had been held in Military Camp #1 had either been released or arraigned.

20. (U) The period 13-18 October has been without known incident involving students. The Olympic Games have almost completely pushed the student situation out of the Mexico City news columns. In a press interview on 15 October, Secretary of Defense Lt Gen Garcia Barragan said that the Army was not increasing its vigilance during the Olympic Games. He also said that troops would remain at IPN installations at Casco de Santo Tomas and Zacatenco until their withdrawal was ordered by competent authority.

COMMENTS:

1. [REDACTED] All Mexican military and otherwise, with whom [REDACTED] have discussed the student situation, feel that there will be no student disorders of any consequence for the duration of the Olympics. (Most do not rule out the possibility, however, of isolated incidents involving a few of the most radical of the student leaders.) The situation has not been resolved by any means, however, and it is generally felt that the students will reactivate their campaign after the Olympics. The "cooling-off" period may help, however and, hopefully, post-Olympic actions will not take the violent course of pre-Olympic actions.

2. [REDACTED] There has been an intense concern among almost all Mexicans that the student situation would either prevent or hamper the Olympics. It is believed that this feeling has had an effect on government and Army actions, which on several occasions could possibly be called "over-reactions", caused primarily by the desire to settle or at least arrest the problem, by force if necessary, to avoid effects on the Olympics. After the Olympics, this pressure factor will not be present.

3. [REDACTED] The question of who fired first--Army or students--at the 2 October battle of the Plaza of Three Cultures probably will never be definitely answered. Several eye-witness accounts, received second and third-handed [REDACTED] indicate that the students were the first to fire to kill. Other evidence tends to corroborate this, primarily the wounding of Brig Gen Hernandez Toledo at the very beginning of the shooting. Certainly at least some of the student extremists went to the meeting prepared to shoot, as is witnessed by the number of weapons found later, and the fact that these persons located themselves strategically at windows of apartment buildings surrounding the plaza. It is possible they planned an ambush of security forces. They reportedly forced their way into some of these apartments, ordering the occupants to leave. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there was considerable disorganization among Army elements present after the wounding of General Hernandez and there was some indiscriminate

(Classification and Control Markings)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

PAGE

9

OF

9

PAGES

ORIGINATOR [REDACTED]

(Classification and Control Markings)

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firing by soldiers who fired wildly at the apartment buildings, rather than trying to locate the exact sources of the sniper fire. No indiscriminate firing by soldiers into the crowd in the plaza was reported, however. These same sources did say that soldiers were observed looting shops in the ground floors of several of the buildings, a situation which indicates they were not very well controlled by their officers and NCO's.

4. [REDACTED] As is typical in Mexico, accurate statistics concerning the number of casualties in the 2 October battle cannot be found. Reports have been received of as high as 350 killed. The best Embassy estimate is that this figure is between 150 and 200. [REDACTED] the Secretariat of National Defense [REDACTED] that two soldiers were killed and 13 injured. [REDACTED] indicate that eight soldiers were killed.

5. [REDACTED] The Paratroop Battalion and the 44th Infantry Battalion made up the bulk of the troops used on 2 October. Over-all commander was Maj Gen Crisoforo Mazon Pineda, CG of the Infantry Brigade.

6. [REDACTED] The immediate aftermath of the 2 October battle was to quiet and subdue the students. It is not known if this was due to the extent of the violence, or that the most militant of the student leaders were captured. It is generally believed that many of the most militant leaders were arrested and that their subsequent interrogation has resulted in the identification of others.

7. [REDACTED] There have been no anti-US aspects to the student disorders. Despite the occasional violence (notably on 2 October), the student disorders have had very little effect on Mexico City as a whole, with the impact being felt almost exclusively in the immediate areas of the demonstrations. The average citizen of the city has felt the disorders mostly through occasional disruption of traffic and public transportation.

8. [REDACTED] On order of the Secretariat of Defense, the public sale of weapons has been halted throughout Mexico for the duration of the Olympics. It will be interesting to see if gunshops are allowed to reopen after the Olympics.

10. (U) A selection of news photographs showing Army personnel and equipment used in various actions described in this report is attached.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: MEXICO	8. REPORT NUMBER: (b)(2)
2. SUBJECT: (U) Mexican Army Preparations to Cope With Future Student Disturbances in Mexico City	9. DATE OF REPORT: 22 October 1968
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
4. DATE OF INFORMATION:	11. REFERENCES: (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(1)
5. PLACE AND DATE OF:	ORIGINATOR:
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE:	PREPARED BY:
7. SOURCE:	APPROVING AUTHORITY:

15. SUMMARY:

(U) Report forwards information concerning Mexican Army preparations to cope with student demonstrations in Mexico City in event they are renewed.

1. (C) [redacted] was queried as to the intentions of Mexican military authorities should student violence be renewed after the Olympic Games which terminate 26 October 1968. [redacted] replied that, although he did not wish to appear overly optimistic, there was a general feeling within military that subsequent to Olympic Games students would pursue their objectives on a more peaceful basis. Further, that a return of students to classes in early November (classes reportedly will be resumed on 4 November 1968) would strengthen this feeling.

(b)(1)

2. (C) [redacted] stated that because no one had certain knowledge of student intentions and because peaceful demonstrations sometimes got out of control and became violent, the Mexican Defense establishment has carefully selected and

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: None	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: Group Three Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.	18. ATTACHMENT DATA: None
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DD FORM 1396

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DIA FOIA B1

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REPLACES DA FORM 1045, 1 AUG 60, GPHAV FORM 3520 (Rev 10-60), AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

Encl. 4

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGIN [REDACTED] (b)(2)

trained a 1,500-man unit (currently called Brigada Olympia) from various units of the Army under direct command of Lt Gen Alvaro Garcia Taboada, Inspector General of the Army. [REDACTED] said another 1,500-man unit was being selected and trained as backup and to permit one of the two to be on alert at all times during periods of crises. [REDACTED] expected second unit to be operational by end of Olympic Games or as soon thereafter as possible. Source reiterated that the Army did not expect renewal of student violence but is preparing to deal with it decisively should it occur.

3. (C) [REDACTED] if above action was unilateral on part of Secretariat of Defense or was decision reached mutually by President and members of his cabinet. Source stated emphatically that President, Cabinet, Staff of Presidential Guard and Secretary of Defense were in complete and full accord on manner in which students should be handled should violence re-occur.

1. (C) [REDACTED]

by military to student violence may be overstated and somewhat hopeful. Quick military reaction to student violence prior to the Olympics may well have been prompted by Administration's desperate need for tranquility during the Games.

2. (U) Although 73 years old, Lt Gen Alvaro Garcia Taboada is reported to be very intelligent and highly regarded as an officer. He demonstrated his ability to maintain order in 1960 when, as Commanding General of the 27th Military Zone, he sent troops to Chilpancingo to quiet a local uprising.

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DIA FOIA B1

(b)(2)
(b)(1)

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FORM 1396c

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE 1962 O-652193

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60
AND DA FORM 605, 1 AUG 60 WHICH
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This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: MEXICO
2. SUBJECT: (U) Status of Brig Gen Jose Hernandez Toledo
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION:
5. PLACE AND DATE OF A:
6. EVALUATION:
7. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

8. REPORT NUMBER:

9. DATE OF REPORT:

10. NO. OF PAGES:

One

11. REFERENCES:

12. ORIGINATOR:

13. PREPARED BY:

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

to the military hospital to visit Brig Gen Jose Hernandez Toledo, Commander of the Parachute Battalion who was wounded in the violence which erupted on 2 October 1968 at the Plaza of Three Cultures. This officer has variously been reported dead and/or close to death; however, he appeared in most satisfactory condition. In brief he can be described as short, stocky, tough and cocky. He walked around his hospital room talking and gesticulating freely. General Hernandez explained that he had been shot twice in the upper chest by 45 caliber balls that ranged downward. He had suffered some lung infection and congestion subsequent to being wounded which gave rise to the report that he was in critical condition. asked the general how many men he lost, killed and wounded, on 2 October. The general responded, "Very few." He did not know exact number wounded but he believed eight were killed.

COMMENTS:

1. (S) Defensa released information indicating that only two had been killed. Exact losses of the Army still undetermined. To correct this, has been requested to provide answers to following: (1) how many Army personnel were killed-wounded; (2) what type of weapons caused the wounds, and (3) number and nationality of any foreigners involved.

2. (S) had previously mentioned that the Army "had taken good care" of 18 foreigners but he was not quite sure of their nationality, although he had heard that some of them were Cubans. When asked what "good care" meant, source gave impression he was sorry he had mentioned matter, but said "good care" meant in custody at Military Camp #1.

15. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

None

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

~~Group Three~~

~~Downgraded at 12 year intervals;~~
~~not automatically declassified.~~

~~DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS~~
~~NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED~~
~~DDP 241 5200-10~~

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

DD FORM 1396

1 SEP 62

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPLACES DA FORM 1045, 1 AUG 60, (3-5)
OPNAV FORM 3520 (Rev 10-61),
AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 62.

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1. COUNTRY: MEXICO

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]

2. SUBJECT: (U) Status of Brig Gen Jose Hernandez Toledo

9. DATE OF REPORT: [REDACTED]

3. ISC NUMBER: [REDACTED]

10. NO. OF PAGES: One

11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED]

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: [REDACTED]

12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

5. PLACE AND DATE OF A: [REDACTED]

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

6. EVALUATION: [REDACTED]

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to the military hospital to visit Brig Gen Jose Hernandez Toledo, Commander of the Parachute Battalion who was wounded in the violence which erupted on 2 October 1968 at the Plaza of Three Cultures. This officer has variously been reported dead and/or close to death; however, he appeared in most satisfactory condition. In brief he can be described as short, stocky, tough and cocky. He walked around his hospital room talking and gesticulating freely. General Hernandez explained that he had been shot twice in the upper chest by 45 caliber balls that ranged downward. He had suffered some lung infection and congestion subsequent to being wounded which gave rise to the report that he was in critical condition. [REDACTED] asked the general how many men he lost, killed and wounded, on 2 October. The general responded, "Very few." He did not know exact number wounded but he believed eight were killed.

COMMENTS:

1. (S) Defensa released information indicating that only two had been killed. Exact losses of the Army still undetermined. To correct this, [REDACTED] has been requested to provide [REDACTED] answers to following: (1) how many Army personnel were killed-wounded; (2) what type of weapons caused the wounds, and (3) number and nationality of any foreigners involved.

2. (S) [REDACTED] had previously mentioned that the Army "had taken good care" of 18 foreigners but he was not quite sure of their nationality, although he had heard that some of them were Cubans. When asked [REDACTED] what "good care" meant, source gave [REDACTED] impression he was sorry he had mentioned matter, but said "good care" meant in custody at Military Camp #1.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

None

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

~~Group Three~~
~~Downgraded at 12 year intervals;~~
~~not automatically declassified.~~

~~DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS~~
~~NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED~~
~~DDP-BW 5200-10~~

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

DD FORM 1396

1 SEP 62

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963 OF-715-217

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REPLACES DA FORM 1048, 1 AUG 60, OPNAV FORM 3420 (Rev 10-61), AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~NOT FOR RELEASE~~
(Classification and Control Markings)

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1. COUNTRY: MEXICO

8. REPORT NUMBER:

(四) (保)

2. SUBJECT: (C) General Officers in
Disfavor With Secretary of
Defense

D. DATE OF REPORT: 14 March 1969

14 March 1969

10. NO. OF PAGES:

(b)(2)

11. REFERENCES

4. DATE OF INFORMATION

12. ORIGINATOR:

5. PLACE AND DATE OF A

13. PREPARED BY:

8. EVALUATION: SOURCE

APPROVING AUTHORITY

(b)(1);(2);3)

15. SUMMARY:

(Leave Blank)

(C) This report deals with the removal of the Chief of Staff, Secretariat of National Defense, and the loss of stature by the Chief of the Presidential General Staff.

1. ~~(C) (NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

17. (S) [REDACTED] stated that MG Mario Ballesteros Prieto, former Chief of Staff, Mexican Secretariat of National Defense, and BG Luis Gutierrez Oropeza, Chief of the Presidential General Staff, were in disfavor with LTC Marcelino Garcia Barragan, Mexican Secretary of Defense. [REDACTED] stated that the reason General Ballesteros was relieved as Chief of Staff was that he, together with BG Gutierrez, had been either countermanding or failing to interpret properly orders given by General Garcia Barragan. Additionally, both generals had made personnel changes and appointments without clearing them with the Secretary of Defense. [REDACTED] also stated that General Gutierrez would no longer occupy his usual position directly behind the President at official functions.

(b)(1),(2)

(b)(1),(2)

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

~~Group Three
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.~~

None

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CONCLUSIONS

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 52

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963 OF-715-217

REPLACES DA FORM 104B, 1 AUG 60,
OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61),
AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

Encl. 6

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR [REDACTED]
(b)(2)

(b)(2)

2. (C) (NO FOREIGN DISSEM) The most important of these orders concerned the events at the Plaza of the Three Cultures on 2 October 1968 during the student disorders. General Garcia Barragan had instructed Ballesteros to send troops to surround the Plaza of the Three Cultures, and to observe what was going on and prevent student demonstrations from spreading to other parts of the city. [REDACTED] categorically stated that the Parachute Battalion's advance into the Plaza which resulted in a violent confrontation with the students was not part of the planned military activity. [REDACTED] stated that General Garcia Barragan could not judge at the time whether General Ballesteros had misinterpreted the orders or changed them deliberately; however, subsequent events convinced Garcia Barragan that both Generals Ballesteros and Gutierrez were bypassing his office and had in fact deliberately changed his orders. (b)(1),(2)

(Leave Blank)

COMMENTS: (C) (NO FOREIGN DISSEM) It is difficult to assess the validity of the allegations made in the above report [REDACTED]

however [REDACTED] is inclined to believe the allegations are true. General Gutierrez is normally positioned directly behind the President at all official functions. During the Army Day breakfast, 19 February 1969, a young Mexican Army captain stood directly behind the President while Gutierrez sat at a table [REDACTED]. Additionally, General Ballesteros has been transferred to Canada as military attache to the Mexican Embassy there.

DIA FOIA B1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962 O-555193

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60
AND DA FORM 808, 1 AUG 60 WHICH
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17 JUN 1969

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~~CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

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(b)(2)

1. COUNTRY: MEXICO

9. REPORT NUMBER:

2. SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND PROBABILITY OF STUDENT/GOVERNMENT VIOLENT CONFRONTATION

3. DATE OF REPORT: 16 May 1969

10. NO. OF PAGES: (b)(2) Two (2)

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES:

(b)(2)

12. ORIGINATOR:

13. PREPARED BY:

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

15. SUMMARY: (S/NOFORN) Luis ECHEVERRIA Alvarez, presently Minister of the Interior is likely to be chosen as the next President of Mexico. Mexican students will not risk another violent confrontation with the Mexican authorities.

(Leave Blank)

THIS REPORT SHOULD BE GIVEN NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION SINCE SUCH DISSEMINATION COULD LEAD TO THE COMPROMISE OF THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION.

21

1. (S/NOFORN)

stated that although there were about three strong possibilities, he believed that the "MINISTRO DE GOVERNACION would probably be the winner" and that he would probably be announced as the PRI candidate sooner than is usual. NOTE: The Ministro de Gobernacion is Luis ECHEVERRIA Alvarez. Reference use of the word "winner"; being chosen the PRI candidate for president is tantamount to being chosen president of Mexico, for the PRI candidate is almost assured of victory because the PRI dominates Mexican politics.

2. stated that he

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16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DDI DIR 5200.10

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

(b)(2)

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~~SECRET~~
~~CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

D-1065-69

REPLACES DA FORM 1045, 1 AUG 60, OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61), AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

DD FORM 1396 1 SEP 68

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DIA FOIA B1

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DIA FOIA B1

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~SECRET~~ (b)(2)
~~CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~
 (Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. _____
 PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DIA FOIA B1

knew the students in Mexico City were showing signs of discontent. However, he believed they would not risk another violent confrontation with the authorities. Continued saying that just after last fall's demonstrations and their bloody aftermath, the people of Mexico were initially pro-student and angry at the strong measures taken by the authorities. Later public opinion changed and people came to believe that the students were to blame for the riots and the results. Because of this change in public opinion, student leaders believe that future disorders will be blamed on them and that the people will not support them.

(Leave Blank)

(b)(1)

DIA FOIA B1

~~SECRET~~
~~CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~
 (Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

SEP 62
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962 O-655193

REPLACES DA FORM 1048-1, 1 AUG 60
 AND DA FORM 606, 1 AUG 60 WHICH
 MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

COUNTRY: GUATEMALA

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: (U) Observations During Visit to Quezaltenango Military Base

9. DATE OF REPORT: 25 September 1970

10. NO. OF PAGES: 3

ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED]

DATE OF INFORMATION: 15 September 1970

12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

PLACE AND DATE OF [REDACTED]

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

EVALUATION: [REDACTED]

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: (U) Report forwards information obtained during a visit to the Quezaltenango Military Base during the period 13-15 September 1970. Information includes comments on the August 1970 Guatemalan Army operations on the MEXICAN Border, the prospects for organization of a provisional battalion in the area and the institution of a Civic Action program.

(Leave Blank)

1. **GENERAL:** During the period 13-15 September 1970 [REDACTED] visit the Quezaltenango Military Base in connection with activities marking the celebration of Central American Independence. The Quezaltenango Base Commander, Colonel Fernando Romeo LUCAS Garcia, recently transferred from the Military Base at Coban, was deeply involved in the activities surrounding the week long celebration and has become an integral part in the life of the community.

2. **MILITARY OPERATIONS:** [REDACTED] was given briefing by the Base Executive Officer, Colonel German CHUPINA Barahona. Col Chupina stated that the equivalent of a Battalion of troops were in the field at that time and were engaged principally in search sweeps along the San Marcos

CONTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
52 USSOUTHCOM

17. DOWNGRADING DATA: [REDACTED]

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:
None

(Classification and Control)

border with Mexico and security operations in the Departments of Quezaltenango and Retalhuleu. He stated that the organization of a provisional Battalion in this area remains in the planning stage however the results of the August 1970 operations along the Mexican border () has gone far to convince Minister of Defense Col VASSAUX, that the Army presence is essential. Col Chupina stated that a reinforced company from the Guatemala City based Guardia de Honor is being recalled after six weeks of participation in the August operation. However Quezaltenango Base has been directed to continue patrol action throughout the area making maximum use of its vehicular resources

(Leave Blank)

Col Chupina also advised that the Air Force has been alerted to provide support in the event determined resistance is encountered. When questioned concerning his equipment for ground to air communication the colonel became vague () that the "troops" have a ground to air capability and that the experience gained in heli-lift operations during August has given all unit leaders a much better appreciation for the tactical and logistical elements essential to insure the success of this type operation.

1. ORDER OF BATTLE:

() the major portion of the assigned vehicles were on patrol duty and that the motor pool housed only those assigned to the base alert unit which were to be used in the 15 September National Day parade. (Eight 2 1/2 ton trucks with trailers, two 3/4 ton and six 1/4 ton trucks and trailers accompanied the three hundred man parade contingent) The personnel strength of the base is reported to be 850 men.

2. CIVIC ACTION:

() his patrols were encountering difficulty in winning the confidence of the campesino. He partially blamed this upon the traditional distrust in the minds of the country peon of anything that represents "government" or "outside control". However he stated his belief that the Guatemalan government is largely at fault for not directing its attention to cutting the bonds of ignorance and poverty that now exist

() He indicated that his thoughts are shared by the present government but how far the resources available to the President may be divided is a question that has not been determined.

3. PRESTIGE AMONG POPULACE:

Colonel Lucas spoke at length about President Arana's being in Quezaltenango on 12 September to give the speech which officially opened the week long Central American Independence ceremonies. President Arana is the first president to have made such an appearance which even more impressed Colonel Lucas, as President Arana was not a popular candidate in the area. Following his speech he stayed to open the gala ball in honor of the beauty queens from all the Central American countries by dancing with each of them in turn. Colonel Lucas stated that the president made more friends in the area during his twelve hour stay than any other president in history.

Colonel Lucas' assignment to Quezaltenango was the personal choice of MOD

Colonel Vassaux who has great faith and trust in Lucas' ability. Since his arrival in Quezaltenango on 3 August 1970 Colonel Lucas has spent seventy-five percent of his time in the field directing his troops. (In so doing he has established an all-time record) He readily admits that the area of operations is new to him but is steadfastly determined to comply with his directive to rid the area of contraband operations and deny the use of the border to the bands of organized criminals who traditionally have recognized the law only as written by themselves.

2. The appearance of the Military Base reflects the personality of its new commander. Troops present a neat appearance, equipment is clean and neatly displayed, vehicles are clean and show signs of use rather than being clean and kept on blocks in the motor pool. Maintenance logs are being used and the maintenance officer takes great pride in the number of vehicles on the road. Troop kitchens were clean and a refrigeration plant is now employed to store meats and perishable foods. Training schedules are up to date and posted on unit bulletin boards - in sum, if it is true that busy troops are happy troops the Quezaltenango garrison should be delirious and the Mexican border area should become an area of tranquility and reason.

3. Army Vice Chief of Staff, Colonel PALOMO advised [redacted] September 1970 that reinforced Company from Guatemala City based Mariscal Zavala Brigade will replace the Company from the Guardia de Honor on 30 September 1970.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: GUATEMALA	8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]
2. SUBJECT: Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces - Guatemala	9. DATE OF REPORT: 29 December 1972
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 3
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 29 December 1972	11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED]
5. PLACE AND DATE OF [REDACTED]	12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]
6. EVALUATION: [REDACTED]	13. PREPARED: [REDACTED]
7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

15. SUMMARY: (U) Report provides update information to the Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces, Guatemala. Format of update information follows that of subject document.

(Leave Blank)

CHANGES:

1. a. General:

A general state of uneasiness and a burgeoning crime rate along the southwestern Mexican border in San Marcos and the southwestern coastal regions prompted the Minister of Defense to launch a battalion sized operation on 13 Dec 72. Troops for this operation come from the airborne battalion at San Jose, the Quezaltenango Military Zone and the Mariscal Zavala Brigade. The command element consists of a composite group of officers all selected personally by the Minister of Defense for their integrity and professional capability. While officially

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16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: J2 USSOUTHCOM	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: [REDACTED]	18. ATTACHMENT DATA: NONE
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DS-402

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CONTINUATION SHEET

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

PAGE

OF 3

PAGES

ORIGINATOR [REDACTED]

(Class/Section and Control Markings)

(Leave Blank)

described as a "battalion" the operating forces consist of platoon and squad elements who respond generally to the directives of the battalion command group in the search of suspected areas. These sweeps are conducted in widely separated areas and receive their direction from information assembled from police reports pertaining to murders, robberies and acts of passion. Presently, much of the information being gained stems from local inhabitants who for reasons of their own, be they revenge or personal aggrandizement, are cooperating with the government forces. This latest government action has not produced a reduction in crime nor has tranquility appeared more fleeting than it is at this point in time.

2. [REDACTED] Following is a list of major unit commanders. All other information remains the same.

UNIT	LOCATION	COMMANDER
<u>Gen Justo Rufino Barrios</u> <u>Military Zone</u>	Guatemala City	BGen Juventino <u>Gomez Recinos</u>
Presidential Guard Battalion	Guatemala City	LTC Boris Rebbio <u>Porta</u> Espana
<u>Honor Guard Brigade</u>	Guatemala City	BGen Otto Guillermo <u>Spiegeler</u> N.
<u>Mariscal Zavala Brigade</u>	Guatemala City	Col Romeo <u>Lucas Garcia</u>
<u>Gen Manuel Lisandro Barillas</u> <u>Military Zone and Brigade</u>	Quezaltenango	BGen Manuel Francisco <u>SOSA</u> Avila
<u>Mariscal Gregorio Solares</u> <u>Military Zone</u>	Quiche	Col Angel Anibal <u>Guevara R.</u>
<u>Gen Aguilar Santa Maria</u> <u>Military Zone</u>	Jutiapa	Col Jose Oscar <u>Sandoval Torres</u>
<u>Capt Gen Rafael Carrera</u> <u>Military Zone and Brigade</u>	Zacapa	Col Hector Mario <u>Lopez Fuentes</u>
<u>Gen Luis Garcia Leon</u> <u>Military Zone</u>	Poptun	Col David <u>Cancinos Barrios</u>
<u>General Felipe Cruz</u> <u>Military Base</u>	San Jose	Col Oscar Humberto <u>Mejia V.</u>
<u>General Miguel Garcia</u> <u>Granados Military Base</u>	Puerto Barrios	Col Chester Reyes <u>Carrera M.</u>
<u>Col Antonio Jose de</u> <u>Granados Military Base</u>	Coban	Col Guillermo <u>Ochoa Cuesta</u>

3. [REDACTED] Inventory of Arms and Equipment On Hand

Mortars:	60-mm (US)	64
	80-mm (Ger)	85

DD FORM 1396c

(Class/Section and Control Markings)

REPLACES AF FORM 1124, JUL 61 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR [REDACTED]

(Classification and Control Markings)

(Leave Blank)

81-mm (US)	40
4.2-in (US)	12
Launcher, Flare, Mortar	22
<u>Rkt & Rcl:</u>	
3.5-in Rkt Launcher (US)	148
40-mm Grenade Launcher (US)	122
57-mm Recoilless Rifle (US)	54
75-mm Recoilless Rifle (US)	20
<u>Arty:</u>	
75-mm Pack How (US)	13
75-mm Cannon, Anderson (US)	6
75-mm Howitzer (Ger)	78
105-mm Howitzer (US)	4 1/
37-mm AT Gun (Ger)	15
37-mm AT Gun (US)	18
20-mm AA Oerlikon (Switz)	12
<u>Armor:</u>	
Lt Tk M8A1 (US)	6
Armored Car, Marmon Harrington (US)	4
Armored Car, M8 (US)	9
Armored Car V-100 (US)	7
Armored Personnel Carrier, M113 (US)	5 2/
<u>Transportation:</u>	
Sedan	1
1/4-ton Truck (US)	356
1/4-ton Ambulance	5
1/2-ton Truck (US)	26
3/4-ton Truck (US)	20
1-ton Truck (US)	16
2 1/2-ton Truck (US)	133
2 1/2-ton Truck, Shop Repair, Van (US)	2
2 1/2-ton Truck, Tank, Fuel (US)	15
2 1/2-ton Truck, Dump, 6x6 (US)	28
2 1/2-ton Truck, Van (US)	3
5-ton Truck (US)	4
5-ton Truck, Dump (US)	39
5-ton Wrecker (US)	2
5-ton Tractor (US)	4
1-ton Ambulance (US)	7
1/4-ton Trailer (US)	237
3/4-ton Trailer (US)	37
1 1/2-ton Trailer (US)	63
1 1/2-ton Trailer, Water (US)	13
1 1/2-ton Trailer, Bolster (US)	12
10-ton Trailer (US)	4
25-ton Trailer, Lowboy (US)	6

1 / 8 - 105-mm Howitzer (US) scheduled for delivery in January 1973.

2 / 5 - Armored Personnel Carriers (M113) (US) scheduled for delivery in July 1973

DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES AF FORM 1124, JUL 61 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: MEXICO

8. REPORT NUMBER: [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

2. SUBJECT: (U) Government Efforts to Capture Lucio CABANAS

9. DATE OF REPORT: 20 August 1974

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

(b)(2)

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES: [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 16 August 1974
(b)(2)

12. ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED]

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: [REDACTED]

13. PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE [REDACTED]

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]

7. SOURCE: [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

(b)(6)

15. SUMMARY:

(S/REF)

[REDACTED] the Mexican government forces have still not captured guerilla leader Lucio CABANAS. [REDACTED] confirmed that the district commander, [REDACTED] had resigned and agreed with the thesis that he probably resigned because of the Minister of Defense, who has taken personal command of the government forces. [REDACTED] is not optimistic about the government's chances of success. He said the terrain is very difficult and there are only about 25 guerillas to capture, so the mission is very difficult.

(Leave Blank)

(b)(1)

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THIS IIR SHOULD NOT RECEIVE FOREIGN DISSEMINATION SINCE SUCH DISSEMINATION COULD LEAD TO THE COMPROMISE OF THE COLLECTION ACTIVITY INVOLVED.

(b)(2)

COMMENT: [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

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(b)(2)

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

[REDACTED]

(b)(2)

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY DIA
EXEMPT FROM GDS OF EO 11652
EXEMPT CAT 2
DECLASSIFY ON 31 DEC 2005

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

NONE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

REPLACES DA FORM 1048, 1 AUG 60,
OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev 10-61),
AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE

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DDB-2680-108-81

211



DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

Military Intelligence
Summary, Volume VIII
Latin America (U)

SEPTEMBER 1981

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GUATEMALA

1. (C/NOFORN) Political-Military Situation: Guatemala is a republic with a popularly elected President and legislature. The military are a pervasive part of the system of government, both national and local. The present level of military influence is considered high and is not expected to diminish for the foreseeable future. The current president, Maj Gen Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia, was inaugurated on 1 July 1978 for a 4-year term. The next presidential election is scheduled to be held in March 1982, and the victorious candidate will assume office on 1 July 1982. It is most likely that Lucas will personally choose a candidate from within the military to be one of the contenders.

(C/NOFORN) President Lucas' record to date has not been impressive. His administration has made few policy innovations, and its performance thus far places it well within the conservative mold of its predecessor while being far more repressive. Lucas himself has not provided inspirational leadership, the level of competence of his Cabinet is weak, and administrative corruption is high. More attention is being paid to socio-economic problems and major infrastructure projects. The Government is making an effort to implement a land reform measure largely in the northern region of the nation. In addition, a national 3-year campaign is underway to diminish the widespread illiteracy that is endemic to the country.

(C/NOFORN) Early in its term, the Lucas government served notice that it would not tolerate the same degree of public disruption and opposition previously allowed during the more permissive regime of ex-President Laugerud. In October 1978, widespread strikes and labor unrest degenerated into rioting, which was supported by leftists, in protest against an increase in the bus fare. Reacting to heavy criticism from the sectors which had backed his campaign, after 9 days of violence Lucas ordered the National Police to gain control of the situation. The rioting was then quelled, but the bus fare increase was canceled.

(C/NOFORN) Since the riots, there has been no diminution in violence--quite the contrary. The Government of Guatemala has cracked down on all sectors offering opposition to its various policies to include the clergy, labor, education, and political leaders. There is credible evidence implicating the Government in political murders and disappearances, which have been attributed to a largely nonexistent "Secret Anticommunist Army (ESA)." The Government's actions have polarized the nation's society and have galvanized opposition forces against the Lucas regime. Antigovernment terrorist activities, both urban and rural, have increased significantly.

(C/NOFORN) The four main guerrilla groups--the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres) EGP; Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (Organizacion Revolucionario del Pueblo en Armas) ORPA; Rebel Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes) FAR; and the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party-Dissident Faction (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo) PGT/D--have agreed to cooperate and coordinate their activities through an umbrella entity called the National Revolutionary Union (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional) URN. Guerrilla actions include hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations carried out against military units and national and provincial leaders, as well as proselytizing and propaganda sessions during takeovers of small towns and farms. The total guerrilla strength is estimated at between 2,000

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GUATEMALA

and 2,500 armed combatants and 4,000 active supporters. There is evidence of Cuban and Nicaraguan support for Guatemalan guerrillas. Some have been trained in Cuba. Guerrilla leaders have been known to travel to Nicaragua and Cuba for strategy meetings. Reports have also been received indicating that Mexico provides some discreet financial, political, and moral support to Guatemalan guerrillas, as well as sanctuary for the nation's political exiles. Additionally, unconfirmed reports state that Mexico has allowed Guatemalan guerrillas to enter Mexico for rest, recuperation, and resupply. Most Guatemalan military officers are convinced that Mexico is also funneling arms to the guerrillas and serves as a route of infiltration. Recent evidence shows that the Cuban-Nicaraguan supply pipeline extends to Guatemala, not just to El Salvador. US weapons from former Vietnam stocks (M-16s, AR-15s, and M-79 grenade launchers) have found their way to Guatemalan insurgents. Also, Soviet-type handgrenades and Communist Chinese rocket-propelled grenades have been captured by Guatemalan military forces.

(C/NOFORN) Of the four main guerrilla groups in Guatemala, the EGP and ORPA are the most active and militant. They have shown an increased capability to successfully ambush Army convoys and attack police stations. The EGP is concentrated primarily in the Indian highlands of the Departments of El Quiche, Huehuetenango, Alta Verapaz, and Chimaltenango, while ORPA operates mainly in the southern Departments of Quezaltenango, San Marcos, Retalhuleu, and Suchitepequez. More recently, they have operated in the interior Departments of Solola and Totonicapan. PGT operations are mostly in and around Guatemala City and the Departments of Escuintla and Santa Rosa. The FAR is most active in the Departments of El Peten and, to a lesser degree, Izabal. Only the southeastern departments are relatively free of guerrilla activity. Guerrilla objectives are to topple the Government by gaining popular support; by discrediting the Armed Forces, causing them to overreact; by crippling the economy; and by isolating the Government from international support. While the Government is not in immediate danger of being overthrown, the guerrillas have achieved a number of successes, which have prompted the Armed Forces to overreact by taking reprisals against leftist suspects. Foreign and domestic investment has dropped noticeably, and the Lucas administration is now branded internationally as repressive. Guerrilla-initiated violence is on the rise and has become commonplace in many areas previously considered safe. As the Government faces increasing pressure from the left, the right is calling for it to restore law and order, while the US and international pressure groups try to prevail upon the Government to exercise moderation and show respect for human rights.

(C/NOFORN) Other challenges facing the Government are an economic slowdown, growing inflation, widespread corruption, the upcoming presidential election, resolution of the lingering dispute over Belize, and relations with a new US administration. Inflation increased 12 percent, and the Government was forced to raise the rural minimum wage by 186 percent last year. Urban minimum wages were also raised accordingly. Higher labor costs threaten to accelerate farm mechanization, which will lead to higher rates of rural employment. Guerrilla attacks and kidnappings targeted against farm/estate management have caused a flight of agro capital and labor. Some markets for previously traditional lucrative crops have closed, and world coffee prices have continued their downward path. Official corruption is widespread and erodes the Government's popular support and credibility. Traditionally in Guatemala, the period before the

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

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FM [REDACTED]

TO DIA WASHDC

INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN
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DIA FOR IR BRANCH, DB-3E, DB-3E2, OS-1, JSI-4B; USCINCSO
FOR SCJ2-IAD.

SUBJ: IR [REDACTED] GUATEMALA/MEXICO/MOD VISITS MEX-
ICO (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: GUATEMALA (GT); MEXICO (MX)
2. (U) IR NO: [REDACTED]
3. (U) TITLE: MOD VISITS MEXICO (U)
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 820913
5. (U) ORIG: SEE FM LINE
6. (U) [REDACTED]

7. (U) SOURCE: LOCAL PRESS

8. (U) SUMMARY: ON 13 SEP 82, BG OSCAR HUMBERTO
(MEJIA) VICTORES, GUATEMALAN MINISTER OF DEF-
ENSE, DEPARTED GUATEMALA DESTINED FOR MEXICO CITY, TO
ATTEND THE 16 SEP 82 MEXICAN INDEPENDENCE DAY CEREMONIES.
ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, MEJIA WILL AVAIL HIMSELF OF THIS
OPPORTUNITY TO SOLICIT INFORMATION REGARDING
THE THOUSANDS OF GUATEMALAN REFUGEES WHO HAVE FLED TO
MEXICO, AS WELL AS TO DISCUSS WITH MEXICAN MILITARY AUTH-
ORITIES THE MATTER OF ALLEGED GUATEMALAN MILITARY INCUR-
SIONS INTO MEXICO.

9A. (U) DETAILS: NONE

ACTION DB-3E(2) (U,P,6,7,8)
INFO NIDS(1) J3:NMCC(1) J5(2) RDJTF:LO(1) SECDEF:(1)
SECDEF(9) USDP(15) ASD:PA&E(1) NMIC(1) RTS-2B(1)
OS-1(1) SWS(1) JSI-4B(1) DC-4(1) AT(1) AT-X(1)
AIS(1) DIO(1) DE(1) DB-1G(1) DB-3(1) DB-3E2(1)
DB-4A(1) DB-5D(1) DB-1E(1) DT-1(1) DIA(1)
+CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+CIA WASHINGTON DC
+SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA FT. GEORGE G MEADE MD

10. (U) PROJ NO: NA
11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE
12. (U) SPEC INST: DIRC-NO
13. (U) PREP BY [REDACTED]
14. (U) APP BY [REDACTED]
15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO; REL TO: NONE
16. & 17. NA
DECL: [REDACTED]
BT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ROUTINE
R 141435Z JUN 85

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TO DIA WASHDC//JSI-4B/DB-3C2//
INFO USDAO MEXICO CITY MX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NOFORN

SERIAL: (U) IIR

PASS: (U) DIA PASS TO AIG 11888

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT), MEXICO (MX)

SUBJECT: IIR MZ #18, SAN MARCOS,
BRIEFING ON MILITARY SITUATION (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.

DOI: (U) 850610

REQS: (U)

SOURCE: (U)

SUMMARY: (C/NF) DURING A VISIT TO MZ #18, SAN
MARCOS, ON 850610, THE MZ COMMANDER, COL JORGE
RENE ((ISAACS)) RODRIGUEZ, AND HIS OPERATIONS
OFFICER ((S-3)) BRIEFED

BRIEFING AND SUBSEQUENT
CONVERSATIONS INCLUDED THE STATUS OF GUERRILLA
OPERATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT, MILITARY OPERATIONS
THERE AND THE GOALS OF THE MZ IN SAN MARCOS.

TEXT: (C/NF) (ENTIRE TEXT CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

1. ACCORDING TO THE S-3, THE INSURGENTS OPERATING
IN SAN MARCOS ARE MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE IN ARMS (ORPA) AND THEY
HAVE TWO OPERATIONAL FRONTS IN THE DEPARTMENT. THE
NORTHERN FRONT, THE COMMANDANT MANUEL COMPANY
(COMPANIA DE COMANDANTE MANUEL), HAS AN ESTIMATED
86 ACTIVISTS. THE SOUTHERN FRONT HAS APPROXIMATELY
140 ACTIVISTS. BOTH FRONTS ARE ALLEGEDLY SUPPORTED
BY LOCAL SYMPATHIZERS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF A POPULAR
RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION CALLED THE "RESISTENCIA
POPULAR DE COMPEMINOS". NO ESTIMATE WAS GIVEN
ABOUT THE NUMBER OF SYMPATHIZERS IN SAN MARCOS.

2. THE NORTHERN FRONT REPORTEDLY HAS WEAPONS THAT
INCLUDE 72 M-16 RIFLES, 9 MISSILE LAUNCHERS
(PROBABLY RPG-2'S), ONE 60 MM MORTAR, ONE HEAVY
MACHINEGUN, AND ONE "CANNON". THE S-3 INDICATED
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE GUERRILLAS
HAVE A "CANNON" AND THAT THE BIGGEST WEAPON
USED THERE TO DATE WAS A 60MM MORTAR.
IT IS VERY UNLIKELY THAT GUERRILLAS HAVE AN
ARTILLERY PIECE BUT PROBABLY HAVE A 60MM MORTAR.)

ACTION JSI-4B(*) (U,6,7,8,F)
INFO CJCS(4) MIDS(*) J5(2) JAD:CSD(1) SECDEF:(*)
SECDEF(9) USDP(11) ASD:PA&E(1) USDP:DSAA(4) DI-1(1)
NMIC(*) RTS-2B(*) NWS(1) AT-5(1) DIO(1) DE-3(1)
DB-3C(2) DB-3C2(1) DB-5D2(1) DIA(1) DT-5(1)
DC-4A5(1)
+SAFE
+AIG 11888
SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 44

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TOR=85165/1452Z

TAD=85165/1530Z

CDSN=MAJ175

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PAGE 1 OF 1
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SECT 01 OF 02

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ROUTINE
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ZYUW RUEHGT5826 1651439

TO DIA WASHDC//JSI-4B/DB-3C2//
INFO USDAO MEXICO CITY MX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UNFORN

SERIAL: (U) IIR

PASS: (U) DIA PASS TO AIG 11888

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT), MEXICO (MX)

SUBJECT: IIR MZ #18, SAN MARCOS,
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, WHICH IS HEADED BY THE MZ
COMMANDER AT THE DEPARTMENT LEVEL. TRAINING IS
BEING CONDUCTED BY ONE OF THE TWO DETACHMENTS
LOCATED NEAR IOQUIAR GRANDE AND IS REPORTEDLY
MODELED AFTER A US SPECIAL FORCES TYPE COURSE.
COMMENTS: (C/NF) THE BRIEFING AND CONVERSATIONS WERE
CONDUCTED IN A VERY FRIENDLY AND OPEN ATMOSPHERE.
THE ATTITUDE OF THE COMMANDER AND S-3 IN MZ #18

VERY PROFESSIONAL AND GUARDEDLY
OPTIMISTIC. THEY SEEMED TO HAVE A SHAKY UPPER
HAND AT THE MOMENT. READING BETWEEN THE LINES,
HOWEVER, THE HOLD IS TENUOUS. WITHOUT SUFFICIENT
RESOURCES TO ACCELERATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
INTERGRATION, THE ARMY WILL HAVE A VERY DIFFICULT
TIME STABILIZING THE DEPARTMENT AND ENHANCING
POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. THE PROXIMITY
OF SAFEHAVENS IN MEXICO FURTHER COMPLICATES THE
PROBLEM OF STABILIZATION AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN
SAN MARCOS. THERE ARE JUST NOT ENOUGH TROOPS IN THE
ZONE TO TOTALLY CONTROL THE AREA. UNITS ASSIGNED
THERE SUFFER FROM DEFICIENCIES IN COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT AND FROM A DEARTH OF MOBILITY RESOURCES.
THE RUGGED SAN MARCOS TERRAIN MAKES HELICOPTERS THE
ONLY RELIABLE MEANS OF MOVEMENT AND THE NATIONWIDE
SHORTAGE OF HELICOPTERS IS WELL KNOWN. GIVEN RESOURCE
LIMITATIONS IN GT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT STABILIZATION
EFFORTS IN SAN MARCOS WILL SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE
IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

PROJ: (U) NA

COLL: (U) AB

INSTR: (U) US

PREP: (U)

APPR: (U)

EVAL: (U) NO, REL TO: NONE

ENCL: (U) NA

DISSEM: (U) NA

WARNING: (U) NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

DECL: (U) OADR DT

ACTION JSI-4B(*)

(I,M)

INFO CJCS(4) NIDS(*) J5(2) JAD:CSD(1) SECDEF:(*)
SECDEF(9) USDP(11) ASD:PA&E(1) USDP:DSAA(4) DI-1(1)
NMIC(*) RTS-2B(*) NWS(1) AT-5(1) DIO(1) DE-3(1)
DB-3C(2) DB-3C2(1) DB-5D2(1) DIA(1) DT-5(1)
DC-4A5(1)

+SAFE

+ATG 11888

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 44

MCN=85165/04421

TOR=85165/1452Z

TAD=85165/1530Z

CDSN=MAK43S

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PAGE 1 OF 1
141435Z JUN 85
SECT 02 OF 02

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PAGE:0528

INQUIRE=DOC17D

ITEM NO=00578026

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX214 MCN = 92120/01993 TOR = 921200109

PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS0007 1200105-~~SSSS~~--RUEALGX.

ZNY ~~SSSSS~~

HEADER

P 290105Z APR 92

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEALGX/SAFE

P 282000Z APR 92

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DO//

TO RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J2//

RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY MX//DATT//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//MCD/ALA//

BT

CONTROLS

~~S E C R E T~~ ~~NOFORN~~ ~~WNINTEL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] MEXICAN DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS. CONCERN
OVER INSURGENTS (U)

WARNING NOTICE: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED--~~S E C R E T~~ ~~NOFORN~~--
~~WNINTEL~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI' (U) 920101-920316.

REQ' (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (~~S/NF/WH~~)/ [REDACTED]

SUMMARY' (~~S/NF/WH~~) THE MEXICAN DEFENSE SECRETARIAT IS CONCERNED
ABOUT THE INSURGENT GROUP PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO OBRERO CLANDESTINO
UNION DEL PUEBLO Y EL PARTIDO DE LOS POBRES (PROCUP-PDLP)
(CLANDESTINE WORKERS REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF THE PEOPLE - PARTY OF
THE POOR) POTENTIAL THREAT TO ITS INSTALLATIONS AND PERSONNEL.

TEXT: 1. (~~S/NF/WH~~) THE MX DEFENSE SECRETARIAT (DEFENSA)
INTELLIGENCE SECTION RECENTLY CIRCULATED A DIRECTIVE REGARDING AN
INCREASE IN SUBVERSIVE PROPOGANDA, ROBBERIES, AND ATTACKS ON POLICE
AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. THE DIRECTIVES PURPOSE WAS TO PLACE
UNITS AND PERSONNEL ON AN INCREASED SECURITY POSTURE. A SYNOPSIS
OF THE DIRECTIVE FOLLOWS:

"SECURITY DIRECTIVE TO WHICH MILITARY UNITS AND INSTALLATIONS MUST
ADHERE"

I. BACKGROUND:

A. RECENTLY, THERE HAS BEEN A NATIONAL SERIES OF CRIMES, SOME OF
WHICH WERE PERPETRATED BY COMMON CRIMINALS, AND OTHERS BY

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~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN WNIINTEL~~

PAGE:0529

NARCOTRAFFICKERS, BUT CRIMES WHICH CANNOT FAIL TO CARRY THE POSSIBILITY SOME OF THEM MAY HAVE BEEN EXECUTED BY CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATIONS OR MILITANTS TO FULFILL THEIR IDEOLOGICAL ENDS. THE OBJECTIVE OF THESE ACTS MAY BE TO OBTAIN ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO ENABLE POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTION. STANDING OUT AMONG THESE ACTIVITIES ARE THOSE CONDUCTED BY THE PROCUP-PDLP.

B. NUMBER 54 OF "EL PROLETARIO" (THE PROLETARIAT) PUBLISHED BY PROCUP-PDLP, LISTS THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVES:

- (1) THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE IS INCORPORATING THE MASSES INTO THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ITS FINAL GOAL: AS WELL AS TO STRENGTHEN ITS POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTION.
- (2) EACH ACT WHICH TAKES PLACE STEMS FROM THE NECESSITY AND CAPACITY TO DO SO' ALWAYS PRESERVING THE FORCES.
- (3) THE SECRET MILITARY STRATEGY IS TO KNOW HOW TO ATTACK AND RETREAT IN AN ORGANIZED FASHION, ALWAYS PRESERVING THE FORCES AND THE CAPACITY TO ATTACK AGAIN.
- (4) THE PARTY IS LIVING A NEW REALITY, STRIVING TO REACH A NEW ERA WITH THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
 - (A) ORGANIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
 - (B) REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE
 - (C) THE NEED TO BECOME A NATIONAL ALTERNATIVE
 - (D) THE INEVITABLE RECOGNITION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN MEXICO
 - (E) THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE PRESENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN MEXICO
 - (F) THE NEED TO GAIN STRENGTH THROUGH MILITARY ACTION
 - (G) THE NEED TO RAPIDLY ACQUIRES KNOWLEDGE OF THE MILITARY CAPACITY OF THE ENEMY
 - (H) THE STRENGTHENING OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROJECTION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

C. A VARIETY OF ARTICLES CRITICIZE AND MANIFEST INCONFORMITY WITH THE THIRD PRESIDENTIAL "STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS," AS WELL AS:

- (1) THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
- (2) THE STABILITY PACT AND PRONASOL
- (3) MODERNIZATION IN THE AGRARIAN SECTOR AND THE REFORMS TO THE 3D AND 130TH ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION
- (5) MODERNIZATION OF EDUCATION

D. THE MEANING OF THIS PUBLICATION:

- (1) THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF THIS ORGANIZATION IS TO AFFECT CAMPAIGNS, TO REORGANIZE ITS CELLS AND CONTINUE WITH ITS POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTION. WHAT STANDS OUT IS THE INTENT TO INFILTRATE THE UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENT AND THUS BE ABLE TO SPREAD ITS MOVEMENT, AS HAS ALREADY HAPPENED IN THE AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY OF BENITO JUAREZ IN OAXACA.
- (2) IT REITERATES ITS OPPOSITION TO THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS.
- (3) GIVEN THE PRECEDING, THE POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED THAT THE ATTACKS ON 9 AND 10 FEBRUARY 1992 AGAINST ELEMENTS OF THE 3D ARTILLERY REGIMENT IN TLACOLULA DE MATAMOROS, OAXACA [REDACTED] ARE RELATED TO THE DIRECTIVE PUBLISHED IN THE "EL PROLETARIO"

~~SECRET~~


~~NOFORN WNIINTEL~~

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~~NOFORN UNINTEL~~

PAGE:0530

E. AMONG THE CRIMES COMMITTED, THE FOLLOWING STAND OUT:

- (1) ASSAULTS PERPETRATED AGAINST POLICE UNITS.
 - (2) TRAINING CAMPS DISCOVERED IN THE STATE OF CHIAPAS: A BASE OF OPERATIONS IN SANTIAGO TANGAMANDAPIO, MICHOACAN: A BOMB THREAT AGAINST PEMEX REFINERIES IN SALINA CRUZ, OAXACA: AND AREAS OF PROCUP-PDLP INFLUENCE IN CHILPANCINGO AND ACAPULCO, GUERRERO, MORELIA, MICHOACAN, OAXACA, PUEBLA, AND TEHUACAN.
- 

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~~NOFORN WMINTEL~~

PAGE:0531

[REDACTED]

//IPSP: (U) PG 2250//.

//COMSOBJ: (U) 431//.

ADMIN

PROJ: (U).

INST: (U) US

PREP: (U)

ENCL: (U)

[REDACTED]

(S/NF/WM).

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED--~~S E C R E T~~ NOT RELEASABLE TO
~~FOREIGN NATIONALS SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS~~
~~INVOLVED.~~

~~DECL: OADR.~~

BT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0470

INQUIRE=DOC22D
ITEM NO=00194832

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX204 MCN = 93155/37119 TOR = 931552116
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS2194 1552116-~~CCCC~~--RUEALGX.
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

R 042116Z JUN 93
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUFQBBA/US SURVEY SHAPE BE
RUEOGWA/CDRUSARSO FT CLAYTON PM
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTCEN QUANTICO VA
RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUFTAKA/UCIRF AUGSBURG GE
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 042032Z JUN 93
[REDACTED]

TO DIA WASHDC

BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX); GUATEMALA (GT).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] MEXICAN MILITARY
OFFICER KILLED, TWO SOLDIERS WOUNDED IN
CONFRONTATION WITH GUATEMALAN-RELATED INSURGENCY
(U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0471

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~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 930523.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) A. [REDACTED]

B. "LA JORNADA" DAILY NEWSPAPER,
930527, A 21, CIRCULATION 40K,
LEFTIST.

SUMMARY: (U) ONE ARMY OFFICER WAS KILLED AND TWO SOLDIERS WERE WOUNDED DURING A CONFRONTATION WITH "TZELTAL" INDIANS AND GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS NEAR OCOSINGO, CHIAPAS, ON 930522 AND 930523.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ ONE ARMY OFFICER WAS KILLED AND TWO SOLDIERS WERE WOUNDED DURING A CONFRONTATION WITH "TZELTAL" INDIANS AND GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS NEAR OCOSINGO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CHIAPAS, ON 930522 AND 930523.

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ ON 930522, [REDACTED] MEMBERS OF THE 83D INFANTRY BATTALION WERE FIRED UPON BY INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE LOCATED IN THE JUNGLE CANOPY ON THE HILL BEING ATTACKED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE RESULT OF THIS ATTACK WAS THAT CORPORAL [REDACTED] WAS WOUNDED.

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE NEXT DAY, A LARGER ELEMENT FROM THE 83D INFANTRY BATTALION RETURNED TO SECURE THE AREA, AND WERE AGAIN FIRED UPON. THIS RESULTED IN 2LT [REDACTED] BEING KILLED, AND SGT [REDACTED] BEING WOUNDED.

4. ~~(C/NF)~~ AS A RESULT OF THE MILITARY ACTION, EIGHT MEXICANS AND TWO GUATEMALANS WERE APPREHENDED, ALONG WITH WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, THREE CIVILIAN RADIO TRANSCEIVERS, AS WELL AS SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA AND GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA TACTICS. IN ADDITION, UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION, THE ARMY DISCOVERED A COMPLETE CITY, CONSTRUCTED OF WOOD, WHICH THE GUERRILLAS UTILIZED FOR CONDUCTING SIMULATED ATTACKS. THE DETAINEES ARE ACCUSED OF HOMICIDE, ARMED ASSAULT, CRIMINAL ASSOCIATION, AND

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VIOLATION OF THE GENERAL LAW OF FIREARMS AND
EXPLOSIVES.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~



//IPSP: (U) PG 2420; PG 2250; PG 1550//.

//COMSOBJ: (U) 431; 511; 513//.

ADMIN

PROJ: (U)

COLL: (U) AB.

INSTR: (U) U.S. 

PREP: (U) 

ACQ: (U) 

DISSEM: (U) 

DCM, DCSD, DEA, NAS, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

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~~DECL: OADR~~

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VV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0001

INQUIRE=DOC22D
ITEM NO=00266788
ENVELOPE
CDSN = LGX847 MCN = 93165/24972 TOR = 931651947
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS5836 1651946-~~cccc~~--RUEALGX.
~~ZNY-cccc~~

HEADER

R 141946Z JUN 93
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEOGWA/CDRUSARSO FT CLAYTON PM
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTCEN QUANTICO VA
RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 141756Z JUN 93

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA//USDAO
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX); GUATEMALA (GT).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] /A CHIAPAS SENATOR
REQUESTS MORE MILITARY PRESENCE TO CURB GUERRILLA
ACTIVITY IN HIS STATE (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

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PAGE:0002

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 930609.
REQS: (U) [REDACTED]
SOURCE: (U) "EL NACIONAL," 930609, SEC A,
P.9, DAILY NEWSPAPER,
LLOK, DAILY CIRCULATION,
CONSIDERED NATIONALIST.

SUMMARY: (U) IN WHAT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED A GROUND-BREAKING REQUEST, BUT WHICH IS NOW MORE ROUTINE, A CHIAPAS SENATOR SUGGESTED MORE MILITARY PRESENCE TO CURB GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN HIS STATE.

TEXT: 1. (U) IN WHAT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED A GROUND-BREAKING REQUEST, BUT WHICH ARE NOW GENERAL REQUESTS FROM PUBLIC FIGURES, A CHIAPAS SENATOR HAS REQUESTED MILITARY INTERVENTION TO CURB GUATEMALAN URNG GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN HIS STATE.

2. (U) THE FOLLOWING IS AN INCOMPLETE TRANSLATION OF THE ARTICLE SOURCED ABOVE.

- TITLE-- "BETTER SECURITY AND VIGILANCE ON THE MEXICAN-GUATEMALAN BORDER."

- SUB-TITLE-- "REQUESTS THE SENATOR FROM CHIAPAS, ANTONIO MELGAR."

- TEXT-- "THE PRI SENATOR FROM CHIAPAS, ANTONIO ((MELGAR)) ARANDA, CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO REINFORCE THE CURRENT CAPABILITIES ALONG THE GUATEMALAN-MEXICAN BORDER TO AVOID THE EXPANDED INTRODUCTION OF GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS INTO MEXICO, WHICH PROVOKES INSTABILITY ON THE SOUTHERN BORDER, ALTHOUGH THE MILITARIZATION OF THE BORDER SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

"THE SENATOR, IN HIS ROLE AS PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTHERN BORDER ZONE COMMISSION, STATED THAT THE MILITARY MUST BE IMMEDIATELY READY TO GUARD MEXICAN NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND IMPEDE THE CAPABILITY OF GUATEMALAN CIVILIANS TO "...ENGAGE IN BELLICOSE ACTS... IN MEXICO."

"HE CONTINUED, STATING THAT IT IS, '...NOT DIFFICULT IN A ZONE AS DIFFICULT TO ACCESS AS THE AREA AROUND OCOSINGO, FULL OF MOUNTAINS AND WITH LIMITED LINES OF COMMUNICATION... TO BE INFILTRATED BY GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS.'

"MELGAR SAID THAT THE CITY (OCOSINGO) HAD

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PAGE:0003

RECEIVED LITTLE IN THE WAY OF CIVIC ACTION WORKS WHICH THE MILITARY TRADITIONALLY PROVIDED THROUGHOUT MEXICO.

"THE SOUTHERN BORDER MUST BE REINFORCED, NOT MILITARIZED, TO PROTECT NATIVE INDIGENOUS GROUPS FROM BECOMING PLACED IN DANGER BY THE GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS.

"FROM HIS PARTICULAR POINT OF VIEW, THE CHIAPAS LEGISLATOR SAID THAT IN AN AREA SUCH AS OCOSINGO, ALONG THE GUATEMALAN BORDER, WITH LARGE FORESTS AND MOUNTAINS, IT IS EASY TO LOSE THE DIVISIONS BETWEEN ONE COUNTRY AND ANOTHER, AND THE ... 'GUERRILLA CAN BELIEVE THEY ARE ACTING IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY.'

"MELGAR CLOSED BY SAYING THE LABORS OF THE MEXICAN MILITARY IN THE REGION ARE LARGELY SOCIAL IN NATURE, BUT WHEN INFORMATION IS OBTAINED THAT ARMED FOREIGNERS ARE PRESENT, THEY MUST AND DO ACT TO GUARD MEXICAN SOIL." END TEXT.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ THIS REQUEST COMES ON THE HEELS OF CONTROVERSIAL OPERATIONS IN HIS STATE BY THE MEXICAN MILITARY [REDACTED]. ALTHOUGH CONFRONTING GUERRILLAS IS A TRADITIONAL ROLE FOR THE MILITARY, THE PUBLIC REQUESTS FOR DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION ARE RARE, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE INCREASE MARGINALLY.

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ THIS PETITION FOLLOWS SIMILAR PUBLIC REQUESTS BY THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP FOR THE MILITARY IN EXPANDED ROLES IN SINALOA AND GUERRERO STATES. [REDACTED]

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ A NEW MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE ORGANIZED TO MEET THREATS TO CIVILIAN ORDER GIVES FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE MILITARY IS EXPANDING, AT CIVILIAN REQUEST, INTO NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES OF PUBLIC SECURITY. [REDACTED]

4. ~~(C/NF)~~ MELGAR'S STATEMENTS ARE WELL TIMED. HE MAY HAVE BEEN CHOSEN TO PROVIDE PUBLIC PRI SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY IN THIS CASE, AS LINES ARE ALREADY BEING DRAWN BETWEEN THE MILITARY, INDIGENOUS GROUPS, AND CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS OVER THE CONDUCT OF THE MISSION IN CHIAPAS OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS.

5. ~~(C/NF)~~ GUATEMALA HAS CONFIRMED THE POSSIBILITY OF GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS VIA THEIR SOURCES, STATING THAT THE URNG LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN "IN CONTACT WITH" A MEXICAN GUERRILLA GROUP IN THE AREA. THIS MEXICAN GUERRILLA HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED

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PAGE:0004

AS THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FZLN).

[REDACTED]

ADMIN

PROJ: (U)

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U)

DCM, DCSD, OPAD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL - NOT RELEASABLE~~

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~~DECL. OADR~~

BT

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PAGE:0462

INQUIRE=DOC22D
ITEM NO=00266800

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX863 MCN = 93165/25131 TOR = 931651950
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS5883 1651950-~~CCCC~~--RUEALGX.
ZNY ~~CCCC~~

HEADER

R 141950Z JUN 93
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEOGWA/CDRUSARSO FT CLAYTON PM
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTCEN QUANTICO VA
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 141801Z JUN 93

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA//USDAO
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04

~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX); GUATEMALA (GT).

SUBJECT: IIR MEXICAN DEFENSE
SECRETARIAT QUIET ON CHIAPAS OPERATIONS (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -
~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0463

DOI: (U) 930522-930609.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) A. [REDACTED]

- B. DEFENSE SECRETARIAT PRESS BULLETIN, 930603, IN SPANISH.
- C. "LA JORNADA," DAILY, 930601, 930602, 930603, 930607, 930608, CIRCULATION 40K; LEFTIST.
- D. "EXCELSIOR," DAILY, 930601, CIRCULATION LLOK; NATIONALIST.
- E. "EL UNIVERSAL," DAILY, 930606, CIRCULATION LLOK; NATIONALIST.
- F. "PROCESO," WEEKLY, 930607, CIRCULATION UKN, LEFT CENTRIST, PP. 18-21.

SUMMARY: (U) THE DEFENSE SECRETARIAT MAINTAINS A CURIOUS SILENCE ON OPERATIONS CONDUCTED OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS AGAINST GUERRILLAS IN CHIAPAS. TO DATE, THE MILITARY HAS ONLY ADMITTED LIGHT CASUALTIES AND CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS IN THE REGION.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE DEFENSE SECRETARIAT MAINTAINS A CURIOUS, YET PREDICTABLE, SILENCE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS CONDUCTED OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS AGAINST POSSIBLE GUERRILLAS IN CHIAPAS. TO DATE, THE MILITARY HAS ONLY PUBLICLY ADMITTED TO LIGHT CASUALTIES AND THE COMPLETION OF CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS IN THE REGION.

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ ON 930522, A MEXICAN ARMY CORPORAL WAS WOUNDED, AFTER BEING FIRED UPON [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE FOLLOWING DAY, 930523, THE BATTALION WHO HAD LOST THE SOLDIER, THE 83RD INFANTRY FROM SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS

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[REDACTED] CHIAPAS RETURNED TO THE SAME AREA, THIS TIME TO "SECURE" THE AREA, AND WERE AGAIN FIRED UPON, LOSING ONE OFFICER AND WOUNDING ANOTHER ENLISTED MAN. (CITE IIR [REDACTED] FOR FURTHER DETAILS.)

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE SITUATION BEGAN, AND AFTER CONTROL OF THE NEWS OF THE EVENTS SEEMED TO BE SLIPPING AWAY, THE SECRETARIAT OF DEFENSE ISSUED A PRESS BULLETIN (REFERENCE B). IT HIGHLIGHTED THE COMPLETION OF A CIVIC ACTION PROJECT, WHICH HAPPENED TO BE COLOCATED IN THE AREA IN WHICH THE ARMED CLASHES HAD TAKEN PLACE. REPORTED RESULTS INCLUDE--

2,196 MEDICAL APPOINTMENTS

387 DENTAL APPOINTMENTS

144 TOOTH EXTRACTIONS

568 VACCINATIONS

47 MINOR SURGERIES

48 ACTIVITIES PROMOTING GOOD HEALTH PRACTICES

240 CARPENTRY PROJECTS

36 ENGINEERING PROJECTS

12 REPAIRS OF HOME APPLIANCES

360 SQUARE METERS OF PAINTING

561 HAIRCUTS.

FINALLY, THE DESTRUCTION OF FOUR MARIJUANA FIELDS AND CAPTURE OF 57 ARMS WAS INCLUDED IN THE CIVIC ACTION REPORT.

[REDACTED]

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PAGE:0465

[REDACTED]

4. ~~(CONF)~~ BY THE TIME THE DEFENSE RELEASE WAS PUBLISHED, THE PGR HAD OFFERED A REPORT ON THE SITUATION NEAR THE "PATATE VIEJO" COMMUNAL FARM, LOCAL "RICH CATTLEMEN" HAD SAID THAT MANY OF THE LOCAL NATIVE FARMERS WERE ENGAGED IN HELPING THE FOREIGN GUERRILLAS, THE COMMUNAL FARMERS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVE UNIONS HAD COMPLAINED TO THE PRESIDENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, SIX INDIGENOUS FARMERS AND TWO GUATEMALAN CIVILIANS HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF MURDER/ILLEGAL ARMS POSSESSION/TREASON, AND THE MILITARY HAD DEPLOYED OVER A THOUSAND TROOPS TO THE AREA.

5. (U) IN THE FIRST CASE CITED IN PARA 4-- A PGR REPORT ON A CONTACT IN THE PATATE VIEJO COMMUNAL FARM-- THE PGR HAD CONFISCATED VARIOUS ARMS, AMMUNITION, RADIOS, AND GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA PAMPHLETS.

6. (U) THE SECOND POINT OF PARA 4-- IN WHICH CATTLEMEN SAID THAT LOCAL COMMUNAL FARMERS HAD BEEN SEEN WITH GUERRILLAS-- A LOCAL CATTLEMEN'S ASSOCIATION REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT 70-140 GUERRILLAS WERE TRAINING MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENT RURAL ALLIANCE EMILIANO ZAPATA (ANCIEZ) IN THIS AREA. THE COMMUNAL FARMS OF VENUSTIANO CARRANZA, LA GRANDEZA, GUADALUPE VICTORIA, MORELIA, CARDENAS, SAN MIGUEL CHULTIC, AND PUEBLA WERE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED BY THE OFFICIAL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE ANCIEZ ARRIVED IN 1991 AND HAS CURRENTLY ORGANIZED ABOUT HALF OF THE LOCAL COMMUNAL FARMS UNDER ITS AUSPICES.

7. (U) IN THE THIRD CASE, LOCAL NATIVE FARMERS COMPLAINED OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. THE OFFICIAL VERSION STATES THAT THESE FARMERS WERE "INTERCEPTED" WITH ARMS. THE SIX MEXICANS AND TWO GUATEMALANS WERE FORMALLY CHARGED ON 930605. THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE:0466

NATIVE REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT THE ARRESTS ONLY CAME AFTER THE INHABITANTS OF COMMUNAL FARMS NEAR ALTAMIRANO, CHIAPAS, HAD BEEN ROUNDED UP, ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL INDIGENOUS UNIONS. THE FOURTH CASE, THE FORMAL CHARGING OF THE ARRESTED "PRESUMED GUERRILLAS," IS BASED ON FIRM EVIDENCE, ACCORDING TO THE CATTLEMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS, THE MILITARY, AND THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.

8. (U) FINALLY, IN THE FIFTH AREA OF INTEREST-- EXTENSIVE MILITARY DEPLOYMENT TO THE AREA-- THE MILITARY IS SAID TO HAVE EXPANDED THE BATTALION LEVEL OPERATION (WHATEVER ITS ORIGINAL INTENT MAY HAVE BEEN) INTO AN EXERCISE AND CONFRONTATION USING OVER TWO THOUSAND TROOPS, LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES, HELICOPTER BOMBING SUPPORT, AND INFILTRATION OF PARACHUTE TROOPS INTO HARD TO ACCESS AREAS IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. IN THE MIXED AND CONFUSING REPORTING FROM THE VARIOUS SOURCES OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE, THE FOLLOWING TIMELINE CAN BE ROUGHLY DEFINED.

930514 83D IN BN BEGINS EXERCISES IN THE AREA
930522 ONE SOLDIER WOUNDED DURING EXERCISE
930523 83D IN BN EXPANDS OPERATIONS
LOSES ONE OFFICER KIA AND ONE SOLDIER WIA
930525 MILITARY ARRIVES AT PATATE VIEJO FARM
SEVERAL PERSONS ARRESTED FOR MURDER/TREASON
MILITARY RIGHTS ABUSES AT LAGUNA DEL CARMEN
930526 TZELTAL INDIANS FLEE INTO HILLS
MILITARY SEARCHES EL VOLCAN FOR GUERRILLAS
24TH ACR OCCUPIES FARMS WITH 60 VEHICLES
PARACHUTISTS LAND IN LA GRANDEZA
ARMY SAYS SIX "G" TRAINING BASES DISCOVERED
GUERRILLAS MOVE TO CAVES, LARGE SCALE
MILITARY OPERATION TO DISLODGE THEM
BEGINS
930603 MILITARY CIVIC ACTION MISSION ENDS
930605 DEFENSE/PGR ADMIT LONG TERM KNOWLEDGE OF
GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN CHIAPAS
930606 ARRESTED "G" FORMALLY CHARGED
930607 STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE CONDUCTS
COINCIDENTAL OPERATIONS IN WHICH A LARGE
NUMBER OF ARMS WERE CONFISCATED
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS GROUPS ACCUSE LOCAL
POLICE OF RIGHTS ABUSES.
930609 MILITARY OPERATIONS CONTINUE.

[REDACTED]

9. ~~(C/NF)~~ OF INTEREST ARE THE ALLEDGED TIES BETWEEN THE GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS CAPTURED AND THE PROCUP-PDLD. REPORTEDLY, IN SOME OF THE COMMUNAL FARMS IN THE AREA, THE LOCAL INDIANS HAD STUDIED OR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0467

BEEN PRESENTED WITH A PROCUP CALL-TO-ARMS FROM 1991
(CITE IIR [REDACTED] AND HAD BEEN
"INDOCTRINATED," ACCORDING TO LOCAL RANCHERS. THE
NATURE OF THE TIES BETWEEN THE URNG AND THE PROCUP-
PDLD HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED AS YET. [REDACTED]

2. (C/NF) [REDACTED] THE ONLY DEFENSE PRESS
RELEASE SO FAR IN JUNE IS THE COMBINED CIVIC ACTION
AND DRUG ERADICATION MIXED REPORT, REFERENCE 2.
THIS RELEASE IS INCONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS CIVIC
ACTION BULLETINS. IF IT IS AN ATTEMPT TO LOWER
REPORTING ON THE SUBJECT, IT HAS NOT MET ITS GOAL;
IT HAS SERVED TO FURTHER CONFUSE AN ALREADY
CONFUSING ISSUE. AS "EXCELSIOR," A NATIONALIST
PUBLICATION SUPPORTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS
OFFICIAL ARMS, SUCH AS THE DEFENSE COMMUNITY, HAS
PUT IT, "...A GREAT HERMETIC SECRECY EXISTS AMONG
THOSE HIGH MILITARY CHIEFS WHO HAVE VISITED THE
REGION."

3. (C/NF) [REDACTED]

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CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

PAGE:0469

//IPSP: (U) PG 2420; PG 2250; PG 1550//.

//COMSOBJ: (U) 431; 511; 513//.

ADMIN

PROJ: (U)

COLL: (U) AB.

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

DCM, DCSD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOT RELEASABLE
TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

~~DECL: OADR~~

BT

#5886

NNNN

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~~NOFORN~~

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE:0412

INQUIRE=DOC23D
ITEM NO=00639811

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX302 MCN = 93289/04682 TOR = 932890242
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS0704 2890239-~~CCCC~~--RUEALGX.
ZNY ~~CCCC~~

HEADER

R 160239Z OCT 93
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUCEAAM/HQ NORAD INTEL CEN CHEYENNE MTN AFB CO//J2V//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 152231Z OCT 93

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX//
RUWANGD/CJTF FIVE
RUWANTX/CJTF SIX
RUEABNE/COGARD LO EPIC EL PASO TX
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] MEXICAN ARMED FORCES
INVOLVED IN HIGHEST VOLUME CAPTURE OF COCAINE IN SEVERAL
YEARS (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE:0413

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 931005.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) A. "EL NACIONAL," NATIONALIST DAILY,
IN SPANISH, 931005, SEC A, P 15.
B. "LA JORNADA," LEFTIST DAILY,
IN SPANISH, 931005, P23.
C. "LA JORNADA," LEFTIST DAILY,
IN SPANISH, 931006, P16.

SUMMARY: (U) THE MEXICAN NAVY, ARMY, AIR FORCE, AND
ELEMENTS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE CAPTURED 8,798
KILOS OF COCAINE IN MAZATLAN AND IN OCOSINGO, CHIAPAS.
THIS IS THE LARGEST CAPTURE IN SEVERAL YEARS.

TEXT: 1. (U) THE MEXICAN NAVY, ARMY, AIR FORCE, AND
ELEMENTS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE CAPTURED 8,798
KILOS OF COCAINE EN MAZATLAN AND IN OCOSINGO, CHIAPAS.
THIS IS THE LARGEST CAPTURE IN SEVERAL YEARS.

2. (U) ON 931003, THE NAVY AND PGR ELEMENTS CAPTURED
8,798 KILOS OF COCAINE NEAR MAZATLAN, SINALOA, MEXICO. A
SHIPPING BOAT, "DANIEL TORRES," WAS BOARDED AT 1500 BY
PJF AND NAVY MEN AND DISCOVERED 268 PACKETS WITH 200
KILOS OF COCAINE. LATER THAT NIGHT THE NAVY, DURING THE
ROUTINE INVESTIGATION OF THE "MARDOQUEO" FISHING BOAT,
DISCOVERED 92 PACKETS WITH 2,098 KILOS OF COCAINE.
FIFTEEN PERSONS WERE DETAINED.

3. (U) LATER THAT DAY THE PJF AND ELEMENTS OF THE
MEXICAN DEFENSE INTERCEPTION GENERAL DIRECTORATE CAPTURED
500 MORE AIR DROPPED KILOS OF COCAINE.

4. (U) IN RELATED INCIDENTS, THE SECNAV ANNOUNCED A
MARIJUANA FIELD DESTRUCTION WHICH ENCOMPASSED 10,000
SQUARE METERS.

5. (U) ADDITIONALLY, ACCOUNTS IN SOURCE B STRESSED THAT
THE MEXICAN ARMY IN CHIAPAS HAD CAUSED GREAT FEAR AMONG
LOCAL TZELTAL INDIANS [REDACTED] ON 930522, THE
ARMY, WHO WAS REPORTEDLY CONDUCTING A SIMILAR CN
OPERATION, WAS FIRED UPON BY "FORTY UNKNOWN PERSONS,"
LATER IDENTIFIED BY THE ARMY AS GUATEMALAN AND MEXICAN
SUBVERSIVES. AFTER CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES, THE
MILITARY SHIPPED IN OVER 3,000 SOLDIERS. GUERRILLA BASE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0414

CAMPS WERE SOON DISCOVERED AND SOME SUSPECTED GUERRILLAS ARRESTED. CITE IIR [REDACTED] FOR GREATER DETAILS AND A TIMELINE ON THE PREVIOUS OPERATION.) IN THIS INSTANCE THE ARMY ARRIVED BY HELICOPTER BEGINNING AT 1600, 931002, AT LA GARRUCHA, SAN MIGUEL, PATIHUITZ, EL ROSARIO, AND LA ESTRELLA-- THE EXACT AREA WHERE THE PREVIOUS OPERATION TOOK PLACE. OVER 500 MEN ARRIVED AND BEGAN SEARCHES OF THE SURROUNDING AREA. FROM 1800, 931003 UNTIL 0100, 931004, HELICOPTERS BOMBED AND SEARCHED THE AREA AROUND OCOSINGO THEN LANDED AT EL ROSARIO; THREE HELICOPTERS AND ONE SMALL PLANE (PROBABLY AN ARAVA) PARTICIPATED. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF CIVILIAN HARRASMENT, AND BY 931005 THE MILITARY HAD LEFT. UNNAMED MILITARY SOURCES SAID THAT A PGR AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN FIRED ON, CAUSING THE ARMY'S INVOLVEMENT. THERE WERE NO DETENTIONS, BUT THE MENTIONED 500 KILOS WERE CAPTURED. THE COMMANDER OF THE 31ST MILITARY ZONE, IN THE VII MILITARY REGION, MG GASTON ((MENCHACA)) ARIAS, STATED THAT THE OPERATION HAD ULTIMATELY NETED 7,112 KILOS OF COCAINE, TWO PICK UP TRUCKS DURING THE JOINT OPERATION WITH THE PGR.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

//IPSP: (U) PG 2550//.

//COMSOBJ: (U) 511//.

ADMIN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0415

PROJ: (U) .

COLL: (U) .

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

DCSD, DEA, OPAD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN

~~NATIONALS.~~

~~DECL: OADR~~

BT

#0705

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~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0070

INQUIRE=DOC24D
ITEM NO=00649314
DTG

042050Z JAN 94

(b)(2)

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN

(b)(2)

SERIAL: (U) IIR

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT); MEXICO (MX).

(b)(2)

SUBJECT: IIR /MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN
PRESIDENTS DISCUSS THE INDIGENOUS UPRISING IN CHIAPAS (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940103.

REQS: (U)

(b)(2)

SOURCE: (U)

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NF)~~ THE PRESIDENTS OF MEXICO AND GUATEMALA
CONVERSED BY PHONE ABOUT THE UPRISING IN CHIAPAS. THE
MEXICAN PRESIDENT REPORTEDLY STATED THAT THERE ARE SIGNS
OF URNG INVOLVEMENT WITH THE EZLN. THIS COULD PROVIDE
PRESIDENT SALINAS A CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY TO PUT PRESSURE
ON THE URNG.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~

~~(C/NF)~~ DURING THE EVENING OF 3
JANUARY, MEXICAN PRESIDENT ((SALINAS)) CALLED PRESIDENT
((DE LEON)) TO TALK ABOUT THE SITUATION IN CHIAPAS.
PRESIDENT SALINAS TOLD DE LEON THAT
THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT HAD VARIOUS INDICATORS THAT THERE
WAS URNG "INVOLVEMENT" IN THIS INDIGENOUS UPRISING.

(b)(1)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

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(b)(1)

1881 [REDACTED]

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED] PRESIDENT DE LEON OFFERED PRESIDENT SALINAS HELP IN TERMS OF PERSONNEL KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT URNG ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS. [REDACTED] THE OFFER WAS ACCEPTED BY PRESIDENT SALINAS AND THAT A TEAM COMPOSED OF CIVILIANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL WOULD DEPART FOR MEXICO CITY TODAY (4 JANUARY). [REDACTED] THIS TEAM OF "URNG EXPERTS" WOULD BE LED BY LTCOL EDGAR RICARDO ((BUSTAMANTE)) FIGUEROA, CHIEF OF PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY, [REDACTED] ONE OF THEIR BEST ANALYTICAL MINDS CONCERNING THE URNG. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED] PRESIDENT DE LEON'S ADVISERS RECOMMENDED TO DE LEON, FOLLOWING THE SALINAS PHONE CALL, THAT HE MAKE A QUICK TRIP TO MEXICO CITY TO CONFER WITH SALINAS OVER ISSUES RELATED TO THEIR COMMON BORDER. [REDACTED] A VISIT BY PRESIDENT DE LEON IS ALREADY PLANNED FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY BUT THAT HIS ADVISERS, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, ARE ENCOURAGING THE PRESIDENT TO GO NOW AS THIS WOULD BE AN IDEAL OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

(b)(1)

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SECRET

SI [REDACTED]
NOFORN

PAGE:7419

INQUIRE=DOC24D
ITEM NO=00658861
ENVELOPE
PATMZYUW YEKDQA 0244 0052053-MORN--YEKDQX

ZNY MMORN
ZKZK PP SOA DE
HEADER
P 052100Z JAN 94
FM SSO DIA//NMJIC//
TO RASIL
ADHOR
AHSOD
AINOZ
AKONS
AZHIR
DIRNSA//N5//
ZEM
CONTROLS
~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] NOFORN
QQQQ
SECTION 01 OF 04
[REDACTED] PASS TO DAO

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE FORECAST (WIF), 05 JAN 94 (U)

////////////////////
(U) STRATEGIC WARNING ISSUES FOR THE COMING WEEK.

NOTE: THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE WARNING STAFF AND ON OCCASION THE VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL WARNING STAFF, US MILITARY SERVICES INTELLIGENCE STAFFS, AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS OF ALLIED NATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE DOD WARNING SYSTEM CONCERNING POTENTIAL THREATS TO U.S./ALLIED INTERESTS. THE ALLIED INPUTS MIGHT NOT REFLECT DIA OR DOD JUDGEMENTS BUT ARE INCLUDED TO GIVE CONSUMERS AN APPRECIATION OF A RANGE OF VIEWS ON THE ISSUES. THESE ANALYSES DO NOT NECESSARILY FORECAST MOST LIKELY OUTCOMES, BUT SEEK TO IDENTIFY POTENTIALLY HARMFUL EFFECTS WHICH COULD ARISE FROM DEVELOPING SITUATIONS. THE FOLLOWING AREAS ARE COVERED IN THIS REPORT:

- A. MEXICO
- B. SOMALIA
- C. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
- D. CAMBODIA
- E. IVORY COAST
- F. NIGERIA
- G. OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN
- H. LATENT WARNING ISSUE - CHINA-HONG KONG
- A. MEXICO - DIA/DIWS ASSESSMENT

~~(CONF)~~ FURTHER INSURRECTIONIST VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO OCCUR IN SOUTHERN MEXICO IN THE COMING MONTHS.

SECRET

SI [REDACTED]
NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

~~SI~~ [REDACTED]
NOFORN

PAGE:7420

-- THE 1 JANUARY INCIDENT DEMONSTRATED HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL PLANNING, LEADERSHIP, AND OPERATIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE REBEL ZAPATA ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (EZLN) THAT TOOK CONTROL OF FOUR TOWNS IN CHIAPAS.

-- THE REBELS ARE PROBABLY OPERATING FROM SANCTUARIES ALONG THE GUATEMALA-MEXICO BORDER. THEIR SOURCES OF FUNDING AND EQUIPMENT ARE NOT KNOWN.

-- THE PERVASIVE POVERTY IN THE REGION WILL PROBABLY PROVIDE THE REBEL CADRE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR INCITING THE LOCAL PEASANTRY TO FURTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE.

~~(C/NF)~~ WHILE THE INSURGENTS ARE NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO FACE THE MEXICAN ARMY, NEITHER IS THE ARMY CAPABLE OF ERADICATING THE REBELS IN HIDING. THE GOVERNMENT WILL SEEK TO RESTRAIN THE ARMY TO AVOID LOCAL COMPLAINTS OF ARMY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE. A STAND-OFF WITH RECURRING VIOLENCE COULD FRIGHTEN FOREIGN INVESTORS AND EMBARRASS THE GOVERNMENT, AFFECTING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN AUGUST. THE GOVERNMENT WILL BEEF UP SECURITY IN THE REGION, AND COULD BE TEMPTED INTO REPRESSIVE TACTICS.

B. SOMALIA - [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~

C. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA - DIA/DIWS ASSESSMENT

~~(C/NF)~~ THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA AND IN THE KRAJINA MAY INTENSIFY THIS SPRING, ESPECIALLY IF KEY MEMBERS OF THE UN PROTECTION FORCE (UNPROFOR) ELECT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OPERATION.

-- BRITAIN AND CANADA ARE REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING WITHDRAWAL FROM UNPROFOR AND MIXED SIGNALS FROM PARIS SUGGESTS THE FRENCH ARE ALSO THINKING ABOUT PULLING OUT.

-- WITH NO END IN SIGHT TO THE CONFLICT AND CIVILIAN PARTICIPANTS IN RELIEF OPERATIONS CONTINUOUSLY EXPOSED TO LIFE-THREATENING SITUATIONS, THE UNHCR COULD COME UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO SUSPEND OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA.

~~SECRET~~

~~SI~~ [REDACTED]
NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

~~SI~~ [REDACTED]
NOFORN

PAGE:7421

~~(C/NF)~~ AS SPRING APPROACHES AND FIGHTING AMONG THE WARRING FACTIONS INCREASES, THE DANGER TO MEMBERS OF BOTH THE UNHCR AND UNPROFOR WILL RISE.

[REDACTED]

E. IVORY COAST - DIA/DIWS ASSESSMENT

~~(C)~~ FOREIGN REFUGEES ARE BEING BLAMED FOR THE CONTINUED

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

DETERIORATION OF THE IVOIRIAN ECONOMY THAT MAY ULTIMATELY LEAD TO ETHNIC VIOLENCE.

-- THE ECONOMY IS CURRENTLY MARKED BY PUBLIC-SECTOR SALARY ARREARS, LABOR STRIKES, AND PLANTATION ABANDONMENT.

-- THE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING FISCAL SITUATION WILL BE AGGRAVATED BY THE LOOMING REDUCTION IN FRENCH BUDGET SUPPORT AND PRESIDENT BEDIES ECONOMIC REFORMS.

-- THE UNDERPAID, UNDERTRAINED, AND POORLY EQUIPPED IVOIRIAN POLICE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE DIFFICULTY IN STEMMING ANY LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE AND WOULD REQUIRE AUGMENTATION FROM THE MILITARY.

~~(C)~~ IVOIRIANS HAVE TRADITIONALLY BLAMED THE PRESENCE OF NON-IVOIRIAN AFRICANS (ESPECIALLY FROM BURKINA FASO AND GUINEA) IN THEIR COUNTRY FOR THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WOES. AS ECONOMIC DETERIORATION CONTINUES, IVOIRIANS WILL PROBABLY BEGIN BLAMING THE FOREIGN POPULATION, WHICH WILL IN TURN PROBABLY LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN THE ETHNIC TENSIONS ALREADY SHARPENED BY THE LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES SEEKING FROM THE CONFLICTS IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE.

F. NIGERIA

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SI~~ [REDACTED]
NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

SI [REDACTED]
NOFORN

PAGE:7422

G. OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN

AFGHANISTAN - DIA/DIWS ASSESSMENT

~~(S)~~ OFFICIAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION RELIEF WORKERS IN AFGHANISTAN MAY BE AT INCREASED RISK AS INTERNECINE FIGHTING SPREADS. BATTLES HAVE BEEN RAGING IN KABUL FOR SEVERAL DAYS, COMBAT HAS ERUPTED IN SEVERAL OTHER CITIES, AND FIGHTING MAY SPREAD TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, THEREBY THREATENING RESUMPTION OF A FULL-SCALE CIVIL WAR.

ALBANIA - [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~

H. LATENT WARNING ISSUE

CHINA-HONG KONG - DIA/DGWS ASSESSMENT

~~(S)~~ SINO-BRITISH ACRIMONY OVER THE FUTURE OF THE COLONY IS LIKELY TO DEEPEN IN THE COMING WEEKS.

-- THE HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL WILL BE TAKING UP POLITICAL REFORM PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE GOVERNOR IN PREPARATION FOR THE FALL 1994 ELECTIONS.

-- THE GOVERNOR IS PROPOSING TO INSTITUTIONALIZE POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION MEASURES WHICH HE HOPES WILL SURVIVE THE TRANSITION OF THE COLONY TO CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY IN JULY 1997.

-- BEIJING SEES THESE EFFORTS AS A THREAT THAT COULD CREATE PRESSURES FOR POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN CHINA ITSELF. THE CHINESE HAVE BROKEN OFF TALKS WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS REFERRED TO AN OLD OBSERVATION BY DENG THAT CHINA MIGHT TAKE CONTROL

~~SECRET~~

SI [REDACTED]
NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

~~SI~~ [REDACTED]
NOFORN

PAGE:7423

OF THE COLONY BEFORE 1997 UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.

~~(C)~~ BEIJING WILL RESIST THE EMPLACEMENT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC
STRUCTURES/INSTITUTIONS IN HONG KONG. POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC
RESISTANCE WILL BE USED BY CHINA TO SLOW THEIR ENACTMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION. NONETHELESS, LARGE NUMBERS OF WORKERS CROSS INTO THE
COLONY DAILY WHO COULD BE A SOURCE OF "DISORDER" SHOULD BEIJING FEEL
IT NECESSARY TO RESORT TO BRINKMANSHIP BY THREATENING INTERVENTION.

////////////////////////////////////
DIA POINTS OF CONTACT: CHIEF ANALYSIS BRANCH WARNING DIVISION,
J-2 [REDACTED]

ADMIN

~~DECL~~ ~~OADR~~
#0248

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~SI~~ [REDACTED]
NOFORN

VV

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE:7202

INQUIRE=DOC24D
ITEM NO=00680716

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX542 MCN = 94007/39344 TOR = 940072348
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS1901 0072352-~~SSSS~~--RUEALGX.

ZNY ~~SSSSS~~

HEADER

P 072352Z JAN 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC
RULSJGI/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 072347Z JAN 94

[REDACTED]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
INFO RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2//
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCGSRB/CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFIN-IC//

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT); MEXICO (MX).

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN MILITARY
LIAISON (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

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PAGE:7203

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940106-940107.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: A. (U) [REDACTED]

B. (S/NF) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: (S/NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GT ARMY CHIEF MEETS WITH MEXICAN GENERAL AND DISCUSSES POSSIBLE EZLN ATTEMPTS TO SEEK SANCTUARY INSIDE GT. MEXICAN MILITARY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR IMAGE IN AFTERMATH OF CHIAPAS UPRISING.

TEXT: 1. (S/NF) [REDACTED]

2. (S/NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE MEXICAN MILITARY IS CONCERNED THAT RETREATING EZLN (ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY) FORCES WILL ATTEMPT TO CROSS THE MEXICAN GUATEMALAN FRONTIER WITH THE INTENTION OF FINDING "SANCTUARY" IN THE PLAYA GRANDE REGION OF NORTHERN QUICHE DEPARTMENT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE EZLN FORCES WOULD THEN ATTEMPT TO BLEND IN WITH BOTH THE GUATEMALAN EGP'S (GUERRILLA ARMY OF THE POOR) FORCES CURRENTLY ACTIVE IN THIS REGION AS WELL AS THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITIES IN POPULAR RESISTANCE (CPR) ALSO LOCATED IN THIS AREA.

3. (S/NF) [REDACTED] A MEETING TOOK PLACE BETWEEN MEXICAN GENERAL ((GODINEZ)) AND GT ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, MAJOR GENERAL JOSE LUIS ((QUILO)) AYUSO, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE (D-2) AND DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (D-3) OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STAFF AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF MILITARY ZONE 22 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE PURPOSE OF THE

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MEETING, [REDACTED] WAS TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR RESPECTIVE INSURGENCIES. [REDACTED] THE GUATEMALAN DELEGATION WAS INFORMED OF MEXICAN SUSPICIONS THAT EZLN ELEMENTS MAY ATTEMPT TO SEEK SANCTUARY IN THE PLAYA GRANDE REGION. [REDACTED] THIS MAY LEAD TO A GT ARMY REINFORCEMENT OF THE BORDER REGION. [REDACTED]

4. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] THE MEXICAN MILITARY HAS NO INFORMATION AS OF YET AS TO WHERE THE EZLN GETS ITS FINANCIAL SUPPORT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IT APPEARS AS THOUGH THE EZLN LEADERSHIP UTILIZED INDIAN PEASANTS AS "CANNON FODDER" AND THE MANY DEATHS (NFI) ON THE PART OF THESE PEASANTS AT THE HANDS OF THE MEXICAN MILITARY WILL HARM THE IMAGE OF THE MEXICAN ARMY.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]


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PAGE:7205



ADMIN

PROJ: (U).

COLL: (U) AH.

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

~~DECL. OADR~~

BT

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~~REL UK CAN AUS~~

PAGE:7100

INQUIRE=DOC24D
ITEM NO=00700955

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX153 MCN = 94010/15284 TOR = 940101553
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS9561 0101555-~~CCCC~~--RUEALGX.
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

O 101555Z JAN 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RULSJGI/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 101550Z JAN 94

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX/INM-FOR GELBARD// IMMEDIATE
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL// IMMEDIATE
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA//USDAO GUATEMALA CITY GT
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2// IMMEDIATE
RHGCSR/BC/CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2/AFIN-IC// IMMEDIATE
RUCBCLF/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2// IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 [REDACTED]

~~REL TO UK, CAN, AUS~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX); GUATEMALA (GT);
EL SALVADOR (ES).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] MEXICAN NAVY PERSPECTIVE

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PAGE:7101

ON CHIAPAS GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES (U).

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CLASSIFIED - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~RELEASABLE TO UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA,~~
~~AUSTRALIA.~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940105.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: A. (U) [REDACTED]
B. (U) DAILY NEWSPAPER, "LA JORNADA",
880727, MEXICO CITY, IN SPANISH;
C. (U) NEWSPAPER, "EL SOL DE MEDIO DIA",
880726, MEXICO CITY, IN SPANISH.

SUMMARY: ~~(C/REL UK,CAN,AUS)~~ [REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/REL UK,CAN,AUS)~~ THE MEXICAN NAVY,
THOUGH NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE
ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY GUERRILLAS IN THE
STATE OF CHIAPAS, MEXICO, IS CLOSELY MONITORING ALL
OPERATIONS [REDACTED] THE
NAVY IS ALSO INCREASING ITS VIGILANCE OF LITTORAL AND
INLAND RIVER AREAS UNDER THEIR JURISDICTIONAL CONTROL.
THEIR PERSPECTIVE, INSIGHTS AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE FOLLOWS.

2. ~~(C/REL UK,CAN,AUS)~~ [REDACTED]

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B. [REDACTED]

C. SINCE IT IS EASY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MEXICAN, GUATEMALAN AND EL SALVADORAN ACCENTS, OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT ACCENTS HEARD [REDACTED] DURING MEDIA INTERVIEWS WERE FREQUENTLY THOSE OF NON-MEXICANS. THIS, COMBINED WITH THE SOPHISTICATION OF THE RADIO TERMINOLOGY, REINFORCES THEIR BELIEF THAT SOME OF THE GUERRILLAS ARE FORMER FOREIGN MILITARY MEMBERS NOW ACTING IN A MERCENARY ROLE.

3. ~~(C/REL UK,CAN,AUS)~~ [REDACTED]

A. THE GUERRILLAS GREATLY UNDERESTIMATED THE ABILITY OF THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES TO REACT RAPIDLY AND EFFICIENTLY IN COMMITTING ADDITIONAL UNITS AND ASSETS. THEY ALSO DID NOT ANTICIPATE THE ARMY'S MOBILITY IN THE ZONE OF OPERATIONS.

B. THE GUERRILLAS EXPECTED THE PEOPLE TO RISE UP AND SUPPORT THEM, BUT IT NEVER HAPPENED. TO THE CONTRARY, THEY NOT ONLY ALIENATED THE LOCALS, BUT DROVE SOME TO RISE UP AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS. [REDACTED]

C. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF GUERRILLA SPOKESMEN WHO APPEARED IN FRONT OF THE MEDIA, MOST GUERRILLAS WERE POORLY ARMED WITH SHOTGUNS AND .22-CALIBER RIFLES. THEIR LACK OF TRAINING NEVER PREPARED THEM FOR FIREPOWER AVAILABLE TO THE ARMY; THE WEAPONS THEY CARRIED WERE RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE WHEN CONFRONTED BY ARMY UNITS. HOW COULD THEY POSSIBLY EXPECT TO IMPRESS LOCAL INHABITANTS, MUCH LESS TAKE ON THE ARMY?

4. ~~(REL UK,CAN,AUS)~~ MEXICAN ARMY:

A. THE ARMY HAS NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE FROM THE MEXICAN NAVY, NOR HAVE THEY NEEDED IT. [REDACTED]


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B. BOTH THE ARMY, AND FOR THAT MATTER, THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO, ARE STILL CONCERNED WITH THE ARMY'S PUBLIC IMAGE AFTER THE 1968 TLATELOLCO MASSACRE IN MEXICO CITY, JUST BEFORE THE '68 OLYMPICS HELD HERE. AS SUCH, THE ARMY IS SHOWING GREAT RESTRAINT AND DISCIPLINE IN ORDER TO LIMIT CASUALTIES AMONG INNOCENT BYSTANDERS OR RISK VIOLATING THE GUERRILLAS' HUMAN RIGHTS. FOR THAT REASON THE GUERRILLAS ARE BEING TREATED AS CIVILIAN CRIMINALS, WHO, FOLLOWING CAPTURE, ARE BEING TURNED OVER TO CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS.

C. [REDACTED] SEVERAL MEDIA SOURCES HAD PUBLISHED ARTICLES ON THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN CHIAPAS DURING THE LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS; HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT EMPHATICALLY MAINTAINED THAT THERE WERE NO GUERRILLAS IN MEXICO. [REDACTED]

(1) THE PUBLIC'S MEMORY OF THE 1968 MASSACRE HAS PREVENTED THE GOVERNMENT FROM EMPLOYING THE ARMY IN MANY SITUATIONS SINCE THEN. THOUGH THE ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE GUERRILLAS' EXISTENCE IN CHIAPAS, THEY FEEL THAT THEY HAVE BEEN PREVENTED FROM ERRADICATING THEM. ERRADICATION EFFORTS WOULD HAVE ENTAILED MILITARY OPERATIONS THAT MAY HAVE PROVEN POLITICALLY SUICIDAL FOR THE GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED]

(2) BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE CONFLICT THE

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GOVERNMENT FELT IT COULD NEGOTIATE AWAY THE PROBLEM, AND NOT HAVE TO RESORT TO MILITARY ACTIONS. HOWEVER, THIS APPROACH WAS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE TO ENTER INTO FORMAL DISCUSSIONS/NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GUERRILLAS WOULD BE TO GIVE THEM A FORMAL STATUS; TO PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE GUERRILLAS' EXISTENCE WOULD IN SOME WAY LEGITIMIZE THE GUERRILLAS' ORGANIZATION. AND FINALLY, TO TREAT WITH THE GUERRILLAS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE DONE ON THE GUERRILLAS' TERMS.

D.



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[REDACTED]

D. THE COMMUNIST-BLOCK EQUIPMENT SOME GUERRILLAS CARRIED IS LEFT OVER FROM OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN CONFLICTS; [REDACTED]

E. THERE ARE NO FORMAL LINKS WITH THE GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS, THOUGH THERE MUST HAVE BEEN CONTACTS.

F. [REDACTED] IF THIS ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY WAS THE SAME ORGANIZATION AS THE "COMANDO REVOLUCIONARIO MEXICANO GENERAL EMILIANO ZAPATA". [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE METHODS, OBJECTIVES AND STATED POLITICAL GOALS WERE DIFFERENT. [REDACTED] IT IS COMMON TO EVOKE ZAPATA'S IMAGE IN MEXICO; AS AN EXAMPLE, THE "FRENTE ZAPATISTA" CURRENTLY EXISTS IN MICHOACAN WITH PURELY POLITICAL REGIONAL GOALS AND NO MILITARY PURPOSES.

6. (~~REL UK, CAN, AUS~~) [REDACTED]

A. THE MEXICAN NAVY HAD NO DIRECT OR SUPPORTING ROLE. THE NAVY WAS ON "ALERT" AND PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED WITH "REPELLING ANY AGGRESSION ON NAVAL INSTALLATIONS". [REDACTED]

7. (~~REL UK, CAN, AUS~~) [REDACTED]

A. THE ARMY'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO CONTAIN THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN THE CURRENT AREA OF OPERATIONS,

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ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .
COLL: (U) AB; AH.
INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]
PREP: (U) [REDACTED]
ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]
DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

DCSD, POL).

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INQUIRE=DOC25D
ITEM NO=00120865

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX942 MCN = 94027/33130 TOR = 940271733
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS7783 0271737-~~0000~~--RUEALGX.

ZNY ~~00000~~

HEADER

O 271737Z JAN 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAHINGEN GE
RUFQBBA/US SURVEY SHAPE BE
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RULSJGI/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUFTAKA/UCIRF AUGSBURG GE
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 271732Z JAN 94

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX/INM-FOR GELBARD// IMMEDIATE
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL// IMMEDIATE
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA//DAO//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2// IMMEDIATE
RHCGSRB/CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2/AFIN-IC// IMMEDIATE
RUCBCLF/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//, IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02

~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
BODY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE:6247

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] MEXICAN ARMY CLAIMS
DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF ZAPATISTA LIBERATION MOVEMENT
(EZLN) BEFORE 1 JANUARY, 1994. (U).

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~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940121.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NF)~~ MEXICAN ARMY CLAIMS DETAILED
KNOWLEDGE OF ZAPATISTA LIBERATION MOVEMENT (EZLN)
ORGANIZATION BEFORE 1 JANUARY, 1994, [REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED] THE
MEXICAN ARMY HAD EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NAMES OF
MEMBERS OF THE EZLN BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE INSURGENCY
ON 1 JANUARY, 1994.
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

3. (C/NF) [REDACTED] SINCE THE START OF THE INSURRECTION IN CHIAPAS, OVER 400 MORE NAMES HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE LIST OF EZLN MEMBERS. [REDACTED] THE SIZE OF THE EZLN IS BETWEEN 1500 AND 2000. OF THIS, NO MORE THAN 400 CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE WELL TRAINED.

4. (C/NF) [REDACTED]

4. (U) POLITICAL COMMENT: JUDGING BY OUR INFORMATION

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FROM OTHER SOURCES, THE MEXICAN MILITARY'S CLAIMS EITHER TO HAVING HAD SUCH EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EZLN AND ITS MEMBERSHIP PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES OR TO HAVING RELIABLE OBTAINED ADDITIONAL NAMES FOR THAT LIST SINCE JANUARY 1 SHOULD BE HEAVILY DISCOUNTED. WE KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE MILITARY ASKED THROUGH MANY CHANNELS -- INCLUDING NONGOVERNMENTAL SOURCES -- FOR CONTRIBUTIONS OF NAMES OF SUSPECTED OR POSSIBLE MEMBERS, SUPPORTERS, OR CONTACTS OF THE EZLN, AND THAT AMONG THE LISTS GIVEN THEM WAS THE ENTIRE LIST OF DOMINICAN PRIESTS IN CHIAPAS; THE NAMES OF ALL MEXICAN PRIESTS REGARDLESS OF LOCATION IN THE COUNTRY WHO HAD ATTENDED THE 1968 CHURCH MEETING IN MEDELLIN, COLOMBIA, WHICH WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE LIBERATION THEOLOGY MOVEMENT; AND ALL OF THE FOREIGN-BORN CATHOLIC PRIESTS, FRIARS, AND NUNS WHO HAD WORKED IN CHIAPAS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF BISHOP SAMUEL RUIZ' INCUMBENCY AS BISHOP OF SAN CRISTOBAL (HE HAS BEEN BISHOP THERE FOR MORE THAN THREE DECADES). WE HAVE LEARNED RELIABLY THAT ALL OF THESE NAMES ARE NOW ON THE MEXICAN MILITARY'S LIST OF KNOWN EZLN MEMBERS. ALSO ON THE LIST, WE BELIEVE, ARE THE NAMES OF LEADERS AND PROMINENT MEMBERS OF RURAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CHIAPAS WHICH HAVE TITLES INCLUDING EITHER ZAPATA OR EMILIANO ZAPATA. THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST A DOZEN SUCH ORGANIZATIONS IN THE STATE OVER THE PAST TWENTY YEARS ALONE. WHILE SOME OF THESE PEOPLE MIGHT WELL BE INVOLVED WITH THE EZLN, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE MILITARY HAS NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER OR NOT MOST OF THE PEOPLE ON ITS LIST ARE, IN FACT, IN ANY WAY INVOLVED OR CONNECTED.

~~ADMIN~~

PROJ: (U)

COLL: (U) AB.

INSTR: (U) U.S.

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U)

DCSD, OPAD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

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~~DECL: OADR~~

BT

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NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:6219

INQUIRE=DOC25D
ITEM NO=00122420

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX591 MCN = 94027/39034 TOR = 940272021
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS8724 0272025-~~CCCC~~-RUEALGX.
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

O 272025Z JAN 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAHINGEN GE
RUFQBBA/US SURVEY SHAPE BE
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RULSJGI/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUFTAKA/UCIRF AUGSBURG GE
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 272023Z JAN 94

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX// IMMEDIATE
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL//
RUEHGT/USDAO GUATEMALA CITY GT IMMEDIATE
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2//
RHCGSRB/CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2//
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX); GUATEMALA (GT).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] MEXICAN ARMY DISCOVERS
GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS FIGHTING WITH EMILIO ZAPATA
LIBERATION MOVEMENT (EZLN). (U).

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NOFORN

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940124.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NF)~~ MEXICAN ARMY INTERCEPTS
COMMUNICATIONS OF GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS THAT FOUGHT ON
THE SIDE OF THE EZLN. GUERRILLAS HEADING BACK TO
GUATEMALA. MEXICAN ARMY COORDINATING WITH GUATEMALAN
COUNTERPARTS.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THESE
COMMUNICATIONS ARE BETWEEN A GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA
GROUP OPERATING IN MEXICO, AND A HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT
LOCATED IN GUATEMALA. THE MEXICAN ARMY DOES NOT KNOW
FROM WHICH FACTION OR ELEMENT OF THE GUATEMALAN
GUERRILLA FORCES THIS PARTICULAR GROUP IS ASSOCIATED
WITH. THE GUERRILLA FORCE IS LOCATED IN THE LANCANDON
JUNGLE AREA OF THE STATE OF CHIAPAS, AND IS APPARENTLY
TRYING TO MAKE THEIR WAY BACK TO GUATEMALA.

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE GROUP INDICATES THEY WERE IN A
FIREFIGHT WITH THE MEXICAN ARMY AND THAT SOME OF THE
GUERRILLAS WERE KILLED. THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE BURIED
IN MEXICO. [REDACTED]

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE EXISTENCE OF A GROUP OF

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GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS FIGHTING IN MEXICO AGAINST THE MEXICAN MILITARY ADDS A NEW DIMENSION TO THE UPRISING IN CHIAPAS. THERE HAVE BEEN REPEATED REPORTS OF GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS USING MEXICO AS A SAFE HAVEN OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, AND SEVERAL CACHES OF WEAPONS HAVE BEEN FOUND IN MEXICO THAT ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BELONGED TO GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS. THIS IS THE FIRST INDICATION THAT GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS ACTUALLY PARTICIPATED IN THE FIGHTING AGAINST THE MEXICAN ARMY.

THE DISCOVERY OF A GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA GROUP WORKING WITH THE EZLN COULD EVEN BE MORE SIGNIFICANT IF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT CHANGES ITS UNSTATED POLICY OF TACITLY ALLOWING SAFE HAVEN FOR GUERRILLAS OPERATING FROM GUATEMALA. CERTAINLY WE CAN EXPECT SOME TYPE OF CHANGE AND POSSIBLY A MUCH CLOSER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN MILITARIES.

3. (U) POLITICAL SECTION COMMENTS: THIS CLAIM BY THE MEXICAN MILITARY TO HAVING INTERCEPTED THE COMMUNICATIONS OF A GROUP OF ALLEGED GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF THE EZLN IN THE MEXICAN STATE OF CHIAPAS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS UNSUBSTANTIATED UNLESS WELL BRIEFED BY OTHER SOURCES. ALL PAST EXPERIENCE OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS OPERATING IN THE PART OF GUATEMALA ADJACENT TO CHIAPAS SHOWS THAT THEY ALWAYS OR VIRTUALLY ALWAYS COMMUNICATE ONLY IN THE QUICHE, MAM, OR OTHER INDIGENOUS DIALECTS OF THE REGION; YET MEXICAN ARMY SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE UNITS, LIKE THEIR CIVILIAN MEXICAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY COUNTERPARTS, HAVE NO PERSONNEL WHO SPEAK OR UNDERSTAND ANY OF THESE LANGUAGES. THE FOUR GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA GROUPS UNDER THE URNG UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION ENJOY A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MEXICO, ESPECIALLY SINCE -- PAYING ALL EXPENSES FOR PARTICIPANTS -- HOST THE ONGOING PEACE TALKS BETWEEN THE URNG AND THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT, USUALLY IN MEXICO CITY. THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT USES INCIDENTS OF ABUSE OF MEXICAN

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HOSPITALITY BY THE GUERILLA GROUPS -- SUCH AS WEAPONS TRAFFICKING THROUGH MEXICO -- AS LEVERAGE OVER THE URNG, AND THE GUERRILLAS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY LEERY OF LOSING THEIR SPECIAL WELCOME BY DOING ANYTHING MORE SERIOUS AND ESPECIALLY ANYTHING THAT CONSTITUTED A DIRECT ATTACK ON MEXICAN AUTHORITIES. SUCH AN EVENT MIGHT WELL HAVE OCCURRED, AS CLAIMED IN THIS REPORT, BUT IT NEEDS TO BE CAREFULLY SUBSTANTIATED, THE MEXICAN MILITARY IS TRYING THROUGH A VARIETY OF MEANS TO SHOW THAT THE EZLN FORCE IT NOW COMBATS IS A BIGGER THAN LIFE UNDERGROUND GROUP OF VAST INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS. A GOOD PORTION OF DEFENSA CLAIMS TO SUBSTANTIATE THAT IMAGE HAVE BEEN PATENTLY INCORRECT, AND THIS MIGHT BE ONE OF THEM.

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .

COLL: (U) AB.

INSTR: (U) U.S.

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U)

DCSD, OPAD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

~~DECL: OADR~~

BT

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INQUIRE=DOC25D
ITEM NO=00166727

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX436 MCN = 94032/41874 TOR = 940322307
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS9464 0322311-~~CCCC~~ RUEALGX.

ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

O 012311Z FEB 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUFQBBA/US SURVEY SHAPE BE
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RULSJGI/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUFTAKA/UCIRF AUGSBURG GE
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 012306Z FEB 94

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX/INM-FOR GELBARD// IMMEDIATE
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL// IMMEDIATE
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2// IMMEDIATE
RHCGRB/CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2/AFIN-IC// IMMEDIATE
RUCBCLF/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//,IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/
BODY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX); GERMANY (GC); CANADA (CA).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] THE LIBERATIONISTS, 57
PRIESTS AND 27 NUNS LISTED AS INVOLVED IN CHIAPAS
UPRISING (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED --- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940125.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) DAILY NEWSPAPER, "EL HERALDO DE MEXICO",
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO, 940125 (U) IN SPANISH.

SUMMARY: (U) ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN "EL HERALDO DE
MEXICO" A MEXICO CITY DAILY NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED 940125,
LISTING A GROUP OF NUNS AND PRIESTS INVOLVED IN THE
CHIAPAS UPRISING.

TEXT: 1. (U) THE FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL
TRANSLATION OF A PORTION OF THE ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN
"EL HERALDO DE MEXICO" A MEXICO CITY NEWSPAPER, 940125,
WRITTEN BY LEOPOLDO ((MENDIVIL)).

TRANSLATION BEGINS

HEADLINE: SUBJECT: THE LIBERATIONISTS, 57 PRIESTS, 21
NUNS, ARCHIMBAUD, DEAD

FOR THE PAST TEN (10) DAYS RUNNING (CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: THE SIGNAL) WE HAVE DISCUSSED WHAT HAPPENED ON
931231, AND THE STRANGE THING DONE BY THE INHABITANTS
OF LAS MARGARITAS, CHIAPAS, BUT NOTHING MORE SUSPICIOUS
HAS COME UP THAN THE CHANGING OF THE MASS OF GALLO
FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT TO SEVEN IN THE AFTERNOON.

BECAUSE OF THIS, DURING THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT THE
CATHOLICS WERE IN THEIR HOMES OR AT PARTIES AND ONLY
THE EVANGELISTS WERE IN THEIR OFFICES THAT NIGHT.
THERE WERE MANY LESS PEOPLE OUT, ONLY THE POOR PEOPLE
THAT CAME TO SUSTAIN THEIR LIVES....

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THAT NIGHT THEY HAD THREE BLACKOUTS IN LAS MARGARITAS. THE FIRST AND THE SECOND OCCURRED AT ELEVEN P.M. AT APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MINUTE INTERVALS, BUT THEY DIDN'T LAST VERY LONG. HOWEVER, THE THIRD WAS ANOTHER THING. IT OCCURRED DURING THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT AND LASTED LONGER, MUCH LONGER.

WHEN THE SAD REALITY HAD BECOME KNOWN THAT THE BLACKOUT WAS SOMETHING ELSE AND THAT THE LAST BLACKOUT WAS CAUSED BY THE GUERRILLAS OF THE EZLN WHEN THEY ENTERED THE CITY. WHEN THE LIGHT CAME ON AGAIN (AFTER THE LAST BLACKOUT) PEOPLE WENT INTO THE STREETS TO LAUNCH THE LAST OF THEIR FIRE WORKS. THE PEOPLE WERE SURPRISED TO FIND THE STREETS COVERED WITH UNIFORMED INDIVIDUALS, HEADS COVERED OR THE FACE COVERED WITH BANDANNAS AND HEAVILY ARMED, HEAVILY ARMED...

THERE ARE TWO STORIES GIVEN CONCERNING THOSE KILLED IN LAS MARGARITAS. THE FIRST IS THAT THEY OCCURRED IN THE STREET WHEN TWO POLICE RAN INTO THE FIRST COLUMN OF GUERRILLAS JUST AS THE CITIZENS WERE COMING OUT OF THEIR HOUSES. A FIRE FIGHT BEGAN AND THE POLICE WERE SURPRISED, TWO POLICE FELL WITH MORTAL INJURIES. THE FIGHTING RESULTED IN TWO POLICEMEN, ONE CIVILIAN AND TWO OF THE GUERRILLAS KILLED. ONE OF WHICH WAS THE GUERRILLA COMMANDER OF THE GROUP, THAT TURNED OUT TO BE ...A WHITE WOMAN.

THE SECOND VERSION, AND APPARENTLY MORE CORRECT, IS THAT WHEN THE ELECTRICITY RETURNED AND THE LIGHTS CAME ON, THE COMMANDER OF THE GROUP WHO WAS IDENTIFIED BY CITIZENS OF LAS MARGARITAS AS "LA GUERRA" (FEMALE GUERRILLA), "LA MONJA" (THE NUN), OR "LA GENERALA" (THE WOMAN GENERAL), ENTERED A ROOM WHERE A DANCE PARTY WAS BEING HELD ALONG WITH ELEMENTS OF HER TROOP. POLICE WHO WERE MAINTAINING ORDER AT THE PARTY REACTED ACCORDING BASED ON THE GUERRILLAS DRESS AND ACCORDING TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITY...IT COST THEM THEIR LIVES...ALSO ONE CIVILIAN, THE LIVES OF THE LEADER OF THE GUERRILLAS AND ONE OF THE GUERRILLA TROOPS.

EVERYONE THINKS THAT THE DEAD GUERRILLA WAS JANINE PAULINE ((ARCHIMBAUD)) BIAZOT, A FORMER NUN OF THE ORDER OF ST. VINCENT, WHO HAD FALLEN INTO INVOLVEMENT WITH THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN CHIAPAS. I SAID THAT "EVERYONE IS BEGINNING TO THINK THAT IT WAS HER" BECAUSE:

1. NO ONE KNOWS WHAT BECAME OF HER.
2. ON THE 30TH OF DECEMBER, JANINE, DRESSED IN HER

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HABIT WAS SEEN WORKING AS A NURSE IN ALTAMIRANO. SHE WAS HAVING A RELATIONSHIP WITH FATHER KARL LENKERSDORF SCHMIDT AND PRIOR TO THE INSURGENCY, THEY SOLD EVERYTHING THEY OWNED, INCLUDING THE HOUSE, WHERE LATER THE INSURGENTS PLACED A LARGE PART OF THE OFFICE EQUIPMENT PLUNDERED FROM THE CITY HALL. AS YOU ALL KNOW THE NEO-ZAPATISTAS TAKE AWAY THEIR DEAD AND WOUNDED WHEN EVER POSSIBLE.

THEY KNOW THAT TWO BODIES WERE BURIED AT DAWN IN THE WOODS AROUND LAS MARGARITAS, BUT NOBODY TO DATE HAS BEEN ABLE TO LOCATE THEM.

A SAD HISTORY, RIGHT? THAT THIS NUN HAD MADE THE DECISION OF HER LIFE, AND GAVE HER LIFE FOR THE DECISION....NOT THAT SHE AND FATHER LENKERSDORF ARE THE ONLY RELIGIOUS CATHOLICS INVOLVED WITH THE EZLN. INFORMATION I'VE RECEIVED FROM MY SOURCES INDICATES THAT IN SINCE 1989 PRIESTS, NUNS, PASTORAL AGENTS AND CATEQUISTAS, THE MAJOR PART OF WHOM ARE FROM THE DIOCESE OF SAN CRISTOBAL HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE MOVEMENT.

I HAVE IN MY POSSESSION A FAIRLY LARGE LIST OF THOSE INVOLVED, MANY WHO ARE FOREIGNERS. THEIR INVOLVEMENT HAS BEEN DISCOVERED AND ALSO THAT THE LEADER IS THE BISHOP OF SAN CRISTOBAL, SAMUEL ((RUIZ)). THEY ARE:

1. PRIEST PABLO ROMO SEDANO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE CENTER FRO HUMAN RIGHTS "FRAY BARTOLOME DE LAS CASAS".
2. PRIEST GONZALO BERNABE ((ITUARTE)) VERDIZCO, GENERAL VICAR OF THE DIOCESE OF SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS.
3. PRIEST VICTOR MANUEL ((ANGUIANO)) HERNANDEZ, PARSON OF LA TRINITARIA.
4. PRIEST DAVID ((MENDEZ)) MORENO, PARSON OF THE DIOCESE OF SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS.
5. PRIEST ROGELIO ((VICTORIA)) FRUTIS, PARSON OF THE DIOCESE OF SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS.
6. PRIEST JOEL ((PADRON)) GONZALEZ, PARSON OF THE CHURCH OF SAN ANTONIO DE PADUA, IN SIMOJOVEL,
[REDACTED]
7. PRIEST JORGE ALBERTO ((BARRON)) GUITTLEIN, ARGENTINE, PARSON OF TUMBALA.

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8. PRIEST RAYMUNDO ((BARRAGAN)), PARSON IN YAJALON.
9. PRIEST HERIBERTO ((CRUZ)) VERA, PARSON IN TILA.
10. PRIEST FELIPE DE JESUS ((INIGUEZ)) PEREZ, HONDURAN, PARSON IN AMATAN.
11. PRIEST JERONIMO ALBERTO ((HERNANDEZ)) LOPEZ, PARSON IN PALENQUE.
12. PRIEST OSCAR ((RODRIGUEZ)) RIVERA, PARSON OF THE CATHEDRAL OF SANTO DOMINGO IN PALENQUE.
13. PRIEST GONZALO ((ROSAS)), PARSON OF THE CATHEDRAL OF SANTO DOMINGO IN PALENQUE.
14. PRIEST GUSTAVO ((ANDRADE)) HERNANDEZ, PARSON OF THE CATHEDRAL OF SANTO DOMINGO IN PALENQUE.
15. PRIEST FELIPE DE JESUS ((TOUSSAINT)) LOERA, PARSON IN SABANILLA.
16. PRIEST HAUL ((MANDUJANO)) GARCIA, PARSON IN CMITAN DE DOMINGUEZ.
17. PRIEST ANGEL ((CERVNTES)) MARTINEZ, PARSON IN COMITAN DE DOMINGUEZ
18. PRIESTJOSE ((LUIS)) VILLELA, PARSON IN ATAMIRANO.
19. PRIEST JUAN ((RUIZ)), PARSON IN STALA.
20. PRIEST MARIO ((HERNANDEZ)), PARSON I SITALA.
21. PRIEST HERVE ((CAMIER)) DUPLOY, FRENCH, PARSON IN EL BOSQUE.
22. PRIEST AMANDO ((HERRERA)) RIOZ, PARSON IN CHILON.
23. PRIEST GUILLERMO ((BADILLO)), PARSON IN LA LIBERTAD.
24. PRIEST ALFREDO ((INDA)) ANDREU , PARSON IN FRONTERA COMALAPA.
25. PRIEST PABLO ((IRIBARREN)) PASCAL, SPANISH, PARSON IN OCOSINGO.
26. PRIEST JORGE ((TREJO)) RUIZ, PARSON IN OCOSINGO.
27. PRIEST JORGE ((RAFAEL)) DIEZ, PARSON IN ALTAMIRANO.
28. PRIEST PABAL ((GUIZAR)) BARRIGAN, PARSON IN

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OCOSINGO.

29. PRIEST PASCUAL ((ALMANIZ)), PARSON IN OCOSINGO.

30. PRIEST MAURICIO ((OLVERA)) GARCIA, PARSON IN LAS MARGARITAS.

31. PRIEST FRANCISCO PEDRO ((CURIEL)) SAUVEDRA, PARSON IN TRES PICOS, TONALA.

32. PRIEST LESTER ALAN ((JENKINS)), U.S.A., OF THE PARROQUIA SAN FERNANDO GUADALUPE DE SALTO DE AGUA.

33. PRIEST PAUL JOHN NADOINY ((STEINWANS)), U.S.A., OF THE PARROQUIA SAN FERNANDO GUADALUPE DE SALTO DE AGUA.

34. PRIEST ARTURO ((FERNANDEZ)), THE STATE OF MEXICO, CHURCH OF SAN JOSE TLATCLOLCO.

35. PRIEST FELIPE AGUIRRE (FRANCO)), BISHOP OF TUXTLA GUITERREZ.

36. PRIEST JORGE ((MARTINEZ)) RODRIGUEZ, PARSON OF THE DIOCESE OF SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS.

37. PRIEST FRANSICO JAVIER ((RUIZ)) REYES, PARSON OF THE DIOCESE OF SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS.

38. PRIEST VINCENTE ((FERRER)), PARSON OF SAN CRISTOBAL.

39. PRIEST CARLOS JAVIER ((CAMARENA)) LABADIE, PARSON IN BACHAJON.

40. PRIEST RAMON ((CASTILLO)) AGUILAR, PARSON IN INDEPENDENCIA.

41. PRIEST FRANSICO ((MARTIN)) OLVERA, PARSON IN OCOSINGO.

42. PRIEST KARL LENKERSDORF ((SCHMIDT)), GERMAN.

43. PRIEST RODOLFO (IZAL) ERLES, SPANISH, PARSON IN SABANILLA.

44. PRIEST ANTOON JULES MARIA ((VAN DE MEULEBROCKE)) PODEVY, BELGIUM, PARSON IN THE CHURCH OF OUR LADY OF THE CANDELARIA IN SOCOLTENANGO.

45. PRIEST CONSTANTINO ((GOMEZ)) URIA, SPANISH.

46. PRIEST MICHEL HENERY JEAN CHANTEAU ((DESLILLIERS)),

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FRENCH.

47. PRIEST JAMES ALBERT ALLISON ((MAHONEY)), CANADIAN.
48. PRIEST EDUARDO JOSE ((GARCIA)) RUIZ, NICARAGUA, PARSON OF THE DIOCESE IN SAN CRISTOBAL.
49. PRIEST LORENT LAYORE ((RIABE)) STAR, NORTH AMERICAN, PARSON IN YAJALON.
50. PRIEST RODOLFO ANTONIO ((ROMAN)) GORDILLO, PARSON IN TILA.
51. PRIEST JOSE LUIS ((CORTES)) LINARES, PARSON IN THE DIOCESE OF SAN CRISTOBAL.
52. PRIEST SALAVADOR ((VILLARUEL)) MALDONADO, PARSON OF HUIXTAN.
53. PRIEST ISIDRO ((BADILLO)) BRANA, PARSON IN TRINITARIA.
54. PRIEST ARNULFO ((QUINTANAR)) MONROY (ORIGINALLY FROM BROWNSVILLE TEXAS, NATIONALIZED MEXICAN, PARSON IN SAN FRANCISCO, SALTO DE AGUA.
55. PRIEST ORLANDO ((LOMELI)) RADILLO, PARSON IN SAN BARTOLOME DE LOS LLANOS, VENUSTIANO CARRANZA.
56. PRIEST VINCENTE FOSTER.
57. PRIEST ANTONIO ((GARNICA)) LOPEZ, PARSON IN OXCHUC.

THERE IS MORE PRESIDENT SALINAS, A GROUP OF NUNS, MOST OF WHOM ARE DOMINICAN, IT IS WELL DOCUMENTED THAT THEY ARE INVOLVED WITH THIS MOVEMENT, THEY ARE:

1. SISTER BERTHA, BERTHA ((LATTAPI)) BOYSSELLE, FRENCH.
2. SISTER MARIA DEL CARMEN, MARIA DEL CARMEN ((PURR)) MIGSDALIA, SPANISH.
3. SISTER MARIA, MARIA DEL SOCORRO ((AGUAYO)), SPANISH.
4. SISTER PATRICIA, PATRICIA ((MOYSEN)) MARQUEZ, ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE SAN CARLOS HOSPITAL IN ALTAMIRANO.
5. SISTER GUADALUPE, MARIA GUADALUPE ((CALVILLO)) RINCON.

6. SISTER CONY, MARIA CONSTANCE ((AGUILAR)) ABRIL, SALAVADOR.
7. SISTER MARIA LUISA, MARIA LUISA ((GONZALEZ)) GALINDO.
8. SISTER SUSANA, CUBA.
9. SISTER ESPERANZA, ESPERNAZA ((RODRIGUEZ)) MURGIL, HOSPITAL SAN CARLOS IN ALTAMIRANO.
10. SISTER CRISTINA, CRISTINA ((MANTILLA)) CALDERON, HOSPITAL IN ALTAMIRANO.
11. SISTER TERESA, MARIA TERESA ((AGUAYO)), SPANISH.
12. SISTER INES.
13. SISTER SOYLA, SOYLA ((SOLIS)).
14. SISTER ESTELA, ESTELA ((BARCO)) HUERTA, IN SABANILLA.
15. SISTER GRACIELA, GRACIELA ((CORNELAS)), HOSPITAL DE LAS CARIDAD, IN SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS.
16. SISTER IGNACIA, IGNACIA ((CORDOVA)).
17. SISTER ROSA OR MOTHER ROSA, ROSA ((RAMIREZ)) DE HERNANDEZ, SECRETARY OF BISHOP RUIZ.
18. SISTER MARTHA, MARTHA ((GOMEZ)) ALVEREZ, OF THE MISSION OF GUADALUPE, IN COMITAN DE DOMINGUEZ.
19. SISTER TERESA, TERESA ((ROSILLO)) CARMONA.
20. SISTER ADELAIDA, ADELAIDA ((SALAZAR)) LABASTIDA.
21. SISTER JANYN, CATHOLIC NUN OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD EL AERNAL IN ALTAMIRANO.

HERE IS A LIST OF RELIGIOUS CATHOLICS THAT ARE NATURALLY FOLLOWING THE THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY, AND THEY ARE IDENTIFIED WITH THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN CHIAPAS.

I ASK MYSELF:

IF TWO OR THREE MONTHS AGO, THEY HAD RECEIVED CERTAIN NOTICES REGARDING INCREASES IN THEIR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS, WOULD THEY HAVE INITIATED (THOSE THAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE:5933

PARTICIPATED) THE GUERRILLA UPRISING?

UNFORTUNATELY, THAT WAS THE ONLY TIME THE TALKS COULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND THEY NEVER DID.

TRANSLATION ENDS

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C)~~ [REDACTED]

THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO IS RELEASING INFORMATION TO THE MEDIA TO SHOW INVOLVEMENT BY FOREIGNERS AND MEMBERS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. THE GOM ALSO HAS ISSUED STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY THAT DOWNPLAY FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT HOWEVER. [REDACTED]

2. ~~(C)~~ INFORMATION, SO FAR UNSUPPORTED, IS BEING RELEASED CONCERNING INVOLVEMENT OF THE CATHOLIC LEADERSHIP IN CHIAPAS AND IT IS LOGICAL THAT PRIESTS, NUNS AND LAY PRIESTS WOULD HAVE CONCERNS OVER THEIR "FLOCK". IT IS ALSO LOGICAL THAT RELIGIOUS LEADERS DESIRING A BETTER LIFE FOR THEIR INDIGENOUS GROUPS EMBRACE THE CONCEPT OF, "LIBERATION THEOLOGY". LIBERATION IDEOLOGY IS PERFECTLY SUITED TO CHIAPAS (AND SEVERAL OTHER STATES IN MEXICO). RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAVE SEEN THEIR "FLOCKS" DISCRIMINATED AGAINST FOR SEVERAL HUNDRED YEARS. THEIR DESIRES TO SEE THAT THEIR CONGREGATION HAS FOOD, ELECTRICITY, EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND A BETTER LIFE ALONG WITH OTHER PROBLEMS IN CHIAPAS, MAKES THEM EASY TARGETS TO BE RECRUITED.

3. ~~(C)~~ THE EZLN BEGAN OPERATION IN 830000 AND ACCORDING TO THIS ARTICLE IT WASN'T UNTIL 890000 THAT RELIGIOUS LEADERS WERE SWEEPED INTO THE INSURGENCY. IF THIS DATE IS CORRECT, RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN CHIAPAS (SOME OF WHOM PERHAPS ALWAYS HAVE BEEN SYMPATHETIC WITH THE MOVEMENT) HAVE MOVED FROM PROVIDING MORAL SUPPORT TO BECOMING MORE PROACTIVE.

4. ~~(C)~~ THERE ARE CONFLICTING REPORTS CONCERNING THE LOCATION AND FATE OF THE FRENCH NUN, JANINE PAULINE ARCHIMBAUD BIAZOT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SHE WAS NOT KILLED DURING THE ASSAULT ON LAS MARGARITAS. [REDACTED]

ADMIN

PROJ: (U)

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PAGE:5934

COLL: (U) .
INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]
PREP: (U) [REDACTED]
ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]
DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]
DSCD, POL).
WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.
~~DECL GADR~~

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SECRET

NOFORN WNIINTEL

PAGE:5345

INQUIRE=DOC25D
ITEM NO=00320307

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX711 MCN = 94048/31751 TOR = 940481848
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS4644 0481850-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER

P 171850Z FEB 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 161852Z FEB 94
FM CDRUSAITAC PENTAGON WASH DC//IAITAC-RK//
TO AIG 12545
RHDLPFI/NAVCRIMINVSERV EUREG LONDON UK//60HQ//
RUFTNKI/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA BAHRAIN//60BJ//
RHDLPBG/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA LONDON UK//60LN//
RUCOPLV/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA KEFLAVIK IC//60KF//
RHDLPJC/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA SIGONELLA IT//60SX//
RHDLPGX/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA NAPLES IT//60NA//
RHDLPQU/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA ROTA SP//60RT//
RUADKHN/NAVCRIMINVSERV FAREASTREG DET YOKOHAMA JA//81SP//
RUKGPFA/CDR 311 MIBN FT CAMPBELL KY//AFZB-KL-B//
RUKGEJA/CDR7THTRANSGRP FT EUSTIS VA//AFFG-B//
RHCGRB/CDRUSARC FT MCPHERSON GA//AFRC-INS//
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASH DC//
INFO RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASH DC//IAITAC-RK/RKA/RKH/RKF//
BT

CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 05

PASS TO: ODCSI USAREUR LNO BENELUX SPACE TO GRENIER; CDRUSAISC
ROCK ISL TO 450TH MID; TTC FT LEE TO SEC OP 300TH SUP GP GEROW
ARMY RES CTR.

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJECT: USAITAC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PERIODIC SUMMARY (CIPS)
94-02 (PART 2 OF 3) (U)

1. (U) GENERAL INFORMATION.

A. (U) THIS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PERIODIC SUMMARY (CIPS) IS
IN THREE PARTS. PART 1 ADDRESSES THE GENERAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
SITUATION, INCLUDING THE ACTIVITIES OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, IN
RUSSIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES, GEORGIA, AND
EUROPE DURING JAN 94. PART 2 ADDRESSES COUNTERTERRORISM,
COUNTERINSURGENCY, COUNTERESPIONAGE, AND COUNTERSUBVERSION
MEASURES TAKEN BY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES OF FRIENDLY
AND SOME SELECTED HOSTILE COUNTRIES. PART 3 ADDRESSES TECHNICAL
EXPLOITATION ACTIVITIES.

B. (U) THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM DIVISION

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 26 Aug 96
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

NOFORN WNIINTEL

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(ANALYST: ~~REDACTED~~)

4. (U) WESTERN HEMISPHERE

A. (U) UPRISING IN CHIAPAS FORCES MEXICAN GOVERNMENT TO REDIRECT MILITARY AND POLICE RESOURCES

(1) ~~(S)~~(U) THE ARMED UPRISING WHICH BROKE OUT ON 1 JAN 94 IN THE SOUTHERN MEXICAN STATE OF CHIAPAS HAS FORCED THE GOVERNMENT TO REDIRECT INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSETS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS, MEXICAN PRESIDENT SALINAS REPLACED THREE OF HIS CABINET MINISTERS, INCLUDING JORGE CARPIZO MCGREGOR, THE FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL. CARPIZO IS NOW SERVING AS THE SECRETARY OF GOVERNMENT. THE SECRETARIAT OF GOVERNMENT, WHICH FUNCTIONS AS AN INTERIOR MINISTRY, OVERSEES THE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY (CISN), WHICH IS MEXICO'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE CISN HAS COME UNDER FIRE FOR NOT WARNING THE GOVERNMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN ORGANIZED UPRISING IN CHIAPAS.

(2) ~~(S)~~(U) THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE THE CHIAPAS UPRISING ITS TOP PRIORITY. AS A RESULT, IT HAS DIVERTED MANY POLICE AND MILITARY UNITS FROM THEIR REGULAR MISSIONS AND ASSIGNED THEM TO COUNTERINSURGENCY DUTY IN CHIAPAS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE ARE FEWER MILITARY AND POLICE UNITS CARRYING OUT COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS THAN IS NORMALLY THE CASE. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH THIS SHIFTING OF ASSETS SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR DRUG TRAFFICKERS TO OPERATE IN MOST PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, THE MASSIVE INFLUX OF MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL INTO CHIAPAS HAS LED TO A VIRTUAL HALT IN DRUG ACTIVITY IN THAT STATE. THE REMOTENESS OF CHIAPAS AND ITS RUGGED TERRAIN HAD MADE IT A FAVORITE AREA OF OPERATIONS FOR DRUG TRAFFICKERS OVER THE YEARS.

(3) ~~(S)~~(U) ANALYST COMMENTS: IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER CARPIZO WILL EXERCISE HIS POWER TO NAME A NEW CHIEF OF THE CISN. BOTH THE CISN AND THE MEXICAN ARMY, WHICH MAINTAINS ITS OWN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION NETWORKS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, WERE TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY THE UPRISING OF THE ZAPATISTA ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (EZLN). BOTH SERVICES WERE AWARE OF THE GROUP'S EXISTENCE AND HAD COLLECTED LIMITED AMOUNTS OF INTELLIGENCE ON IT. UNTIL THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT CAN BRING THE EZLN UNDER CONTROL, THE ARMY, THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL POLICE, AND THE CISN WILL CONTINUE TO DEVOTE LARGE AMOUNTS OF RESOURCES TO THE CHIAPAS REGION. MOST LIKELY THIS WILL BE A TEMPORARY MEASURE, BUT IF THE INSURGENCY PROVES TO HAVE STAYING POWER, IT COULD LEAD TO A PERMANENT REORDERING OF PRIORITIES OF THE MEXICAN ARMY AND THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. (ANALYST: ~~REDACTED~~)

B. (U) COLOMBIAN EFFORTS TO FIGHT POLICE CORRUPTION

(1) (U) DURING MAR 93, TWO GENERAL OFFICERS WERE RELIEVED OF THEIR DUTIES AS TOP-LEVEL COMMANDERS IN THE NATIONAL POLICE FORCE. COLOMBIA HAS BEGUN YET ANOTHER EFFORT TO CURTAIL WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION AND OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WITHIN THE

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ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX885 MCN = 94111/32597 TOR = 941111837
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HEADER

R 211841Z APR 94
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INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
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RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHINGTON DC//KT//
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RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
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CONTROLS

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SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] THE ARMY, AUTHENTIC
PRODUCT OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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AUSTRALIA.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940408.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) DAILY MEXICO CITY NEWSPAPER,
"EXCELSIOR", 940408, IN SPANISH.

SUMMARY: ~~(C/REL UK,CAN,AUS)~~ NEWSPAPER ARTICLE/ESSAY
DETAILS PAST AND CURRENT ROLE PLAYED BY THE MEXICAN
ARMY AND MEXICAN AIR FORCE IN SUPPORT OF THE NATION.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/REL UK,CAN,AUS)~~ THE FOLLOWING IS AN
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE SECOND OF SIX ESSAY
ARTICLES DEALING WITH THE MEXICAN MILITARY WHICH
APPEARED IN THE "IDEAS" SECTION OF THE APRIL 8, 1994
EDITION OF THE MEXICO DAILY NEWSPAPER, "EXCELSIOR", IN
SPANISH. THIS ARTICLE IS ENTITLED "THE ARMY,
AUTHENTIC PRODUCT OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION".

BEGIN TRANSLATION.

THE MEXICAN ARMY, MORE THAN ANY OTHER INSTITUTION IN
OUR SOCIETY, IS A PRODUCT OF THE MOST IMPORTANT
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL OCCURRENCE IN MEXICO DURING THIS
CENTURY THE REVOLUTION OF 1910. IF IT IS CORRECT TO
SAY THAT ALL ASPECTS OF MEXICAN SOCIETY WERE AFFECTED,
UP TO A CERTAIN POINT, BY THAT MOVEMENT, THEN IT IS
SAFE TO SAY THAT THE MILITARY ITSELF, WAS REVISED FROM
TOP TO BOTTOM. IN EFFECT, TODAY'S MEXICAN MILITARY
DERIVES FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 1910, AND IT IS A FACT
THAT ITS CORPORATE IDENTITY AND TRADITIONS CONTINUE AS
PART OF A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT. [REDACTED] THE
SALIENT FEATURE OF THE STUDENT OR ANALYST OF THE
MEXICAN ARMY IS ITS CLOSE IDENTIFICATION AND TIES TO
THE REVOLUTION AND THE MEXICAN PEOPLE, WHO WERE UNITED
UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE MILITARY UMBRELLA AS A
RESULT OF THAT REVOLUTION.)

THE REVOLUTION EXPLAINS MANY OF THE PECULIARITIES OF
THE ARMY AND THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS
DEVELOPED BETWEEN MEXICO'S CIVILIAN AND MILITARY
AUTHORITIES. THE REVOLUTION PRODUCED ITS OWN
MYTHOLOGY, PART OF IT FOUNDED ON FACTS, PART ON
HEARSAY. ONE OF THE MOST INTERESTING MYTHS THAT
CHARACTERIZES IT, AND OTHER REVOLUTIONS, IS ITS

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POPULAR ORIGINS.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE REVOLUTION INTRODUCES NEW SOCIAL PATTERNS TO THE FLOW OF MEXICAN LIFE, PATTERNS THAT THEMSELVES FEED AN ECLECTIC IDEOLOGY STRONGLY INCORPORATED WITHIN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1917 AND TO THE LATER DEVELOPMENT OF POWER WHICH FOLLOWED IN THE 1920'S. IN TERMS OF SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE, THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE OF THE REVOLUTION WAS TO GIVE TO NUMEROUS INDIVIDUALS - ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM RURAL AND WORKING CLASS BACKGROUNDS - OPPORTUNITIES TO ENTER INTO CAREERS IN PUBLIC LIFE AND THE ARMY FROM THE GEOGRAPHIC WELL OF THE MILITARY ELITE

THE MEXICAN ELITE, WHETHER REFERRING TO MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL CLASSES OR THE OFFICER CORPS IN THE MILITARY, NEVER INCLUDED INDIVIDUALS FROM THE BROAD SECTOR OF THE POPULACE, WHETHER THEY CAME FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION OR ANY OTHER. THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION, NEVERTHELESS, DID EXPAND THIS SECTOR'S REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. FOR EXAMPLE, THE MAJORITY OF MEXICANS LIVED IN RURAL AREAS, BEFORE AND DURING THE REVOLUTION, WHILE TWO-THIRDS OF THE POLITICAL CLASS DURING THE PORFIRIO DIAZ ERA CAME FROM THE CITIES. .

THE REVOLUTION CHANGED THESE STATISTICS. IN ITS WAKE, THE NUMBER OF MEXICAN POLITICIANS WHO WERE BORN IN URBAN AREAS DECLINED SHARPLY AND DID NOT RETURN TO PRE-1910 LEVELS UNTIL THE 1960'S, ALMOST A HALF CENTURY LATER. IN ACTUAL FIGURES, THE GREATEST NUMBER OF URBANITE POLITICAL LEADERS WAS ACHIEVED IN 1893, AND NOT REPLICATED UNTIL 1982, DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF JOSE LOPEZ PORTILLO. NEVERTHELESS, THE URBAN CHARACTER OF POLITICIANS DURING THE ERA OF PORFIRIO DIAZ WAS GREATER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER PRESIDENT UNTIL CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI: THE NUMBER OF MEXICANS FROM THE URBAN AREA WAS MINIMAL, WHILE THOSE STATISTICS SHOWED SUBSTANTIAL GROWTH IN THE 1950 CENSUS.

A SIMILAR SHIFT IS SEEN IN THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE MEXICAN ARMY'S LEADERSHIP, BUT IT IS MORE PROBABLE THAT ITS MEMBERS WOULD HAVE COME FROM SMALL RURAL COMMUNITIES - ESPECIALLY THOSE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION BORN BETWEEN 1880 AND 1890. THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, THE ORIGIN OF THE GENERALS - LIKE THAT OF THEIR CIVILIAN POLITICAL COUNTERPARTS - BEGAN TO BECOME MORE AND MORE URBAN, CORRESPONDING ALMOST EXACTLY, DECADE AFTER DECADE, WITH THE STATISTICS OF THE POLITICIANS. DURING THE 1930'S, LESS THAN ONE OF

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FIVE NATIONAL POLITICIANS OR GENERALS OF THE ARMY CAME FROM RURAL AREAS. [REDACTED] THE KEY TO UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY'S CURRENT CONCENTRATION OF SERVING OFFICERS WITH URBAN BEGINNINGS, IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE OFFICER SELECTION PROCESS. THE TEST IS OFFERED AT ONLY EIGHT REGIONAL TESTING SITES YEARLY; THESE ARE EIGHT OF MEXICO'S LARGEST URBAN AREAS, AS ONE WOULD EXPECT. THE HIGHER EDUCATIONAL LEVELS ATTAINED IN THE CITIES AND THE COST OF TRAVEL AND MAINTENANCE OF THE TESTEE DURING THE PROCESS RESULTS IN AN OFFICER CORPS SKEWED TOWARD AN URBAN BACKGROUND.)

THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION EXPANDED BRIEFLY THE GEOGRAPHIC WELL FROM WHICH WAS EXTRACTED THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ELITE, INFLUENCING ALSO ITS SOCIAL ORIGIN. CONTRARY TO MYTH, THE MAJORITY OF THE SUCCESSFUL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS THAT THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION PRODUCED HAD ROOTS IN THE MIDDLE CLASS.

HERMETISM TOWARD CIVILIAN INTRUSION

IN FACT, IN EACH ADMINISTRATION SINCE 1920 - EXCEPTING THAT OF LAZARO CARDENAS - TWO THIRDS OR MORE OF THE LEADING CIVILIAN UPPER CLASS HAS COME FROM THE UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASS OF MEXICAN SOCIETY. IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT MEXICAN GENERALS VERY LIKELY CAME FROM THE WORKING CLASS BETWEEN 1920 AND 1930, THEIR ORIGINS WERE INCREASINGLY FROM THE MIDDLE CLASS, IN NUMBERS COMPARABLE TO THAT OF THE CIVILIAN POLITICIANS.

MANY SOCIAL THEORIES ASCRIBE THAT THE SOCIAL AND GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF A PERSON CAN AFFECT THEIR ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR. ALTHOUGH SCHOLARLY EVIDENCE SOMEWHAT CONFIRMS THIS, ANALYSTS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE MORE HOMOGENEOUS THE SOCIAL AND GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS, THE MORE PROBABLE IT IS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE SHARED IDEOLOGIES AND COMMON GOALS. IN MEXICO, THESE ASSOCIATIONS COULD BE EVEN CLOSER, GIVEN THE SHARED REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF BOTH THE MILITARY AND THE CIVILIANS. THERE EXIST A NUMBER OF EXPLANATIONS ABOUT WHY THE APPARENTLY SIMILAR SOCIAL AND GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS IN MEXICO HAVE NOT RESULTED IN A SIMILAR JOINTNESS OF ATTITUDES AND VALUES. THE KEY FACTOR IN EXPLAINING WHY SHARED SOCIAL ORIGINS ARE NOT A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS, IS THE INSTITUTIONALIZED HERMITIC NATURE OF THE MEXICAN ARMY AND ITS CONTINUAL EFFORTS TO GUARD ITS AUTONOMY AGAINST CIVILIAN INTRUSION.

[REDACTED] DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE THE ROOT

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CAUSE. RATHER, THE MEXICAN MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM IS DESIGNED FOR THE MILITARY MAN, UNTIL THE WAR COLLEGE LEVEL, WHICH IS NORMALLY ATTENDED BY OFFICERS WITH AN AVERAGE OF 25 YEARS OF SERVICE. THE CADET ACADEMY IN MEXICO IS A HIGH SCHOOL, A SCHOOL WHICH DOES NOT ALLOW THE CIVILIAN ELITE TO MIX WITH THEIR MILITARY AGE GROUP PEERS. THE ONLY OFFICERS, OTHER THAN SPECIALISTS RECEIVING MEDICAL OR JUDICIAL TRAINING, TO RECEIVE A COLLEGE DIPLOMA ARE THE CGSC GRADUATES, ALSO NOT A COURSE DESIGNED TO RECEIVE CIVILIAN PEERS DURING THE COURSE OF INSTRUCTION. THUS, THE FIRST MILITARY EDUCATIONAL CONTACT WITH CIVILIAN POLITICAL ELITES OCCURS AT AN ADVANCED CAREER POINT. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY IS REKNOWNED FOR ITS PRIVACY AND THE SEAL TO OUTSIDERS, THAT IS NOT THE DETERMINING FACTOR HERE.)

CLOSED INSTITUTIONS

THE MILITARY, IN AN ATTEMPT TO REMAIN INTACT FROM CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE, BECAUSE OF POLITICAL-MILITARY INTERVENTION IN OTHER PLACES IN LATIN AMERICA, HAS SACRIFICED, UP TO A CERTAIN POINT, A WIDER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CIVILIAN SECTOR OF SOCIETY.

THE MEXICAN MILITARY, UNLIKE THEIR CIVILIAN POLITICAL COUNTERPARTS, HAS ESTABLISHED ITS OWN INSTITUTIONS FOR TRAINING AND SHAPING THEIR FUTURE LEADERS. ALL THE OFFICERS IN THE ARMY ARE A PRODUCT OF MILITARY SCHOOLS WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN SINCE AGE 17, WHEN THEY ENROLLED IN THE HEROIC MILITARY COLLEGE. FOLLOWING THAT COMES EVEN MORE ADVANCED COURSES OF TRAINING AT THE SUPERIOR WAR COLLEGE, IF THEY ARE CONSIDERED ADEPT AT BECOMING HIGH LEVEL OFFICERS AND FINALLY, THEY GO TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE BEFORE THEY BECOME GENERALS.

SINCE THE BODY OF OFFICERS, WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, HAS BEEN TRAINED WITHIN A CONTROLLED MILITARY ENVIRONMENT, THEY DEVELOP A SET OF ATTITUDES AND VALUES THAT, ALTHOUGH THESE OFFICERS ARE A PART OF CIVILIAN SOCIETY, THEIR OUTLOOKS ARE DOMINATED BY THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. LOYALTY TO THE ARMY AS AN INSTITUTION, AND OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIORS ARE ALSO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL MILITARY CAREER.

ON THE SURFACE, THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE MILITARY APPEAR QUITE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL ELITE. NONETHELESS, IN SOME WAYS THEY ARE DIFFERENT. GIVEN THE DEMANDS OF A SUCCESSFUL MILITARY CAREER, AND THE UNUSUAL LEVEL OF INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY, A GREAT PERCENTAGE OF FUTURE OFFICERS,

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ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO OBTAIN ADVANCED MILITARY TRAINING IN ORDER TO ACCEDE TO THE RANK OF GENERAL, ARE FREQUENTLY SONS OR FAMILY MEMBERS OF OTHER OFFICERS. IN OTHER WORDS, A GREAT PORTION OF THE FUTURE ASPIRANTS TO THE BODY OF OFFICERS IN THE MEXICAN DEFENSE FORCES COME FROM A PRE-SELECTED WELL OF INDIVIDUALS.

THE TWO GROUPS OF LEADERS ALSO DO NOT PRECISELY SHARE THE SAME SOCIAL ORIGINS. ALTHOUGH BOTH COME FROM THE MIDDLE CLASS, THOSE ORIGINALLY OF LOWER CLASS ARE MORE FREQUENTLY FOUND AMONG THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP. THE REASON FOR THIS IS ESSENTIALLY ECONOMIC.

MANY INDIVIDUALS WHO DO NOT COME FROM MILITARY FAMILIES ENTER THE OFFICER CORPS AS A MEANS OF CLIMBING THE SOCIAL LADDER. ALSO, UNTIL 1944, THE MILITARY ALLOWED ENLISTED SOLDIERS, WHO HAD ATTAINED THE GRADE OF CORPORAL AND SERGEANT TO ATTEND THE HEROIC MILITARY COLLEGE. THEREFORE, THIS STRENGTHENED OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH MODEST ORIGINS.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS.

TO SUMMARIZE, ACCEPTANCE AS A CADET IN ONE OF THE MILITARY ACADEMIES IS THE ROAD TO A HIGHER EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND PROFESSIONAL STATUS. TO BE A SUCCESSFUL POLITICIAN, ONE SHOULD HAVE AN UNIVERSITY EDUCATION AND, NOWADAYS, POSTGRADUATE STUDIES. THE ARMY GUARANTEES AN EDUCATION ONCE THE INDIVIDUAL JOINS THE INSTITUTION, JUST LIKE THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OFFERS SEMINARY EDUCATION TO THEIR FUTURE PRIESTS AND BISHOPS. THE POLITICIAN, HOWEVER, HAS TO HAVE THESE CREDENTIALS [REDACTED] (BEGIN BOLD-TYPE IN ARTICLE) "BEFORE" (END BOLD-TYPE) BEING CONSIDERED. THERE EXIST IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES IN THE SOCIAL TRAJECTORY OF OFFICERS AND NATIONAL POLITICIANS. FOLLOWING THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION OF 1910, NUMEROUS PROMINENT FIGURES EMERGED WHOSE ROOTS WERE IN THE VIOLENCE OF THE EARLY DECADES OF THE CENTURY; INDIVIDUALS WHO COULD BE BETTER DESCRIBED AS POLITICAL-MILITARY. THESE MEN WHO WERE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, ACTED AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP, BUT BEGAN TO DISAPPEAR DURING THE 60'S AND 70'S, AS THE MILITARY BEGAN TO PROFESSIONALIZE, MORE AND MORE, ITS CORPS OF OFFICERS.

ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP CONTINUES SUBORDINATE TO CIVILIAN CONTROL, NUMEROUS TENSIONS EXIST BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS OF LEADERS; TENSIONS THAT PARTLY COME FROM SEPARATIONS WHICH THE MILITARY THEMSELVES HAVE

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IMPOSED. THE POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE FEW SOCIAL CONTACTS WITH THE MEXICAN OFFICER CORPS. THIS LACK OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS THUS MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE SUSPICIONS ABOUT MOTIVATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE OTHER GROUP. GIVEN THAT MILITARY POLICIES ARE SELDOM DISCUSSED OPENLY, OR ARE PART OF THE POLITICAL DEBATES IN MEXICO, THE MILITARY UNDERSTANDS MORE OF THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY, THAN THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY DOES OF THE MILITARY. [REDACTED] RECENTLY-- DUE TO A SERIES OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING INVOLVEMENT CLAIMS, SEVERAL RESULTING FROM A DECEMBER 1991 SHOOT OUT WITH FEDERAL JUDICIAL POLICE DURING A CN OPERATION BY THE POLICE; OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE ALLEGATIONS FROM CN OPERATIONS IN BABORIGAME AND OTHERS AS A RESULT OF THE REVOLT IN CHIAPAS; AND OF CIVILIAN DOUBTS ABOUT THE LOYALTY OF THE MILITARY TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, DUE TO THE MILITARY'S CLEARLY STATED LACK OF SUPPORT FOR THE NEW RULING INSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONARY PARTY CANDIDATE IN THE WAKE OF THE ASSASSINATION OF THAT CANDIDATE'S PREDECESSOR-- THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND ITS CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP HAVE BECOME MORE PRONOUNCED AND CERTAINLY MORE VISIBLE TO THE PUBLIC EYE.)

THE TENSION BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS OF LEADERS INCREASES IN TIMES OF POLITICAL CRISES. THUS, THE SITUATION IN CHIAPAS HIGHLIGHTS ALREADY EXISTING PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP, AND THE MILITARY'S ABILITY TO RELATE TO THE SOCIETY IN GENERAL. THE MILITARY HAD ITS OWN STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH THE ZAPATISTA ARMY OF LIBERATION (EZLN), A STRATEGY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI INITIALLY ACCEPTED. [REDACTED] SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ANTONIO ((RIVIELLO)) BAZAN OPENLY CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENT AT HIS LOYALTY DAY SPECCH, AN UNPRECEDENTED ACT.)

THE CIVIL LEADERSHIP TURNED AGAINST THIS STRATEGY - HARD AND REPRESSIVE AS IT WAS - BEFORE THE INTENSE SCRUTINY OF THE INTERNATIONAL NEWS MEDIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS. THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, ESPECIALLY UNDER SALINAS DE GORTARI, HAS BEEN SENSITIVE TO THE TONE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MASSIVE MEDIA IMAGES. IN FACT, IT HAS BECOME A VICTIM OF ITS OWN PULIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN AND ITS NATIONAL POLICY IN CHIAPAS IS BEING DIRECTED, TO A GREAT EXTENT, BY THE NECESSITY OF ADHERING TO A CERTAIN POLITICAL IMAGE.

POOR MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS

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BY CONTRAST, THE MILITARY IS NOT ADAPTED TO MANAGE MEDIUMS OF COMMUNICATION. THE REASON FOR THIS IS TWOFOLD:

- FIRST, THE DESIRE FOR AUTONOMY THAT IS REFLECTED IN THE MILITARY'S SECRETIVE AND PROTECTIVE INSTITUTIONAL POSTURE, IS GUARANTEED BY THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP THAT ACTS AS A CENSOR FOR THE PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF MILITARY AFFAIRS. THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP INTERVENES BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE NEWS MEDIA IN MATTERS PERTAINING TO MILITARY POLICY. MOREOVER, THERE DO NOT EXIST MILITARY ANALYSTS IN MEXICO, WHICH IS TO SAY, CIVILIANS WITH SPECIALIZED INTERESTS AND EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH MILITARY ISSUES.

- SECOND, THE NATURALLY HERMETIC SOCIAL NATURE OF THE MEXICAN MILITARY IMPEDES THEIR ESTABLISHING A WIDE NETWORK OF CONTACTS AND LINKS WITH THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD, AND THAT OF THE NEWS MEDIA; LINKS THEY COULD USE TO AIR THEIR OWN VIEWPOINTS ABOUT POLITICAL MATTERS AND HELP STRENGTHEN THEIR OWN IMAGE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE MILITARY IS IN THE PROCESS OF ADDRESSING THIS RATHER SEVERE SHORTCOMING BY SENDING PUBLIC RELATIONS EXCHANGE TEAMS ABROAD IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP A MORE MEANINGFUL, POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MEDIA.)

THE ARMY HAS CONSIDERED ITSELF, FOR QUITE SOME TIME, A PRODUCT OF THE MEXICAN POPULACE: DERIVED FROM THE POPULAR CLASSES OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION. AND IT IS CERTAIN THAT IT CAN MAKE THIS CLAIM WITH GREATER LEGITIMACY THAN ANY OTHER LEADING GROUP. NEVERTHELESS, IN THE YEARS TO COME, IT WOULD DO WELL TO CALL UPON ITSELF TO RE-EVALUATE ITS LOYALTY TO THE MEXICAN PEOPLE, SUCH AS THE COUNTRY'S CIVILIAN LEADERS ARE DOING AT THIS MOMENT. BY MEANS OF RE-EVALUATING WHAT ITS RELATIONSHIP TO MEXICAN SOCIETY SHOULD BE, THE MEXICAN MILITARY WILL NEED TO OPEN ITSELF UP TO GREATER PUBLIC SCRUTINY AND THEREBY ENHANCE ITS SOCIAL IMAGE.

END OF TRANSLATION.

COMMENTS: 1. (~~C/REL UK,CAN,AUS~~) [REDACTED]
THIS EXCELLENT ARTICLE "SAYS IT LIKE IT IS", AND PAINTS A GOOD COMMON-SENSE PICTURE OF HOW THE MEXICAN ARMY'S THOUGHT PROCESS AND COMPORTMENT WERE DEVELOPED. WE SHOULD HOPE THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MEXICAN ARMY READS AND UNDERSTANDS THE VERY ACCURATE MESSAGE WHICH THIS ARTICLE CONVEYS. WE SHOULD FURTHER HOPE THAT AN INFORMED PUBLIC READS AND UNDERSTANDS "WHY" THE

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MEXICAN ARMY IS THE WAY IT IS, AND THUS DOES IT OWN PART TO DRAW THE ARMY CLOSER INTO THE FOLD OF POPULAR SOCIETY

2. (~~C/REL UK,CAN,AUS~~) IT IS INTERESTING TO OBSERVE THAT THE NEWSPAPER "EXCELSIOR" WHICH CARRIED THIS ARTICLE IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED A MOUTHPIECE TO DISSEMINATE THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POSITION, AND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION APPEARS WILLING TO PUBLISH AN ARTICLE, THOUGH NOT PER SE CRITICAL OF THE MILITARY, IS UNABASHED IN ACCURATELY DESCRIBING THE ARMY'S CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH MEXICAN SOCIETY.

3. (~~C/REL UK,CAN,AUS~~) IT IS ALSO INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THIS EXCELLENT COMMENTARY WAS AUTHORED BY AN AMERICAN LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES PROFESSOR WHO RECENTLY PUBLISHED A LARGELY UNSATISFACTORY AND INACCURATE BOOK ON THE MEXICAN MILITARY. THE AUTHOR'S EXCELLENT AND WELL-DESERVED REPUTATION AS A MEXICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM OBSERVER CROSSED OVER INTO HIS WIDELY ACCEPTED RESEARCH ON THE MEXICAN MILITARY, AN UNWARRANTED ACCEPTANCE OF A WORK FULL OF INACCURACIES, AS ANY REPORTER WHO HAS IN FACT WORKED WITH AND BEEN SCHOOLED WITH THE MEXICAN MILITARY CAN EASILY ATTEST.

ADMIN

PROJ: (U)

INSTR: (U) U.S.

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U)

DCSD, DEA, NAS, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

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PAGE:4027

INQUIRE=DOC26D
ITEM NO=00128184

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX394 MCN = 94112/45446 TOR = 941122301
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS4395 1122259-~~8888~~-RUEALGX.
ZNY ~~8888~~

HEADER

P 222259Z APR 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 221926Z APR 94

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC
AIG 7883
RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
RUEHC/STATE DEPT WASHDC //INR-IC-CD//
RUDMIFE/ONI IFE SUITLAND MD//2132//
BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET NOFORN UNINTEL~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

BODY

PASS: (U) NSACSS FOR ZKZK PP DXD RRK DE;
DIA PASS TO CH-5 FOR INFO.

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] MILITARY REACTION TO THE MEXICAN
GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET NOFORN UNINTEL~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940329.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: ~~(S) NOFORN UNINTEL~~
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN UNINTEL~~

~~NOFORN~~ ~~WINTTEL~~

PAGE:4028

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ THIS REPORT PROVIDES INFORMATION CONCERNING THE MEXICAN MILITARY'S REACTION TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT IN THE STATE OF CHIAPAS, MEXICO.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ [REDACTED] MILITARY OFFICIALS ARE DISGRUNTLED WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE ZAPATISTA ARMY FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION (ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT - EZLN) IN THE STATE OF CHIAPAS, [REDACTED] MEXICO. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE GOVERNMENT HAD FAILED TO RESPOND TO EARLY INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE POPULAR REVOLT IN CHIAPAS, MEXICO. THEY ALSO CONTEND THAT WHILE THEY KNEW OF THE POSSIBLE REVOLT AND REPORTED THIS TO SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN MEXICO CITY, THE GOVERNMENT IS LAYING THE BLAME FOR THE EZLN PROBLEM ON THE MILITARY. THE INITIAL ATTACK BY EZLN-LED PEASANTS WAS SCHEDULED FOR 1 DECEMBER 1993, BUT WAS CHANGED TO 1 JANUARY 1994 WHEN EZLN LEADERS REALIZED THAT 1 DECEMBER 1994 FELL ON A HOLIDAY COMMEMORATING THE EQUIVALENT OF APRIL FOOLS DAY IN THE UNITED STATES (DIA DE LOS INOCENTES). THE EZLN LEADERS FEARED THAT IF THEY MADE THEIR INITIAL ATTACK ON 1 DECEMBER 1994 PEOPLE WOULD TAKE THE ACTION TO BE A PRANK THEREBY REDUCING THE INITIAL MEDIA EXPOSURE.

2. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ THE MILITARY IS ALSO UNHAPPY THAT, WHILE THEY HAVE FULLY RESPECTED THE GOVERNMENT'S CALL FOR A CEASE FIRE, THE EZLN HAS BEEN ACTIVELY RECRUITING AND ARMING ITSELF FOR FUTURE ACTION. SINCE THE INITIAL EZLN ATTACK ON 1 JANUARY 1994, ALL MILITARY OPERATIONAL UNITS HAD BEEN PLACED ON FULL ALERT WITH ALL PERSONNEL GARRISONED IN THEIR MILITARY QUARTERS. AFTER THE CEASE FIRE WAS ANNOUNCED IN MID-FEBRUARY 1994, MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INSTRUCTED TO WORK EVERY OTHER DAY ON 24-HOUR SHIFTS. THIS STILL RESTRICTS PERSONNEL TO THE CLOSE VICINITY OF THEIR GARRISONS PREVENTING MANY FROM VISITING THEIR FAMILIES AND HAS CAUSED AN INCREASE IN DESERTIONS AND AWOL CASES.

3. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ AFTER THE 23 MARCH 1994 ASSASSINATION OF THE PRI PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, LUIS DONALDO ((COLOSIO)), ALL MEXICAN MILITARY OPERATIONAL UNITS WERE PLACED ON FULL ALERT STATUS FOR ONE COMPLETE WEEK. FOLLOWING THIS INITIAL WEEK, ALL UNITS WERE INSTRUCTED TO RETAIN AT LEAST A PLATOON-SIZED ELEMENT FOR EVERY COMPANY ON FULL ALERT.

4. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ MEXICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN ORDERED NOT TO REFER TO THE MOVEMENT AS THE EZLN AS THIS RECOGNIZES THEIR IDENTITY AS A NATIONAL ARMY. PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO REFER TO THE EZLN AS GUERRILLAS, CRIMINALS, DELINQUENTS, OR ZAPATISTAS.

5. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ [REDACTED]

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PAGE:4029

COMMENTS: (U) NONE.

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) 226611.
INSTR: (U) US
PREP: (U)
ACQ: (U)
DISSEM: (U)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ WARNING NOTICE
~~INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN~~
~~NATIONALS.~~
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PAGE:3919

INQUIRE=DOC26D

ITEM NO=00186919

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX412 MCN = 94119/44669 TOR = 941192346

RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS4919 1192344-~~CCCC~~--RUEALGX.

ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

R 292344Z APR 94

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//

RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//

RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL

RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 292311Z APR 94

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

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RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL//

RUEABNE/EPIC EL PASO TX

RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHDC

RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2//

RHCGSRB/CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2//

RULYSHH/COMMARFORLANT//G-2//

BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 [REDACTED]

~~REL TO UK, CAN, AUS~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] CHIAPAS: THE MEXICAN
ARMY TAKES FIRST STEP IN PUBLIC RELATIONS;
LOGISTICS/SUPPLY DEFICIENCIES (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AUS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE:3920

~~RELEASABLE TO UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA,
AUSTRALIA.~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940423.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) DAILY NEWSPAPER, "EXCELSIOR", MEXICO CITY, MEXICO, 940422, IN SPANISH.

SUMMARY: (U) THE MEXICAN ARMY TAKES ITS FIRST STEP IN PUBLIC RELATIONS BY INVITING REPORTERS TO THE 31ST MILITARY ZONE'S BASE. A REPORTER MAKES COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE EZLN AND MEXICAN ARMY'S LOGISTICS/SUPPLY. THE 31ST MILITARY ZONE COMMANDER MAKES PUBLIC REMARKS.

TEXT: 1. (U) THE MEXICAN ARMY TAKES ITS FIRST STEP IN PUBLIC RELATIONS BY INVITING REPORTERS TO RANCHO NUEVO, THE 31ST MILITARY ZONE'S BASE, FOR THE FIRST TIME. A REPORTER MAKES COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE EZLN AND MEXICAN ARMY'S LOGISTICS/SUPPLY. THE 31ST MILITARY ZONE COMMANDER MAKES PUBLIC REMARKS.

2. (U) THE REMARKS OF GENERAL JOSE RUBEN ((RIVAS)) PENA, THE NEW COMMANDER OF THE 31ST MILITARY ZONE, WERE REPORTED IN THE DAILY NEWSPAPER "EXCELSIOR", MEXICO CITY, MEXICO, 940422, IN SPANISH. THE FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE ARTICLE TITLED "THE MILITIA WILL SUPPORT A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN CHIAPAS: RIVAS P."; THE CORRESPONDENT IS MARTA ((ANAYA)).

SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, CHIAPAS, 22D OF APRIL. - THE CONFLICT IN CHIAPAS IS A PROBLEM BETWEEN MEXICANS; "FOR THAT REASON WE - THE MILITARY MEN - BELIEVE THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CHIAPAS CONFLICT MUST BE PURSUED BECAUSE WE ARE NOT CONFRONTING A FOREIGN AGGRESSOR", GENERAL JOSE RUBEN RIVAS PENA, COMMANDER OF THE 31ST MILITARY ZONE OF RANCHO NUEVO, DECLARED.

"ALL OF US WANT PEACE ... AND THE SOONER THE BETTER!", THE GENERAL DECLARED THIS MORNING AT A MEETING WITH A GROUP OF REPORTERS. THE REPORTERS WERE GIVEN A TOUR OF THE 31ST MILITARY ZONE HEADQUARTERS, WHICH GEN. RIVAS HAS COMMANDED SINCE 940401.

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THE GENERAL REJECTED SUB-COMMANDANTE MARCOS' ALLEGATIONS THAT THE MEXICAN ARMY WAS NOT ALLOWING FOOD AND MEDICINES TO ENTER THE ZAPATISTA HELD TERRITORY, "WE LET EVERYTHING PASS!" THE ONLY THING NOT ALLOWED TO PASS ARE ARMS AND GASOLINE; ESPECIALLY GASOLINE "FOR TACTICAL REASONS."

HE RECOGNIZED IN TURN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EZLN'S STAND-DOWN FROM RED ALERT, ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY RO COMMENT: 940421, MEANT TO HIM -- THE INSURGENTS "HAVE THE WILL TO SEEK A POLITICAL SOLUTION."

REFERRING TO THE TIMES IN WHICH CHIAPAS IS LIVING THROUGH DURING THIS CEASEFIRE, THE BRIGADIER GENERAL INDICATED THAT "WE ARE IN A SITUATION WHICH IF NOT DELICATE, CERTAINLY INDICATES A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AND THERE IS SOME OF TENSION", BUT CONSIDERED THAT "IF WE OBSERVE THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES DURING PEACE TALKS, IT'S LOGICAL..." AND WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE ARMY-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AND THE ACCOUNTS OF POSSIBLE "FISSURES" BETWEEN THEM, THE GENERAL ANSWERED: "THE MEXICAN ARMY, WHICH COMES FROM THE PEOPLE, IS INSTITUTIONAL, AND A CASE OF DISOBEDIENCE WOULD NEVER CROSS ITS MIND. THE MEXICAN ARMY SERVES ITS THE MEXICAN PEOPLE THROUGH DISCIPLINE."

GENERAL RIVAS PENA - A MODERATE MAN IN SPEECH - SAID "TO RESPECT" THE ZAPATISTAS "BECAUSE THEY'RE MEXICANS"; HE CONSIDERED THAT THEY "LOOK FOR A SOLUTION" TO THEIR PROBLEMS, BUT "WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THE METHODS EMPLOYED."

AS FOR LAST WEEK'S ATTACK SUFFERED BY HIS SOLDIERS AT A CHECKPOINT NEAR TUXTLA-GUTIERREZ, THE GENERAL AFFIRMED THAT THE AUTHOR'S OR AUTHORS' INTENTIONS "COULD CONFORM TO AN INTENT TO BREAK THE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION FOR CHIAPAS AND FOR MEXICO."

HE INSISTED THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT MUST BE FOUND "BECAUSE WE ARE NOT CONFRONTING A FOREIGN AGGRESSOR; THIS IS A MEXICAN PROBLEM AND THIS MEXICAN PROBLEM MUST HAVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION."

THIS MORNING ABOARD THE MILITARY BASE WAS LIKE ANY OTHER, ONLY THIS TIME -- THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE ZAPATISTA ASSAULT -- THE REPORTERS OBSERVED THE DAILY

ROUTINE OF THE 31ST MILITARY ZONE'S BASE.

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HUNDREDS OF SOLDIERS, ASSIGNED TO THE "FUERZA ARCOIRIS" - A NAME CARRIED BY THE OPERATIVE WHICH PROVIDES SECURITY IN CHIAPAS -, BEGAN THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH MUSTER AT SIX O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING.

WELL UNIFORMED, WELL ARMED, THEY RENDERED HONORS TO THE FLAG, SANG THE NATIONAL ANTHEM WITH GUSTO, AND MARCHED AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE LARGE PLAZA LOCATED IN THE CENTER, TO THE BEAT OF THE DRUMS, BUGLES AND SOUND OF THE BOOTS ON THE GROUND.

THE COMPARISON WITH THE MARCH OF THE ZAPATISTA INSURGENTS ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF EMILIANO ZAPATA'S DEATH, WAS INEVITABLE. HERE, EVERYONE WEARS PRACTICALLY NEW UNIFORMS; OVER THERE, PATCHED. HERE, GOOD WEAPONS; THE OPPOSITE WITH THE ZAPATISTAS.

CERTAINLY IT WAS KNOWN, BUT THE COMPARISON SO CLEAR, SO VIVID, SO IMMEDIATE WAS STRIKING.

THIS GOES WITHOUT MENTIONING FOOD. TODAY'S MENU - ON A SHEET OF PAPER NAILED TO A TREE - ANNOUNCED:

- BREAKFAST: JUICE, ATOLE RO COMMENT: A MEXICAN BEVERAGE, MILK WITH GRANOLA, SHREDDED BEEF, BEAN STEW, WHITE BREAD, SWEET ROLLS.

- LUNCH RO COMMENT: THIS CULTURE'S LARGE MEAL: VEGETABLE SOUP, RICE WITH CARROTS, TUNA SALAD, MAYONNAISE, BEAN STEW WITH BACON, TORTILLAS, SEASONAL FRUIT, PUNCH, POTABLE WATER.

- DINNER: MILK SHAKE, HAMBURGER WITH FRIES, BEAN STEW WITH CHEESE, WHITE BREAD, SWEET ROLLS.

THE INSURGENTS BARELY EAT TWICE A DAY, AND FOOD USUALLY CONSISTS OF BEANS AND TORTILLAS; AND ON RARE OCCASIONS A PIECE OF MEAT, BE IT JERKY, OR PREPARED IN A BROTH.

HOWEVER, THERE ARE SIMILARITIES HERE AND OVER THERE: BOTH SIDES TROOPS BELIEVE IN WHAT THEY'RE DOING; BOTH SIDES TROOPS BELIEVE THAT WHAT THEY ARE DOING THEY ARE DOING FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY.

FOR THE SOLDIERS OF THE MEXICAN ARMY, THEIR MISSION IS TO "PROTECT THE PEACE". FOR THE ZAPATISTA ARMY, TO ACHIEVE "JUSTICE, LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY."

THEIR ORIGINS ARE SIMILAR. PERHAPS SOME MORE HUMBLE THAN OTHERS. BUT OF THE PEOPLE IN THE END. AND, IN

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THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, SOMETHING ELSE MAKES THEM
SIMILAR: THE SEPARATION FROM LOVED ONES.

ONLY, THE MEXICAN ARMY HAS FOUND A FORMULA - CURIOUS
AND ENTERTAINING - TO DRAW THE FAMILIES NEAR IN SOME
WAY AND TO ALLAY THEIR APPREHENSIONS. WHILE WE
BREAKFASTED WITH GENERAL RIVAS PENA AND HIS STAFF -
MEMBERS OF THE 83D BATTALION RO COMMENT: THE 83D IS
PERMANENTLY BASED AT RANCHO NUEVO, 39TH BATTALION,
SECOND GROUP OF MORTARS AND A MEDICAL GROUP -, WE WERE
SHOWN A VIDEO:

VARIOUS SOLDIERS APPEARED ON THE VIDEO. ONE BY ONE
THEY SENT GREETINGS TO THEIR WIFE, MOTHER, THEIR CHILD
AND ASKED THEM NOT WORRY, THAT THEY WERE ALRIGHT ...

LATER THE FAMILIES OF SOME CORPORALS OR SERGEANTS,
FROM DIFFERENT TOWNS AND CITIES, APPEARED ON THE VIDEO
AND ALSO SENT MESSAGES. SOME OF THE MESSAGES SENT BY
THE MOTHERS AND WIVES:

- I HOPE YOU RETURN ... IT'S BEEN ALMOST FOUR MONTHS
SINCE YOU LEFT...
- I AM PROUD THAT MY SON REPRESENTS THE 83D
BATTALION...
- TELL THEM TO BEHAVE THEMSELVES WITH THE POOR
PEOPLE...
- DON'T CALL SO MUCH BY TELEPHONE, IT'S VERY
EXPENSIVE. IT WOULD BE BETTER IF WE WROTE TO EACH
OTHER.
- I KNOW HE IS STRONG ... I KNOW IT'S DANGEROUS, BUT
WE ARE PROUD OF ALL YOU HAVE DONE ... MANY BLESSINGS
IT WAS THE HUMAN PART OF THEMSELVES, OF THEIR FAMILIES
AND FRIENDS. HOW, THEN, DO YOU KEEP UP THE MORALE?
THE GENERAL ANSWERED: "MORALE IS OBTAINED WITH
TRAINING ... THERE IS A VERY POSITIVE ENTHUSIASM.

AND AROUND THE PERIMETER - AND UNTIL THE MOMENT A
PEACE IS SIGNED, THAT'S THE WAY IT WILL BE - THE
TRAINING WILL CONTINUE.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(G/REL UK, CAN, AUS)~~ PUBLIC RELATIONS

A. THE FACT THAT THE MEXICAN ARMY INVITED THE
PRESS ONTO ANY BASE IS UNUSUAL; THE FACT THAT THE BASE
WAS RANCHO NUEVO IS SIGNIFICANT.

TALKING TO THE PRESS GOES AGAINST THE
INSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF THE MEXICAN ARMY. HOWEVER,
THE ARMY BELATEDLY REALIZED THAT WHETHER OR NOT THEY

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WERE SUCCEEDING IN THEIR EFFORTS IN CHIAPAS WAS IRRELEVANT WHEN THE EZLN APPEARED TO BE WINNING THE POLITICAL BATTLE AT HOME AND ABROAD.


B.



C. FOR THE FIRST TIME THE ARMY IS ATTEMPTING TO PUT A HUMAN FACE ON THE INSTITUTION. IF THE ARMY IS TO CONVINCE THE MEXICAN PUBLIC THAT IT IS TRULY AN ARMY OF THE PEOPLE, THEN IT MUST CONVINCE THE PUBLIC THAT THE INSTITUTION IS MADE UP OF PEOPLE LIKE THEM. THESE SOLDIERS COME FROM THE SAME NEIGHBORHOODS, ARE SONS, BROTHERS, FATHERS, AND HUSBANDS.

2. ~~(C/REL UK;CAN,AUS)~~ LOGISTICS/SUPPLY

A. THE ARMY'S LOGISTICS WAS INADEQUATE TO THE TASK WHEN THE CHIAPAS INSURGENCY BEGAN. SIMPLY KEEPING THE SOLDIERS FED OVERWHELMED THE MEXICAN DEFENSE SECRETARIAT.



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C. THOUGH FIELD EXPEDIENT KITCHENS HAVE BEEN MOVED INTO NEARBY BUILDINGS, THERE THERE ARE STILL NO CP OR GP TENTS, FIELD MESSHALLS, PORTA-POTTIES, ETC. SOLDIERS EAT WHEREVER THEY CAN FIND A PLACE TO SIT IN THE OPEN. QUARTERMASTERS ARE SEEN DAILY IN THE TOWNS BUYING FOOD ON THE ECONOMY -- BREAD FROM THE BAKERIES, TORTILLAS FROM THE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED TORTILLA SHOPS, MEAT AND FRUIT IN THE MARKETS, ETC. MILITARY VEHICLES WAIT IN LINE AT GAS STATIONS LIKE EVERYONE ELSE.

D.



ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .

COLL: (U) AC.

INSTR: (U) U.S.

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U)

DCSD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RELEASABLE TO UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, AUSTRALIA.

DECL: ~~QADR~~

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PAGE:3735

INQUIRE=DOC26D
ITEM NO=00278277

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX217 MCN = 94131/41330 TOR = 941312350
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS5843 1312348-~~CCCC~~--RUEALGX.

ZNY, ~~CCCC~~

HEADER

R 112348Z MAY 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
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RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 112014Z MAY 94

TO DIA WASHDC

BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] /BRITISH MILITARY PROVIDES
MINE AND EOD TRAINING (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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PAGE:3736

DOI: (U) 940504.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) A. [REDACTED]
B. [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NF)~~ THE MEXICAN MILITARY'S 1ST MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE IS CURRENTLY RECEIVING MINING, DEMINING, EOD, AND COUNTERMINE TRAINING AT THEIR BASE ON MEXICO CITY'S MILITARY CAMP ONE. THE TRAINING IS BEING PROVIDED BY SOLDIERS FROM THE BRITISH ARMY.

TEXT: ~~(C/NF)~~ 1. THE MEXICAN MILITARY'S 1ST MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE IS CURRENTLY RECEIVING MINING, DEMINING, EOD, AND COUNTERMINE TRAINING AT THEIR BASE ON MEXICO CITY'S MILITARY CAMP ONE. THE TRAINING IS BEING PROVIDED BY SOLDIERS FROM THE BRITISH ARMY.

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE TRAINING IS DESIGNED TO ADDRESS A MEXICAN MILITARY SHORTCOMING IN MINE WARFARE. THIS HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY MORE IMPORTANT OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS DUE TO THE USE OF MINES AND TRAPS IN THE STATE OF CHIAPAS BY THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (EZLN).

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED] A VARIETY OF COUNTRIES ARE PRESENT IN MEXICO PROVIDING TRAINING TO MEXICAN MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES. THESE INCLUDE ISRAEL AND SPAIN.

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE:3737



ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .

COLL: (U) AB.

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

DCSD, QPAD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS.

~~DECL: OADR~~

BT

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~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:3560

INQUIRE=DOC26D
ITEM NO=00430255

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX178 MCN = 94152/00736 TOR = 941520027
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS0291 1520028-~~CCCC~~--RUEALGX.
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

O 010028Z JUN 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 312356Z MAY 94
[REDACTED]

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX/INM-FOR GELBARD// IMMEDIATE
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL// IMMEDIATE
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHDC
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2// IMMEDIATE
RHCGSRB/CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2/AFIN-IC// IMMEDIATE
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//, IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] THE MEXICAN SECRETARIAT OF
DEFENSE (SEDNA) PURCHASED "STEALTH" AIRCRAFT (U).

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FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940524.

REQS: (U) 

-
SOURCE: (U) 

-
SUMMARY: (U) THE MEXICAN SECRETARIAT OF DEFENSE HAS
TAKEN DELIVERY OF THE FIRST OF FOUR (4) SA-2-37,
SCHWEIZER (RG-8A) "CONDOR" AIRPLANES. THE AIRCRAFT IS
1 MOTORIZED GLIDER DESIGNED TO PROVIDE "COVERT"
SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY. ENCLOSURES.

1. ~~(C)~~ THE MEXICAN AIR FORCE HAS TAKEN DELIVERY OF
THE FIRST AIRCRAFT OF FOUR (4) SCHWEIZER SA-2-37 MOTOR
DRIVEN GLIDER AIRPLANES. 


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
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COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT TOOK DELIVERY OF THIS AIRCRAFT AFTER THE CHIAPAS UPRISING. THIS UPRISING MAY HAVE INFLUENCED THE GOM TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR MILITARY PURCHASES;



2. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE MEXICAN MILITARY WILL PROBABLY DEPLOY THIS AIRCRAFT AGAINST THE EZLN WHO ARE OPERATING IN THE LACANDON JUNGLE. THERE IS CURRENTLY A CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN MEXICAN FORCES AND THE EZLN WHICH PROHIBITS OPERATIONS (INCLUDING OVER FLIGHT) INTO THE

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
EZLN HELD TERRITORY.



ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .
COLL: (U) AC.
INSTR: (U) U.S. 
PREP: (U) 
ENCL: (U) TO FOLLOW: 2 ENCLOSURES.

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RG-8, 1 COPY, IN ENGLISH, 940524 (U).
2. SKETCH OF THE RG-8 AIRCRAFT, 1 COPY, 940524 (U).

ACQ: (U) 
DISSEM: (U) 

DSCD, POL).

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BT

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VV

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PAGE:3522

INQUIRE=DOC26D
ITEM NO=00439940

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX085 MCN = 94152/49546 TOR = 941522228
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS7173 1522206-~~0000~~--RUEALGX.
ZNY ~~00000~~

HEADER

R 012206Z JUN 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 011922Z JUN 94

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2//
RHCGSRB/CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2//
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] MEXICAN RECONNAISSANCE
AIRCRAFT FIRED ON BY APPARENT SA-7 ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS.
(U)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) [REDACTED]

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NF)~~ MEXICAN ARMY [REDACTED]
REPORTS [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT FIRED ON BY APPARENT SA-7
ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS. WEAPONS FIRED ON TWO OCCASIONS
DURING [REDACTED] IN THE STATE OF
CHIAPAS, MEXICO.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE MEXICAN ARMY [REDACTED]
IS REPORTEDLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE USE OF SA-7
ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES BEING FIRED AT AIRCRAFT IN THE
STATE OF CHIAPAS.

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE MEXICAN AIR FORCE HAS BEEN USING TWO OF
THEIR ISRAELI PROCURED "ARAVA" AIRCRAFT FOR [REDACTED]
COLLECTION IN THE STATE OF CHIAPAS, MEXICO. THE AIRCRAFT
ARE CONFIGURED AS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AND HAVE BEEN USED SINCE EARLY JANUARY TO
PROVIDE [REDACTED] ON THE EMILIANO ZAPATA
LIBERATION ARMY (EZLN).

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

4. ~~(C/NF)~~ APPROXIMATELY A MONTH AGO AND THEN ABOUT A
WEEK LATER, THE AIRCRAFT REPORTED LARGE EXPLOSIONS AT THE
SAME HEIGHT AS THE AIRCRAFT, BUT SOME DISTANCE AWAY.
MEXICAN ARMY [REDACTED] BELIEVES THESE EXPLOSIONS WERE
PRODUCED BY TWO SA-7 ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES THAT WERE
FIRED AT THE AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT FLY WITHOUT ANY
LIGHTS, SO THE MISSILES WOULD HAVE TO BE FIRED BASED ON
THE SOUNDS OF THE AIRCRAFT. BECAUSE OF THIS AND THE
RELATIVELY LOW HEAT SIGNATURE OF THE AIRCRAFT, THE
MEXICAN AIR FORCE BELIEVES IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO
HIT THE AIRCRAFT, BUT ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT ANY FUTURE
HELICOPTER OPERATIONS. HELICOPTERS WOULD BE EXTREMELY
VULNERABLE TO ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES.

5. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ IT IS BELIEVED THE REAL STRENGTH IN TERMS OF WEAPONS OF THE EZLN HAS YET TO BE REVEALED, AND WE HAVE UP TO NOW ONLY SEEN VERY LIGHT WEAPONS USED BY THE EZLN FORCES. THERE HAVE BEEN NO ARTILLERY, HEAVY MACHINE GUNS, OR MORTAR SYSTEMS SHOWN IN THE PRESS OR SEEN BY VISITORS TO THE EZLN CAMPS. ALL OF THESE WEAPONS TO INCLUDE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES WOULD BE LOGICAL WEAPONS FOR DEFENSE OF THEIR BASE CAMPS. ACTUAL USE OF THE SA-7S WOULD INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO USE MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS, AND WOULD MAKE THE TASK OF THE MEXICAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT SHOULD NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN, AND FIGHTING COMMENCE.

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .
COLL: (U) AB; AC.
INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]
PREP: (U) [REDACTED]
ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

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DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]
DCSD, OPAD, POL).

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NATIONALS.

~~DECL: OADR~~

BT

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INQUIRE=DOC26D
ITEM NO=00584859

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX662 MCN = 94171/25342 TOR = 941711932
OTTSZYUW RUEKJCS2457 1711932-~~SSSS~~-RUEALGX.

ZNY ~~SSSS~~

HEADER

O 201932Z JUN 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI IOC BOLLING AFB DC//DTA//
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
O 201917Z JUN 94

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-HEX/INM-FOR GELBARD// IMMEDIATE
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL// IMMEDIATE
RUEHGT/USDAO GUATEMALA CITY GT
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHDC
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2// IMMEDIATE
RHCGSRB/CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2/AFIN-IC// IMMEDIATE
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//, IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 15 [REDACTED]

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] ANALYTICAL STUDY, POTENTIAL

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FOR VIOLENCE IN MEXICO PRIOR TO 941231 (U).

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 940101-940615

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(S/NF)~~ AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY
SITUATION IN MEXICO REVEALS SEVERAL POTENTIAL ARMED-
ACTION SCENARIOS, IDENTIFIED AS "VIOLENCE WINDOWS," WHICH
EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO, THE EZLN REBELS, OR
OTHER ELEMENTS COULD INITIATE PRIOR TO 941231.

TEXT: ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

1. ~~(S/NF)~~ AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY
SITUATION IN MEXICO REVEALS SEVERAL POTENTIAL ARMED-
ACTION SCENARIOS, IDENTIFIED AS "VIOLENCE WINDOWS," WHICH
EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO, THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL
LIBERATION ARMY (EZLN) REBELS, OR OTHER ELEMENTS (NON-
RULING PARTIES, OTHER INSURGENT OR DISSIDENT GROUPS,
NARCO TRAFFICKERS) COULD INITIATE PRIOR TO 941231.
RESULT OF THE STAFF STUDY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INDICATES A BETTER THAN AVERAGE POTENTIAL
FOR ARMED VIOLENCE PRIOR TO THAT END-DATE. THE "VIOLENCE
WINDOWS" ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE; THEY ARE TIME LINED
AND COULD IN FACT OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY OR CONSECUTIVELY.
NO PRIORITIZATION OR STATISTICAL PROBABILITY OF WHICH
"VIOLENCE WINDOW" SCENARIO WILL OCCUR HAS BEEN
ACCOMPLISHED; RATHER, THE POTENTIAL FOR THE POSSIBILITY
OF OCCURRENCE OF ANY OF THESE SCENARIOS HAS BEEN ASSESSED
AND REPORTED.

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE MOST LIKELY WINDOW IS RIGHT AFTER THE ELECTIONS [REDACTED] WITH THE EZLN INITIATING ARMED CONFLICT UNDER THE PRETENSE OF REACTING TO ELECTORAL FRAUD, SHOULD THE EZLN'S LEADERSHIP BELIEVE THE ELECTIONS WERE NOT FAIR, HONEST, AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DESIRES OF THE PEOPLE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EVEN
THOUGH THE MILITARY (AT LEAST AT THE JUNIOR- TO MID-LEVEL OFFICER LEVELS) MAY FEEL MILITARILY PREPARED TO GO AFTER THE EZLN, IT IS FAR LESS LIKELY THAT THE GOM WOULD INITIATE HOSTILITIES PRIOR TO THE ELECTION [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] OR EVEN AFTER WITHOUT SOME [REDACTED] PROVOCATION.

3. (S/NF) [REDACTED]

-
- TEXT--
-

-
2. ASSUMPTIONS:
-

A. THE RULING PARTY OF MEXICO, THE INSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PRI), WISHES TO MAINTAIN EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OF MEXICO.
-

B. THE MEXICAN ARMY IS FIRMLY UNDER CONTROL OF THE RULING PARTY'S CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP AND WILL NOT ATTACK THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (EZLN) PRIOR TO OR AFTER THE ELECTIONS, WITHOUT SPECIFIC ORDERS TO ATTACK FROM THE PRESIDENCY, WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO COME PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS.
-

C. [REDACTED]

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D. THE EZLN IS AN INDEPENDENT REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION WITH ITS OWN POLITICAL AND MILITARY AGENDAS; THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO (GOM) DOES NOT CONTROL ITS (EZLN'S) LEADERSHIP.

E. BOTH THE MEXICAN ARMED FORCES AND THE EZLN HAVE SUFFICIENT PREPARATION, SIZE, AND WILL TO ACT TO INITIATE AN OFFENSIVE, IF THAT IS JUDGED BY THEIR LEADERSHIP TO BE IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS.

F. THE EZLN HAS CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER TERRORIST OR INSURGENT GROUPS IN MEXICO WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY CAUSE THE SPREAD OF THE INDIGENOUS/PEASANT FIGHT IN MEXICO TO OTHER STATES-- MOST LIKELY OAXACA, GUERRERO, MORELOS, TABASCO, PUEBLA, SINALOA AND MICHOACAN.

G. SHOULD THE EZLN FEAR A SURPRISE ATTACK BY THE GOM COMBINED WITH THE PROBABILITY OF AN UNFAIR ELECTION, WE ASSUME THAT IT MIGHT BE STIMULATED TO ACT PRIOR TO THE ELECTION. IF THE EZLN IS WILLING TO GIVE THE PEOPLE A CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN A FAIR AND OPEN ELECTION WITH NO FEAR OF GOM ACTION AGAINST THE EZLN, WE ASSUME THAT IT WOULD BE MORE INCLINED TO ADOPT A WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

A. EZLN.

1) THE EZLN OCCUPIES A PORTION OF THE MEXICAN NATIONAL TERRITORY AND IS MAKING DEMANDS ON THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE GOM IS CURRENTLY NOT WILLING TO MEET.

2) ON 940611 THE EZLN REJECTED THE PEACE PROPOSALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO; AN EZLN SPOKESMAN, SUBCOMANDANTE MARCOS, CLAIMED THE PACT CONCEALED A DEATH THREAT AND OFFERED A SOLUTION WITHOUT DIGNITY AS THE REASONS FOR THE REJECTION.

3) THE EZLN HAS PROVEN ADEPT AT THE USE OF BOTH VERBAL AND WRITTEN PROPAGANDA EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND THE MEXICAN PUBLIC.

B. MEXICAN MILITARY.

1) THE MEXICAN MILITARY HAS DEVELOPED, AND IS PREPARED TO EXECUTE ON ORDER, AN OFFENSIVE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR CHIAPAS. IT HAS EXISTING STRATEGIC PLANS FOR PREPARED TO EXECUTE ON ORDER, AN OFFENSIVE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR CHIAPAS. IT HAS EXISTING STRATEGIC PLANS FOR MOBILIZATION THROUGHOUT THE NATIONAL TERRITORY.

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-
2) THE MEXICAN MILITARY IS UPDATING DOCTRINE TO BETTER PREPARE, STRATEGICALLY AND TACTICALLY, TO FIGHT A PROTRACTED GUERRILLA WAR.
-

3) THE MEXICAN MILITARY IS REBUILDING ELEMENTS OF ITS FORCE STRUCTURE TO BETTER FIGHT THE SAME TYPE OF INTERNAL ENEMY.
-

4) THE MEXICAN MILITARY IS UPDATING ITS EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT THE ABOVE MENTIONED DOCTRINAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES.
-

5) 

-
C. THE RAINY SEASON HAS STARTED IN CHIAPAS. ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS WILL LIMIT MEXICAN ARMY AERIAL AND GROUND ACTIVITIES. THIS SEASON WILL EXTEND THROUGH DECEMBER.
-

D. THE MEXICAN TRADITION OF PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION IS FULLY OPERATIONAL; THIS RELIEF OF SOCIAL TENSIONS AND PUBLIC DISPLAY WILL CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.
-

E. MEXICO IS SCHEDULED TO HOLD ELECTIONS 940821. THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD EXPECT THE MILITARY TO KEEP AS MANY TROOPS AS POSSIBLE AVAILABLE TO COUNTER WHATEVER CIVIL UNREST MIGHT RESULT FROM THE ELECTIONS, WHICH REQUIRES THE MILITARY NOT BECOME ENGAGED IN RENEWED FIGHTING AGAINST THE EZLN UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS.
-


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C. BACKGROUND.

1) ON 940101 THE ARMED INSURRECTION IN MEXICO'S SOUTHERN CHIAPAS STATE BEGAN WITH THE OCCUPATION OF FOUR TOWNS-- SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, OCOSINGO, ALTAMIRANO, AND LAS MARGARITAS. THE MILITARY RESPONDED AND MOVED ACTIVELY AGAINST THE EZLN GUERRILLAS THE FOLLOWING DAY.

2) BY 940112 A CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN CALLED. SHORTLY AFTER, A PEACE COMMISSION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED AND A PEACE COMMISSIONER, MANUEL ((CAMACHO)) SOLIS, NAMED. A GENERAL AMNESTY WAS PROCLAIMED SHORTLY AFTER. THE CEASEFIRE HAS HELD. THE PEACE COMMISSIONER RESIGNED 940616.

3) ON 940612 THE EZLN REJECTED THE PEACE ACCORDS OFFERED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO. THE GOM PEACE COMMISSIONER MANUEL ((CAMACHO)) TOLD THE U.S. AMBASSADOR THAT PEACE AGREEMENTS WOULD NEED TO BE REACHED BY MID JUNE OR THEY PROBABLY WOULDN'T HAPPEN BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD 940821 FOR LOCAL, STATE AND NATIONAL POSITIONS. NEWSPAPERS ARE CARRYING REPORTS OF LARGE SHIPMENTS OF ILLEGAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION FROM THE U.S. TO MEXICO. THE MEXICAN ARMY IS MAKING PREPARATIONS TO FIGHT A JUNGLE GUERRILLA WAR, PREPARATIONS WHICH WILL NOT BE COMPLETE PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS. THE RAINY SEASON HAS STARTED IN MEXICO WHICH WILL LIMIT AIR AND ROAD TRAVEL IN THE MOUNTAIN REGIONS OF SOUTHERN MEXICO. THE EZLN HAS TAKEN OVER A LARGE SECTION OF THE STATE OF CHIAPAS AND MAINTAINS COMPLETE CONTROL IN THE RURAL, EAST-CENTRAL PORTION OF THE STATE, ROUGHLY THAT AREA WHICH INCLUDES THE LACANDON RAIN FOREST AND THE

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USUMACINTA RIVER BORDERING ON GUATEMALA.

C. DISCUSSION POINTS.

1) GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO.

THE GOM, REPRESENTED BY THE RULING FRI PARTY DESIRES TO MAINTAIN ITS HISTORICAL HOLD ON THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT. IT HAS PREVIOUSLY PROVEN CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING CONTROL, [REDACTED]

THE RULING PARTY (PRI) LOST ITS POPULAR CANDIDATE TO AN ASSASSIN'S BULLETS 940323; THE FRI'S REPLACEMENT CANDIDATE, ERNESTO ((ZEDILLO)), IS NOT SEEN AS A CANDIDATE WITH THE SAME LEADERSHIP QUALITIES AS HIS PREDECESSOR. ZEDILLO HAS HAD SOME NEGATIVE PROBLEMS WITH THE MILITARY, PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE SINCE BEEN OVERCOME AND APPARENTLY RESOLVED TO THE MILITARY'S SATISFACTION. MANY CITIZENS OF MEXICO FEEL THAT THIS ELECTION COULD MARK THE END OF THE FRI'S DOMINATION AND CONTROL OF ELECTORAL POLITICS IN MEXICO. THE TWO MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTIES, THE PRD AND PAN, HAVE GROWN INTO FORMIDABLE OPPONENTS WITH, DIEGO ((FERNANDEZ)) OF THE PAN SHOWING INCREASED POPULARITY, AT SOME TIMES AND IN SOME PLACES EXCEEDING THAT OF ZEDILLO. IF THE ELECTIONS ARE HONEST (MANY CITIZENS DON'T BELIEVE THEY WILL BE) THE FRI WILL LOSE MANY FEDERAL DEPUTY AND SENATE SLOTS, AND POTENTIALLY THE PRESIDENCY AS WELL.

2) THE MEXICAN MILITARY.

THE MILITARY IS UNDER THE FIRM CONTROL OF THE NATION'S CIVILIAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. SOME, YOUNGER ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S POLICIES, INCLUDING THOSE RESULTING IN A PUBLIC LOSS AND HUMILIATION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE CHIAPAS CAMPAIGN'S FIRST PHASE (ENDING WITH A CEASEFIRE AND ATTACKS AGAINST THE MILITARY FROM THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND LACKADAISICAL SUPPORT FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH); THESE ELEMENTS ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND DO NOT REPRESENT AT THIS TIME A THREAT TO MILITARY STABILITY.

THE MILITARY HAS PREPARED A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE CHIAPAS THEATER; THE PLAN IS BUILT ON A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE. THE MILITARY IS PREPARED TO EXECUTE THE PLAN ON RECEIPT OF AN EXECUTIVE ORDER. THE MILITARY WOULD WILLINGLY INITIATE THE CAMPAIGN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY AND WOULD INFLICT HEAVY CASUALTIES ON THE EZLN AND PROBABLY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF CHIAPAS;


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B) PREEMPTIVE ACTIVITIES

WITH THE REJECTION BY THE EZLN OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL FOR SETTLING THE SITUATION IN CHIAPAS; THE INCREASE IN NARCOTICS-BASED TERRORIST BOMBINGS AND OTHER VIOLENT CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRING

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THROUGHOUT MEXICO; THE INCREASED SEIZURE OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY; AND THE LIKELIHOOD FOR LARGE-SCALE DEMONSTRATIONS BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTIONS-- IT APPEARS THE MEXICAN ARMY HAS BEEN GIVEN THE MISSION TO PREEMPT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY PRE- OR POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE BY EITHER ISOLATING ANY POTENTIAL TROUBLE MAKERS, OR PUTTING THEM ON THE DEFENSIVE SO THEY WON'T BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY REACT DURING THE ELECTION SEASON.



1) A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN MEXICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITY.

2) THE DEPLOYMENT OF A LARGE TASK FORCE



3) THE REINFORCEMENT OF ARMY UNITS INTO POTENTIAL TROUBLE AREAS.

4) REPORTS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY TRAINING BY UNITS NOT NORMALLY EXPECTED TO PERFORM THIS MISSION.

THE SOURCES OF POTENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE OR ARMED DISTURBANCES WOULD LOGICALLY BE FOCUSED ON TWO DIFFERENT GROUPS. THE FIRST IS THE NARCOTRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS WHO HAVE SHOWN A RECENT TENDENCY FOR EXTREMELY VIOLENT ACTIONS, AND THE SECOND WOULD BE ANY TYPE OF INSURGENT OR ANTI-GOVERNMENT GROUP WITH EITHER REAL OR BELIEVED GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. THUS, ANY INCREASED OR ENHANCED MISSION OF THE MEXICAN ARMY WOULD BE REVEALED BY A CHANGE IN ACTIVITIES AGAINST THESE GROUPS. EACH WILL BE LOOKED AT IN TURN, AND IT CAN BE SEEN THE ARMY HAS TAKEN A MORE ACTIVE ROLE AGAINST BOTH TYPES OF ACTIVITIES.

IN ADDITION TO A MORE FORCEFUL ERADICATION EFFORT TO INCLUDE (FOR THE FIRST TIME) ARMED ENCOUNTERS WITH DRUG TRAFFICKERS IN THE GROWING AREAS,


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THE MILITARY HAS REINFORCED (AND IN SOME CASES SUPPLANTED) THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL POLICE (PGR) IN SOME COUNTER DRUG ACTIVITIES. IT IS NOW COMMON FOR THE MEXICAN ARMY TO BE PRESENT IN SEARCHING OF SUSPECTED DRUG HOUSES, 


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DURING THE 1970S, THE STATE OF GUERRERO WAS THE SITE OF A GUERRILLA UPRISING THAT WAS SUPPRESSED BY THE ARMY, AND IT HAS LONG BEEN REPORTED TO BE A HOT SPOT WITH THE POTENTIAL TO FLARE UP SIMILAR TO CHIAPAS. THE U.S. LEGAL ATTACHE HAS ALSO REPORTED AND IT HAS LONG BEEN RUMORED THAT THERE IS AN ARMED BAND OF 150 GUERRILLAS IN THE MOUNTAINS IN GUERRERO WHO SUPPOSEDLY ARE THE REASON FOR A CURRENT 8 BATTALION (1500 SOLDIER) MEXICAN ARMY EXERCISE IN THE AREA. EVEN THOUGH THE ARMY AND THE STATE GOVERNOR HAVE DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF GUERRILLAS IN THE STATE OF GUERRERO, THIS POSITION IS THE NORMAL ONE BOTH WOULD TAKE, AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS COMPLETELY FACTUAL. IT IS NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT TO REVEAL THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS IN MEXICO SO CLOSE TO THE AUGUST ELECTIONS.

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OPEN SOURCES HAVE REPORTED, AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS ADMITTED THE REINFORCEMENT OF UNITS IN POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CLAIMS THE REINFORCEMENTS ARE IN CONJUNCTION WITH COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES, BUT IT DOES IMPROVE THE ARMY POSTURE SHOULD ANY ELECTION DISTURBANCES OCCUR.

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PAGE: 3238

3) THE EZLN.

THE EZLN INITIALLY WON THE PUBLICITY WAR IN MEXICO AND INTERNATIONALLY. THE FIRST PHASE OF THEIR STRATEGIC PLAN-- TO ATTACK THE GOM, TO EMBARRASS THE MILITARY, AND THEN TO RETREAT INTO THEIR JUNGLE STRONGHOLDS, AND FINALLY TO WIN TEMPORARY PEACE CONCESSIONS FROM THE GOM-- SUCCEEDED ADMIRABLY. WITH MINIMAL LOSSES THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY WAS KNOCKED ON ITS HEELS AND FORCED TO SUBMIT TO LENGTHY, PUBLIC PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE EZLN CURRENTLY HOLD A LARGE SECTION OF THE RURAL PORTIONS OF THE STATE OF CHIAPAS FROM WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO RECRUIT NEW FORCES, IMPROVE TRAINING PROGRAMS, AND BUILD SUPPLY NETWORKS. THIS CONSOLIDATION PROCESS HAS BEEN LARGELY TO THE BENEFIT OF THE EZLN.

THE REAL STRENGTH OF THE EZLN LIES NOT IN ARMED POWER BUT IN ITS LEADERSHIP, WHICH HAS REVEALED THE PLIGHT OF THE POOR PEOPLE OF CHIAPAS TO THE WORLD. THE EZLN HAS BEEN PREPARING FOR THIS CONFLICT FOR ALMOST EIGHT YEARS AND APPEAR CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A PROTRACTED GUERRILLA WAR. THEY SEEM TO HAVE BOTH THE POLITICAL WILL AND THE WILL TO INFLICT AND SUSTAIN CASUALTIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF A LENGTHY GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN IN MEXICO.

4) OTHER.

OTHER TERRORIST OR REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS EXIST, [REDACTED] IN MEXICO. THE GOVERNOR OF GUERRERO RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT NO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS EXIST IN HIS STATE, DESPITE EXTENSIVE MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS WHICH SUGGEST THE OPPOSITE; IN LATE NOVEMBER, 1993, THE GOVERNOR AND

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MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF CHIAPAS MADE THE SAME CLAIM, AND ATE THEIR WORDS A MONTH LATER. SHOULD THESE GROUPS ACT, IN AN EFFORT TO GAIN THEIR OWN CONCESSIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY WOULD BE OVER STRETCHED TO ADEQUATELY FIGHT ON TWO OR MORE FRONTS. IF THESE GROUPS ACTED WITH THE EZLN, A GROUP SUCH AS THE TERRORIST, URBAN BOMBER PROCUP-PDLP COULD DESTROY LIMITED TARGETS IN MEXICO

[REDACTED] AND EFFECTIVELY FREEZE THE CITY, FORCING GREATER CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS IN THE CITY AND RESULTING IN FEWER TROOPS AVAILABLE TO ADDRESS THE THREAT OUTSIDE OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY. A COMBINED, WELL-TIMED THREAT WOULD BE VERY EFFECTIVE.

NARCOTRAFFICKERS POTENTIALLY HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO GAIN FROM THIS INSTABILITY. MORE TROOPS INVOLVED IN THE GUERRILLA FIGHT EQUALS FEWER TROOPS INVOLVED IN COUNTER DRUG MISSIONS, AND AS WE HAVE SEEN IN CHIAPAS ALSO DIVERT MORE TRADITIONAL PGR AND POLICE CN EFFORTS. GUERRILLA OCCUPIED AREAS GIVE TRAFFICKERS POTENTIAL FREE OPERATING SPACE. ADDITIONALLY, DRUG-RELATED SERVICES IN TRADE FOR NEEDED ARMS COULD SATISFY THE NEEDS OF BOTH THE TRAFFICKERS AND THE GUERRILLAS.

THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, SOMEWHAT LIMITED IN THE PRESS BUT FULLY AVAILABLE TO THE PEOPLE, CONTINUES UNOBSTRUCTED IN MEXICO. VOCAL, NUMEROUS, LARGE-SCALE SUPPORT FOR THE EZLN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, AND FOR WORKER RIGHTS HAS RESULTED IN MANY PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS. THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT IS LARGELY UNABLE TO CURB THESE PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS, AS ANY PROHIBITION WOULD WORK AGAINST THE RULING PARTY AS THE ELECTION NEARS.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

A. THE NEXT TWO MONTHS IN MEXICO ARE CRITICAL FOR

[REDACTED] NATIONAL ELECTIONS ARE TWO MONTHS AWAY. VIOLENT ACTIVITIES AND PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS ARE INCREASING THROUGHOUT MEXICO. THE EZLN IS AWARE THAT AFTER THE ELECTIONS THE GOM WILL HAVE LESS NEED-- AS MEDIA AND NGO ATTENTION FADES-- TO HOLD THE ARMY BACK AND THE MEXICAN MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY BE

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ALLOWED TO START ITS OFFENSIVE TO (1) REGAIN FACE AND
(2) ELIMINATE VIA ARMED FORCE THE PROBLEM IN CHIAPAS.

B. THE EZLN HAS JUST REPORTEDLY VOTED, ALLEGEDLY BY MORE THAN 98 PERCENT, TO REJECT THE GOM PEACE PROPOSALS. THE GOM IS SCRAMBLING TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT WILL ALLOW THE PRI TO ISOLATE THE PROBLEM, THUS GAINING NEEDED CREDIBILITY TO WIN VOTES AND, HOPEFULLY, THE ELECTIONS.

1) VIOLENCE WINDOW 1. THE EZLN WILL INITIATE HOSTILITIES PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS. THE EZLN HAS REJECTED THE PEACE PROPOSALS OF THE GOM AND REALIZES THAT THE GOM WILL NOT GIVE IN TO ALL ITS DEMANDS. IT ALSO REALIZES THAT AFTER THE ELECTIONS IF THE PRI IS STILL IN POWER IT (THE EZLN) WILL HAVE LOST THE INITIATIVE. AFTER THE ELECTIONS THE PRI COULD SEEK A MILITARY SOLUTION, BELIEVING IT WILL HAVE SIX YEARS TO RECOVER FROM ANY ADVERSE PUBLICITY. THEREFORE, WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH IT (THE EZLN) WILL BEGIN MOVING FROM BASE CAMPS BREAKING INTO SMALL GUERRILLA FIGHTING CELLS.

THEIR INITIAL ATTACKS WILL BE CLASSICAL GUERRILLA OPERATIONS CONFINED MOSTLY TO CHIAPAS. OTHER ACTS OF AGGRESSION WILL OCCUR IN OTHER PARTS OF MEXICO, SOME OF WHICH MAY BE SPONSORED BY THE EZLN. OTHER TERRORIST/GUERRILLA OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF CHIAPAS WILL PROBABLY BE CONDUCTED BY OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, SOME WHICH ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE EZLN IDEOLOGY AND OTHERS WHO ARE USING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THEIR OWN GAIN. THE INTENT OF THESE ACTIVITIES WILL BE DISRUPTION OF THE ELECTIONS. VOTERS, MANY WHO ARE TIRED OF THE PRI, COULD SEE THIS WINDOW AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO VOTE FOR SOMEONE ELSE, WHILE OTHER MAY BE SCARED AND STAY HOME. ANOTHER NET GAIN FOR THE EZLN WOULD BE THE REFOCUS OF WORLD VISION AND OPILION ON THE INDIGENOUS PLIGHT IN MEXICO.

IF THE EZLN DESIRES TO PLACE THE MOST PRESSURE ON THE MILITARY IN MEXICO, THIS SCENARIO IS LIKELY, DESPITE EZLN CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY.

2) VIOLENCE WINDOW 2. MEXICAN MILITARY

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INITIATES HOSTILITIES PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS. THE MEXICAN MILITARY HAS A CONTINGENCY PLAN. BY ACTING PREEMPTIVELY IT CAN CONCENTRATE FORCES AND REDUCE THEM PRIOR TO HAVING TO CONFRONT A MEXICO-WIDE PROBLEM.

IF THE CIVILIAN ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT JUDGES THE POLITICAL COSTS TO BE MANAGEABLE, THIS WINDOW'S VIOLENT SCENARIO IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP. HOWEVER, THE POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE WORLDWIDE REFOCUS ON BOTH MEXICO'S INDIGENOUS PROBLEM AND IMAGE OF NOT RUNNING A TRULY CLEAN NATIONAL ELECTION MAKES THIS A LOW PROBABILITY COURSE OF ACTION.

3) VIOLENCE WINDOW 3. THE EZLN INITIATES ACTION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. IF THE EZLN BELIEVES THAT FAIR ELECTIONS WEREN'T CONDUCTED, IT COULD EASILY MANIPULATE THE PRESS-- SOME OF WHOM ARE ALREADY PREDISPOSED TO FOLLOW THAT SUGGESTION-- AND USE THIS AS A TRIGGER. THE PRD'S CARDENAS HAS ALREADY STATED IN PRESS RELEASES THAT IF THE ELECTIONS ARE NOT "CLEAN" IT COULD RESULT IN A CIVIL WAR IN MEXICO.



SHOULD THE EZLN WANT TO PLACE MAXIMUM, TIMELY PRESSURE ON THE NEWLY-ELECTED CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP (TO REGAIN LOST INITIATIVE), THIS IS A VERY LIKELY ARMED SCENARIO. EZLN SPOKESMAN MARCOS RECENTLY STATED THAT THE EZLN COULD AND HAS NOT RULED OUT RENEWED ARMED STRUGGLE IF THE GOVERNMENT GOES AGAINST THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE IN THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS. THIS IS THE MOST PROBABLE INITIATION WINDOW.

4) VIOLENCE WINDOW 4. THE MEXICAN MILITARY INITIATES ACTION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. POST-ELECTION THE MILITARY AND ITS CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP WAIT FOR ANY ELECTORAL COMPLAINTS TO GO AWAY. WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT SAFELY INSTALLED, IT COULD THEN EASILY SEAL THE CONFLICT AREA AND GO AFTER THE EZLN AT ITS LEISURE; THIS REMAINS A DIFFICULT PROPOSITION, AS THE TERRAIN AND CURRENT STATE OF THE MEXICAN ARMY ARE NOT EQUAL TO THE TASK.

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IF THE GOVERNMENT DESIRES TO REDUCE THE PROBLEM VIA "CUTTING OFF" THE PEASANT POPULATION FROM WHICH THE EZLN DRAWS ITS STRENGTH, AND IF PAYING THE POLITICAL PRICE SIX YEARS LATER IS ACCEPTABLE, THIS IS A POTENTIAL SCENARIO.

5) ANOTHER SCENARIO. SHOULD A MINORITY CANDIDATE WIN OR SHOULD SIGNIFICANT PRI LOSSES OCCUR BELOW NATIONAL LEVEL, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY VIOLENCE WINDOW SCENARIO WOULD OCCUR IN THE SHORT-TERM, GIVING BOTH SIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS AMICABLY OR AT LEAST IN A PEACEFUL MANNER.

6) SUMMARY. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THE EZLN, IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER SOCIETAL ELEMENTS, WILL EITHER INITIATE HOSTILITIES IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE ELECTION [REDACTED] OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER [REDACTED]

THE MOST LIKELY WINDOW IS NUMBER THREE, WITH THE EZLN INITIATING ARMED CONFLICT UNDER THE PRETENSE OF ELECTORAL FRAUD, SHOULD THE EZLN'S LEADERSHIP BELIEVE THE ELECTIONS WERE NOT FAIR, HONEST, AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DESIRES OF THE PEOPLE. THE INITIATION OF VIOLENCE WINDOW ONE HAS ONE MAJOR DRAWBACK FOR THE EZLN-- PROBABLE LOSS OF SUPPORT AND SHIFT IN WORLDWIDE PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD THE EZLN PREEMPT THE ELECTORAL PREROGATIVE OF THE MEXICAN PEOPLE BY INITIATING HOSTILITIES PRE-ELECTION. EVEN THOUGH THE MILITARY (AT LEAST AT THE JUNIOR- TO MID-LEVEL OFFICER LEVELS) MAY FEEL MILITARILY PREPARED TO GO AFTER THE EZLN, IT IS FAR LESS LIKELY THAT THE GOM WILL INITIATE HOSTILITIES PRIOR TO THE ELECTION (VIOLENCE WINDOW 2), OR EVEN AFTER WITHOUT SOME (POSSIBLY SELF-GENERATED) PROVOCATION.

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PAGE:3250

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .

COLL: (U) AB.

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

DCSD, OPAD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

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INQUIRE=DOC28D
ITEM NO=00336408

ENVELOPE

PATMZUW YEKDQA 0360 3011519-MORN--YEKQX.

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK PP SOA DE

HEADER

P 281701Z OCT 94

FM SSO DIA//J2M-1//

TO INDIC

INFO [REDACTED] MEXICO

SAFE

ZEM

CONTROLS

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SECTION 1 OF 2

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[REDACTED] PASS TO USDAO

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: [REDACTED]

1. ~~S&~~ [REDACTED]

RENEWED SPORADIC VIOLENCE COULD OCCUR, PARTICULARLY IN CHIAPAS, BEGINNING IN EARLY DECEMBER. THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY EZLN HAS THREATENED TO RENEW ITS VIOLENT ACTIVITY IF EDUARDO ROBLEDO, THE RULING INSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONARY PARTY'S PRI& GOVERNOR-ELECT OF CHIAPAS, IS INAUGURATED ON 8 DECEMBER. THE EZLN HAS CONTENDED THAT ROBLEDO WON THE GOVERNORSHIP THROUGH FRAUDULENT MEANS AND THAT AMADO AVENDANO, THE OPPOSITION CANDIDATE FROM THE PARTY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION PRD, IS THE TRUE WINNER. OTHER SUBVERSIVE GROUPS ALLEGED TO EXIST IN CHIAPAS ARE SAID TO BE SYMPATHETIC WITH THE EZLN. THE ZAPATISTA-SPONSORED NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION HAS DEMANDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT REMOVE TROOPS FROM THE CONFLICT AREAS IN CHIAPAS, WARNING THAT THE CHOICE IS "DEMOCRACY OR BARBARISM."

~~S&~~ DESPITE THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE EZLN SINCE THAT HAS HELD SINCE JANUARY, CHIAPAS HAS REMAINED UNSETTLED, WITH SPORADIC TAKEOVERS OF PRIVATE LAND BY PEASANTS, ROAD BLOCKAGES, BUILDING SEIZURES, AND OTHER PROTESTS. THE TENSE ATMOSPHERE HAS RECENTLY BEEN INTENSIFIED BY REPORTS OF ARMY AND EZLN TROOP MOVEMENTS, MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS OF TERRITORY HELD BY THE EZLN, EZLN THREATS TO RENEW VIOLENCE, AND THE REBEL GROUP'S ACTION TO BREAK OFF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT. AS THE MILITARY INCREASES ITS SECURITY MEASURES PRIOR TO THE 8 DECEMBER INAUGURATION IN CHIAPAS, TENSIONS WILL PROBABLY INCREASE FURTHER AND COULD RESULT IN VIOLENCE. IF THE EZLN FOLLOWS THROUGH WITH ITS THREAT, SUBVERSIVE GROUPS AND THOSE SYMPATHETIC TO THE EZLN CAUSE IN CHIAPAS AND ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY COULD ALSO JOIN IN SPORADIC VIOLENCE. WHILE THE PRD HAS CALLED FOR PEACEFUL

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CIVIL RESISTANCE TO PROTEST THE INAUGURATION, SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS COULD TURN VIOLENT IF INFILTRATED BY DISSIDENTS OR RADICAL PRD MEMBERS.

2. U& CATEGORY ACTIVITY ASSESSMENT CHANGES: N/A
3. U& CATEGORY FUNCTIONAL AREA ACTIVITY ASSESSMENT CHANGES: N/A
4. ~~ca~~ [REDACTED]

A. ~~ca~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SINCE MARCH 1994, TWO HIGH-PROFILE POLITICAL FIGURES HAVE BEEN ASSASSINATED. THE PRI'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, LUIS DONALDO COLOSIO&, WAS MURDERED IN MARCH AND THE PARTY'S SECRETARY GENERAL, JOSE FRANCISCO RUIZ&, WAS KILLED IN SEPTEMBER. WHILE A GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION RULED COLOSIO WAS KILLED BY A LONE GUNMAN, FEW BELIEVE THAT FINDING. RUIZ' MURDER IS STILL BEING INVESTIGATED, BUT IT APPEARS THE KILLING WAS ORDERED FOR POLITICAL OR PERSONAL REASONS. WHATEVER THE MOTIVES FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS, THE PERCEPTION PORTRAYED IS THAT THERE IS AT LEAST SOMEWHAT OF AN AIR OF INSTABILITY IN MEXICO'S POLITICAL CLIMATE. SUCH A PERCEPTION HAS IN PART CAUSED SOME PUBLIC CONCERN THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE BEHIND THE KILLINGS OR IS LOOSING CONTROL OF PUBLIC SECURITY. THE EZLN HAS PLAYED UPON SUCH FEARS IN ADDITION TO ITS RHETORIC ABOUT GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCE. 28 SEP 94&.

B. ~~S/NF&~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE COMBINED DECLARATIONS OF THE ZAPATISTAS AND THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION HAVE MOVED THE MILITARY TO A HIGHER STATE OF READINESS IN THE CHIAPAS THEATER OF OPERATIONS. AN INCREASE IN MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS IN-THEATER REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN NOTED IN BOTH THE STATE CAPITAL OF TUXTLA GUTIERREZ AND IN COMITAN, AT THE NEW AIR STRIP ON THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE THEATER. ADDITIONALLY, IN AUGUST, THE MEXICAN ARMY BEGAN RECEIVING THE FIRST OF MORE THAN 60 FRENCH-MADE VCI FRENCH-MADE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS IT HAD PURCHASED FROM FORMER BELGIAN MILITARY STOCKS. THESE VEHICLES ARE PROBABLY SLATED FOR ONE OF

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

THE ARMY'S THREE ARMORED BRIGADES. THIS ACQUISITION HIGHLIGHTS THE MILITARY'S DETERMINATION TO REMEDY THE DEFICIENCIES REVEALED BY THE ZAPATISTA REBELLION IN JANUARY. THE INADEQUATE OFF-ROAD CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMY'S FLEET OF WHEELED ARMORED VEHICLES HINDERED OPERATIONS IN CHIAPAS. THE VEHICLES PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO A LOW-INTENSITY THREAT. 27 OCT 94&.

C. ~~ca~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, A NEW SUBVERSIVE GROUP IN CHIAPAS CALLED THE SOUTHEASTERN REVOLUTIONARY INSURGENT ARMY EIRS& ANNOUNCED ITS FORMATION. THE GROUP, WHICH CLAIMS IT IS SYMPATHETIC TO BUT NOT PART OF THE ZAPATISTA ORGANIZATION, HAS DEMANDED THE ARREST OF THE LAST FOUR CHIAPAN STATE GOVERNORS AND A REJECTION OF MEXICAN PRESIDENT-ELECT ZEDILLO'S AND CHIAPAN GOVERNOR-ELECT ROBLEDOS VICTORIES, AMONG OTHER THINGS. IT HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED WHETHER THIS GROUP ACTUALLY EXISTS. HOWEVER, IF IT DOES, IT COULD PIGGYBACK ON ZAPATISTA-INITIATED VIOLENCE

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AND PROVOKE ADDITIONAL DISTURBANCES. 7 SEP 94&.

D. U& [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SPEAKING TO
A RECENT GATHERING OF DELEGATES FROM THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
CONVENTION, ZAPATISTA LEADER "SUBCOMMANDER" MARCOS REITERATED THE
REBELS' DECISION TO RESUME MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT
FORCES IF EDUARDO ROBLEDO, PRI GOVERNOR-ELECT OF CHIAPAS, IS
INAUGURATED ON 8 DECEMBER. 16 OCT 94&.
5. U& POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS [REDACTED]

~~DECL GADR~~

ADMIN

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PAGE:0984

INQUIRE=DOC28D
ITEM NO=00573341

ENVELOPE

OATMZYUW YEKDQA 0224 3321800-MORN--YEKDXB.

ZNY MMORN

ZKZK 00 SOA DE

HEADER

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FM SSO DIA//J2M-1//

TO ALTAX

INFO [REDACTED] MEXICO

SAFE

ZEM

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

QQQQ

[REDACTED] PASS TO USDAO

BODY

SUBJ: [REDACTED]

1. ~~S&~~ [REDACTED]

2. U& CATEGORY ACTIVITY ASSESSMENT CHANGES:

A. ~~S/NF&~~ [REDACTED]

THE MILITARY RECENTLY HAS TAKEN INCREASED MEASURES IN PREPARATION FOR RENEWED HOSTILITIES IN CHIAPAS BY THE REBEL ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY EZLN& AND ITS SYMPATHIZERS. SOME OF THE INCREASED MEASURES INCLUDE RESUPPLYING SOME UNITS IN THE AREA WITH MUNITIONS, RATIONS, AND UNIFORMS; CONDUCTING AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF EZLN-HELD TERRITORY; AND ENLISTING THE ASSISTANCE OF THE CHILEANS TO TRAIN MEXICAN TROOPS IN COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS. MILITARY CHECKPOINTS NEAR THE CONFRONTATION AREA ARE MORE THOROUGH THAN EARLIER IN THE YEAR. THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND ALSO RECENTLY PLACED ITS TROOPS IN CHIAPAS AND SURROUNDING STATES ON FULL ALERT. UPDATED 28 NOV 94&.

3. U& CATEGORY FUNCTIONAL AREA ACTIVITY ASSESSMENT CHANGES:

A. ~~S&~~ [REDACTED]

SEE 2.A. ABOVE. 28 NOV 94&.

4. ~~C&~~ [REDACTED]

A. ~~S/NF&~~ [REDACTED]

AS OF LATE NOVEMBER, MILITARY TROOPS IN THE STATE OF CHIAPAS AS WELL AS IN SURROUNDING STATES HAVE BEEN PLACED ON FULL ALERT AND BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BE READY FOR ANY FLARE-UPS OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN 1 AND 8 DECEMBER, THE INAUGURATION DATES FOR THE PRESIDENT-ELECT OF MEXICO AND THE GOVERNOR-ELECT OF CHIAPAS RESPECTIVELY. 28 NOV 94&.

5. U& POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DECL OADR

ADMIN

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PAGE:0878

INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00027275

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS288 MCN = 94339/32744 TOR = 943392332
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS8624 3392331-~~CCCC~~--RUEANSS.
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

R 052331Z DEC 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUENAAA/CND WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUWMBKA/12AINS DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RULKNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINSERV WASHINGTON DC//NAVATAC/22//
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 052022Z DEC 94

[REDACTED]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUDMONI/ONI SUITLAND MD
RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY
RUEAHQA/SAF WASHDC//IAL
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//DHO-5
RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//J2
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2
RHLBAAQ/USCINCSO SCJ2//QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEADWD/DA WASHDC//DAMO-SSM/DAMI-FI
RHLBAAF/CMO470THMIBDE
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) ARGENTINA (AR), MEXICO (MX).

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] ARGENTINE MILITARY ADVISORS IN
CHIAPAS (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE:0879

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 941202.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: A. (U) [REDACTED]

B. (U) DAILY NEWSPAPER, "CLARIN", BUENOS AIRES,
ARGENTINA, 941230 (U), IN SPANISH. INDEPENDENT,
MODERATE NEWSPAPER WITH NATIONALISTIC ORIENTATION WHICH
PRESENTS A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS AND INFORMATION CRITICAL
OF MENEM ADMINISTRATION. INFLUENTIAL WITH TOP
POLICYMAKERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, POLITICIANS, AND
THE MILITARY.

C. (U) DAILY NEWSPAPER, "BUENOS AIRES HERALD", BUENOS
AIRES, ARGENTINA, 941202 (U), IN SPANISH. INDEPENDENT,
LIBERAL NEWSPAPER WHICH HAS BEEN A FIRM DEFENDER OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND A FREQUENT CRITIC OF THE GOVERNMENT.
CONSIDERED INFLUENTIAL WITH POLICYMAKERS, POLITICIANS,
MILITARY OFFICERS, AND BUSINESSMEN.

SUMMARY: ~~(C)~~ MINISTRY OF DEFENSE DENIES REPORTS OF
ACTIVE DUTY ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTING AS ADVISORS TO
MEXICAN ARMED FORCES IN THE MEXICAN STATE OF CHIAPAS.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C)~~ ARGENTINE SPECIALISTS IN URBAN GUERRILLA
WARFARE ARE REPORTED TO BE ACTING AS ADVISORS TO
MEXICAN MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES IN THEIR FIGHT
AGAINST THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY IN THE
SOUTHERN MEXICAN STATE OF CHIAPAS. ARGENTINE MINISTER
OF DEFENSE, OSCAR ((CAMILION)) PUBLICLY DENIED THAT ANY
ACTIVE DUTY ARGENTINE MILITARY FORCES WERE OPERATING IN
MEXICO AS EITHER OBSERVERS OR ADVISORS. HIS DENIAL,
HOWEVER, LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT EITHER FORMER
MILITARY OFFICERS OR RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS MAY BE
WORKING IN MEXICO WITHOUT THE OFFICIAL SANCTION OF THE
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

2. (U) IN MARCH OF 1994, THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT WAS
REPORTED TO HAVE SENT A DELEGATION TO BUENOS AIRES TO
OBTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT THE METHODS USED IN ARGENTINA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE:0880

DURING THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION OF "DIRTY WAR" OF THE 1970'S. MANY OF THE ARGENTINE MILITARY OFFICERS WHO WERE THE LEADERS DURING THE DIRTY WAR WERE FOUND GUILTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, SENTENCED TO JAIL, AND DISCHARGED FROM THE MILITARY. ALTHOUGH THEIR JAIL SENTENCES WERE LATTER PARDONED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE, THEY WERE NOT REINDUCTED INTO THE MILITARY. CAMILION WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT BE STRANGE FOR SUCH UNEMPLOYED MILITARY OFFICERS TO PACK THEIR BAGS AND WORK IN MEXICO.

COMMENTS: 1. (C) [REDACTED] THE ARGENTINE MILITARY HAS KEPT A WATCHFUL EYE ON THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE MEXICAN UPRISING IN CHIAPAS. THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT THE TYPE OF SOCIAL FORCES THAT CREATED THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY MAY ALSO EXIST IN ARGENTINA.. THEY POINT TO THE PUBLIC RIOTS IN SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO (CITE IIRS [REDACTED]) AS CLEAR EXAMPLES OF THE POTENTIAL FOR WIDESPREAD CIVIL DISTURBANCE IN ARGENTINA.

2. (C) [REDACTED]

3. (C) WHILE THE ARGENTINE MILITARY IS PREVENTED BY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM DOING ANYTHING MORE THAN PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR POLICE FORCES TASKED TO QUELL DOMESTIC INSURRECTIONS, THEY FEEL THAT A FAILURE OF THE ZAPATISTAS WOULD ACT AS A DETERRENT FOR ANY POTENTIAL ARGENTINE INTERNAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF ARGENTINA.

4. (C) EVEN IF ARGENTINE EX-MILITARY LEADERS ARE ACTING AS URBAN GUERILLA WARFARE EXPERTS IN MEXICO, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE ARGENTINE MILITARY WOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN PROGRAMS TO QUELL DOMESTIC UPRISINGS, GIVEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST THEIR PARTICIPATION EXCEPT FOR SPECIFIC LOGISTICAL FUNCTIONS.

[REDACTED]
ADMIN

PROJ: (U).

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE:0881

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

~~DECL:QADR~~

BT

#8625

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0267

INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00154078

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS790 MCN = 94357/18004 TOR = 943570926
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS0712 3570924-~~CCCC~~--RUEANSS.
ZNY-~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

R 230924Z DEC 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 230025Z DEC 94

TO RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHDC
RUWDEAA/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA//00/N2//
RHCGSRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2//
RUCKMAA/COMMARFORLANT //G-2//
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2//
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX//
RUEHGT/USDAO GUATEMALA CITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR CHIAPAS, MILITARY ROTATION
DOES LITTLE TO AID EXPOSED UNIT AT ALTAMIRANO (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0268

CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 941204.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NF)~~ ROTATION OF ARMY UNITS DOES LITTLE TO AID THE MISSION OF THE EXPOSED UNITS AT ALTAMIRANO. THIS THREATENS THIS ALREADY VULNERABLE UNIT, SEPARATED BY AS LITTLE AS TWO KILOMETERS FROM EZLN GUERILLA CHECKPOINTS.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE MEXICAN MILITARY'S CONTINUED ROTATION OF COMBAT ARMS UNITS ATTACHED TO THE RAINBOW TASK FORCE [REDACTED] GROUP NUMBER FIVE AT ALTAMIRANO [REDACTED] DOES LITTLE TO AID MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE EXPOSED UNITS. THE ROTATIONS THREATEN THE ALREADY VULNERABLE GROUP, WHICH IS SEPARATED BY AS LITTLE AS TWO KILOMETERS FROM THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (EZLN) GUERILLA CHECKPOINTS AT JALISCO [REDACTED] AND THE MORELIA COMMUNAL FARM ("EJIDO") [REDACTED]

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS ALL OF THE GROUP FIVE COMBAT ARMS UNITS HAVE ROTATED. MAJOR GENERAL JORGE JUSTINIANO GONZALES ((BETANCOURT)) REMAINS IN COMMAND OF THE GROUP AT ALTAMIRANO. [REDACTED]


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0269



3. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE ROAD CHECKPOINT PERSONNEL ARE, AS ONE WOULD EXPECT, TENSE AND CAREFUL. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, BOTH COURTEOUS AND, AT TIMES, HELPFUL.

4. ~~(C/NF)~~ NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (NGO) PERSONNEL HAD BEEN STATIONED AT ALL MILITARY CHECKPOINTS IN ALTAMIRANO, ALTHOUGH ALL HAVE NOW DEPARTED. THEY WERE NOT A WELCOME ADDITION TO THESE POINTS, FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW.

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0270

[REDACTED]
ADMIN

PROJ: (U)

COLL: (U) AC.

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

DCSD, OPAD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN~~

~~NATIONALS.~~

~~DECL: OADR~~

BT

#0713

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AUS~~

PAGE:0236

INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00158825

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS263 MCN = 94357/26628 TOR = 943571426
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS3188 3571425-~~CCCC~~-RUEANSS.

ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

R 231425Z DEC 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 230020Z DEC 94

TO RUCKMAA/COMMARFORLANT //G-2//
RUWDEAA/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA//OO/N2//
RHCGSRB/CINCFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2//
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL//
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX//
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGT/USDAO GUATEMALA CITY
RUDMONI/ONI SUITLAND MD//JJJ//
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL/REL TO UK, CAN, AUS~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] A RESPECTED MEXICAN NAVAL
ZONE COMMANDER DISCUSSES THE UNREST IN CHIAPAS.

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~~REL UK CAN AUS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AUS~~

PAGE:0237

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CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ --
~~REL TO UK, CAN, AUS.~~


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 941210.


REQS: (U) 

SOURCE: (U)

SUMMARY: ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AUS)~~



3. ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AUS)~~

THE UNDERLYING ISSUE IN CHIAPAS IS THAT THE REGION HAS
BEEN SO ISOLATED FOR SO LONG, THAT THEY DO NOT FEEL
LIKE A PART OF MEXICO.  THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AUS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AUS~~

PAGE:0238

FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTION WAS "COMMUNICATION" [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO AND THE PEOPLES OF
THE REGION. IN THIS REGARD, [REDACTED] THE
CHALLENGE OF EFFECTING THIS COMMUNICATION IS BROAD,
INCLUDING DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE SUCH AS ROADS,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, ETC., SO THE REGION COULD BE LINKED
WITH THE REST OF THE COUNTRY.

4. (~~C/REL UK, CAN, AUS~~) [REDACTED] A
PROJECT OF THIS MAGNITUDE WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] OPTIMISM IS
BASED ON [REDACTED] A VERY SIMILAR SITUATION WITH
UNREST IN GUERRERO MORE THAN TWO DECADES AGO. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THERE WAS A TIME DURING THE EARLY 1970'S
WHEN THE COASTAL MOUNTAINOUS REGION OF THAT STATE NORTH
OF ACAPULCO WAS A NO-MAN'S LAND, AND AS DANGEROUS, IF
NOT MORE SO, THAN THE CENTRAL CONFLICT AREA IN CHIAPAS.
THAT REGION TOO HAD BEEN ISOLATED FROM THE REST OF THE
COUNTRY [REDACTED] AND A FEUDAL SYSTEM EXISTED, WITH
SEVERAL REGIONAL WARLORDS. [REDACTED] THE
MEXICAN GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO COMMUNICATE WITH
THE REGION AND MAKE THEM FEEL LIKE PART OF THE COUNTRY
RESOLVED THESE PROBLEMS; AND TODAY, THE REGION IS FULLY
INTEGRATED INTO THE COUNTRY. [REDACTED]
CHALLENGES REMAIN I
N THE ISOLATED INLAND MOUNTAIN AREAS
OF GUERRERO WHERE SOME UNREST STILL EXISTS.

5. (~~C/REL UK, CAN, AUS~~) RETURNING TO CHIAPAS, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE HAVE NO
FUNDAMENTAL ALLEGIANCE TO THE EZLN CAUSE, BUT ARE USING
THE ZAPATISTA'S NOTORIETY TO HIGHLIGHT THEIR PLIGHT.
[REDACTED] MOST OF THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE ARE NOT
HARD-CORE GUERRILLAS, AND AS THEY ARE MADE TO FEEL LIKE
THEY BELONG TO THE REST OF MEXICO, THE PROBLEM WILL
SLOWLY BE RESOLVED.

COMMENTS: 1. (~~C/REL UK, CAN, AUS~~) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE SITUATION IN GUERRERO WAS
RESOLVED IN ANYTHING BUT PEACEFUL FASHION. IT WAS NOT
THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE AND
"COMMUNICATE" WITH THE MOVEMENT IN GUERRERO IN THOSE
DAYS; RATHER IT WAS A HARSH MILITARY CAMPAIGN CONDUCTED
BY THE MEXICAN MILITARY WHICH REINTEGRATED THE REGION.
SOME BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY THING HOLDING THE LID ON
GUERRERO IS THE MEMORY OF THE MEXICAN ARMY'S BLOODY,
ALBEIT SMALL, COUNTER-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN CONDUCTED IN
THE REGION.

2. (~~C/REL UK, CAN, AUS~~) [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AUS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AUS~~

PAGE:0240

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .
COLL: (U) AA; AC; AH.
INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]
PREP: (U) [REDACTED]
ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]
DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

DCSD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL -- RELEASABLE TO UNITED
KINGDOM, CANADA, AUSTRALIA.~~

~~DECL: OADR~~

BT

#3190

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AUS~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0246

INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00158529

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS877 MCN = 94358/05748 TOR = 943580315
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS5393 3580307-~~SSSS~~-RUEANSS.

ZNY ~~SSSSS~~

HEADER

P 240307Z DEC 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUDHSIC/CDRUSASOIC WASHINGTON DC//DI//
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 231856Z DEC 94

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2// PRIORITY
RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO PRIORITY
BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT); MEXICO (MX).

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] GUATEMALAN POSTURE ON THE
PROBLEM IN CHIAPAS (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0247

DOI: (U) 941222 - 941223.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: A. (C/NF) [REDACTED]

B. (U) DAILY NEWSPAPER, "PRENSA LIBRE", GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA, 941223, (U), IN SPANISH. THE PAPER HAS AN ESTIMATED CIRCULATION OF 100,000, IS KNOWN TO BE CONSERVATIVE AND INDEPENDENT. LARGEST CIRCULATION DAILY NEWSPAPER IN GT.

C. (C/NF) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: (S/NF) GUATEMALAN ARMY PROVIDES MEXICAN ARMY INFORMATION REGARDING POSSIBLE ARMS SHIPMENTS FOR THE EZLN. SPECIAL FORCES AND AIR FORCE TRAINERS ARE LOANED TO TRAIN MEXICAN PERSONNEL. UN REFUGEE COMMISSION INQUIRES ABOUT ESTABLISHING REFUGEE CAMPS IN GUATEMALA.

TEXT: 1. (S/NF) [REDACTED] THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY HAS AGAIN BEEN APPROACHED RECENTLY BY THE MEXICAN ARMY ASKING FOR INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH THE CONTINUING ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (EZLN) INSURGENCY IN CHIAPAS. REPORTEDLY THE GUATEMALAN ARMY HAS SHARED WITH THE MEXICANS INFORMATION THAT INDICATES THAT MUNITIONS AND ARMS ARE ENTERING CHIAPAS VIA GUATEMALA DESTINED FOR THE EZLN. [REDACTED]

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PAGE:0248

[REDACTED]

3. (U) SOURCE 'B' CARRIED AN ARTICLE ON 23 DECEMBER IN WHICH SUB COMANDANTE MARCOS FROM THE EZLN DENOUNCED THE PRESENCE IN CHIAPAS OF GUATEMALAN KAIBILES. IN THE ARTICLE, MARCOS STATED THE EZLN WAS AWARE THAT KAIBILES REGULARLY CROSSED THE FRONTIER WITH MEXICO INTO THE LACANDONA FOREST, IN PURSUIT OF URNG INSURGENTS. SUB COMANDANTE MARCOS ALSO STATED THAT THE EZLN WAS AWARE THAT THE GUATEMALAN KAIBILES WERE PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE MEXICAN ARMY, WHICH WAS INDICATED BY THEIR PRESENCE IN CHIAPAS. THE DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND DIVULGATION (DIDE), THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT FOR THE GUATEMALAN ARMY, DENIES THE ALLEGATIONS BY MARCOS THAT KAIBILES ARE PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE MEXICAN ARMY.

4. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] THE UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE COMMISSION HAS RECENTLY APPROACHED THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT AND ASKED IF THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT MEXICAN REFUGEES IN GUATEMALA. THE RESPONSE OF THE GUATEMALANS WAS THAT THEY WOULD.

[REDACTED] THE GUATEMALAN ARMY IS NOW SEARCHING FOR POSSIBLE REFUGEE SITES IN ZACAPA, JALAPA, JUTIAPA, CHIQUMULA AND PUERTO BARRIOS. REPORTEDLY, THE SITES BEING LOOKED AT REQUIRE READY ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY AND WATER IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY AMENITIES FOR THE REFUGEES, IF THEY IN FACT DO COME INTO GUATEMALA.

5. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] IT WAS RATHER IRONIC THAT GIVEN THE HISTORY OF THE GUATEMALAN CONFLICT AND THE ABUNDANCE OF GUATEMALAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN MEXICO, THAT THE TABLES HAVE NOW TURNED AND MEXICAN CAMPS MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN GUATEMALA. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ANY CAMPS ESTABLISHED WOULD BE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THAT, UNLIKE THE CAMPS IN MEXICO, NO OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE ALLOWED FOR THE EZLN TO USE THE CAMPS AS BASES IN GUATEMALA.

[REDACTED]

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] GIVEN THE RECENT RESURGENCE OF THE EZLN ACTIVITY IN CHIAPAS, AND THE POSSIBLE IMPACT IT CAN HAVE ON NOT ONLY THE

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PAGE:0249

GUATEMALAN/URNG PEACE TALKS, BUT THE WAR IN GUATEMALA AS WELL, PARTICULAR ATTENTION WILL BE PAID TO THIS ISSUE. WITHOUT A DOUBT, THE GUATEMALANS WILL DEDICATE MAJOR RESOURCES TO KEEPING TRACK OF THE PROBLEM, AND WILL NOT HESITATE, AS HAS BEEN STATED IN RECENT NEWS ARTICLES, TO BEEF UP THEIR FORCES ALONG THE FRONTIER IF IT APPEARS THAT THE CONFLICT IN CHIAPAS WILL DRIFT OVER INTO GUATEMALA. UNFORTUNATELY, THE ONLY AREA WHERE THEY MAY HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO SWIFTLY REINFORCE THEIR FRONTIER IS IN MILITARY ZONE 22 (PLAYA GRANDE). THE FRONTIER THAT SEPARATES CHIAPAS AND MILITARY ZONE 19 (HUEHUETENANGO) IS A LARGER AREA, MORE ISOLATED AND WILL PROVE TO BE MORE DIFFICULT TO REINFORCE IF THE NEED ARISES.

2. ~~(S/NF)~~



ADMIN

PROJ: (U).

INSTR: (U) U.S.

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ NOT

~~RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

~~DECL:OADR~~

BT

#5394

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0031

INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00198768

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS140 MCN = 94364/25925 TOR = 943641929
RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS8137 3641927-~~SSSS~~-RUEANSS.
ZNY ~~SSSSS~~

HEADER

R 301927Z DEC 94
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUDHSIC/CDRUSASOIC WASHINGTON DC//DI//
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 301550Z DEC 94

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO
RUEHMU/USDAO MANAGUA NU
RUEHSN/USDAO SAN SALVADOR
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2//

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT).

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] EZLN STRENGTH (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~.

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0032

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 931227.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) A. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(S/NF)~~ MX MILITARY [REDACTED] ESTIMATES EZLN ARMED STRENGTH AT 5,000 COMBATANTS, WITH FIVE TO TEN SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR EACH ARMED COMBATANT. GT ARMY PREPARES CONTINGENCIES IN CASE OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN MX ARMY AND EZLN.

TEXT: 1. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CHIAPAS, MEXICO [REDACTED] MEXICAN MILITARY [REDACTED] HAD INFORMED THE GT ARMY [REDACTED] THEY ESTIMATED CURRENT EZLN (ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY) STRENGTH AT APPROXIMATELY 5,000 ARMED COMBATANTS. THESE COMBATANTS ARE WELL ARMED WITH MOSTLY AK-47'S OR M-16'S, NOT THE POOR WEAPONRY SEEN WHEN THE EZLN FIRST APPEARED IN JANUARY 1994. [REDACTED] FURTHER ESTIMATED THAT FOR EVERY ONE ARMED ZAPATISTA COMBATANT, THERE WERE FROM FIVE TO TEN ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL FORMING THE EZLN SUPPORT NETWORK IN CHIAPAS.

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] BECAUSE OF THE CEASEFIRE DECLARED IN JANUARY 1994, THE MX ARMY HAD IN EFFECT CEDED A LARGE AREA TO THE FULL CONTROL OF THE EZLN. THE EZLN HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THIS SITUATION TO BECOME BETTER ORGANIZED AND ARMED. LIKEWISE, THERE ARE MANY UNIMPEDED ACCESS AREAS INTO EZLN CONTROLLED TERRITORY THAT FACILITATE WEAPONS SMUGGLING TO THE EZLN. MOST LIKELY, WEAPONS WERE SMUGGLED THROUGH NORTHERN BELIZE AND THE NORTHERN PETEN DEPARTMENT OF GUATEMALA, [REDACTED] DESCRIBED AS "WIDE OPEN" FOR SUCH SMUGGLING, INTO MX TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY THE EZLN.

3. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE OF THESE WEAPONS AS BEING THE FMLN (FARABUNDO MARTI FRONT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION) IN EL SALVADOR, THE FSLN (SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT) IN NICARAGUA, AND POSSIBLY THE EGP (POOR PEOPLE'S ARMY) OF THE GUATEMALAN URNG (GUATEMALAN NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY UNITY). [REDACTED] HEARD THAT SUBCOMANDANTE MARCOS OF THE EZLN HAD SERVED AS ONE OF THE SMALL GROUP OF "INTERNATIONALISTS" WITH

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PAGE:0033

THE FSLN WHEN THEY OVERTHREW THE SOMOZA REGIME IN 1979, PROVIDING A LINK BETWEEN THE FSLN AND THE EZLN. [REDACTED] EFRAIN ((BAMACA)) VELASQUEZ, THE ORPA (POOR PEOPLE'S ARMY) LEADER, HAD ALSO SERVED AS ONE OF THE "INTERNATIONALISTS" WITH THE FSLN IN 1979.

4. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] AS A RESULT OF THE PROBLEMS IN CHIAPAS, COOPERATION [REDACTED] HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY BETWEEN THE MX AND GT ARMIES. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EVEN WITH 5,000 ARMED COMBATANTS, THE EZLN IS NOT A MILITARY THREAT TO THE MX ARMY. THE PROBLEM IS MUCH MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GT ARMY HAD FACED A SIMILAR SIZED INSURGENT FORCE FROM THE URNG IN 1980 AND 1981, AND WAS ABLE TO DEFEAT THEM AND ISOLATE THEM IN REDUCED NUMBERS TO A FEW SMALL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, IT HAD BEEN A BLOODY STRUGGLE WITH HIGH POLITICAL COSTS FOR THE GOG. MX FACES A SIMILAR DILEMMA--THEY CAN DEFEAT THE EZLN, BUT THE COMBAT WOULD BE BLOODY WITH HIGH POLITICAL COSTS.

5. ~~(S/NF)~~ IN THE MEANTIME, [REDACTED] THE GT ARMY IS PREPARING CONTINGENCY PLANS IN CASE OPEN HOSTILITIES RESUME BETWEEN THE MX ARMY AND THE EZLN, WHETHER IT IS INITIATED BY EITHER SIDE. FOR THE MOMENT, THOSE GT UNITS ON THE BORDER HAVE BEEN PLACED ON AN INCREASED STATE OF ALERT. GT UNITS HAVE DETECTED NO EZLN PRESENCE ALONG THE MX-GT BORDER DURING DECEMBER, HOWEVER. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IF ANY ARMED EZLN FORCES DO CROSS INTO GT, THEY WILL BE COMBATTED BY THE GT ARMY. IF HOSTILITIES DO RESUME IN CHIAPAS, THE GT ARMY ALSO EXPECTS A LARGE FLOW OF MX REFUGEES INTO GT, AND MUCH OF THE [REDACTED] PLANNING IS CONCERNED WITH HOW TO DEAL WITH SUCH A SITUATION.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]


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PAGE:0034



ADMIN

COLL: (U) DA.

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ NOT

~~RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

~~DECL:OADR~~

BT

#8138

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PAGE:4856

INQUIRE=DOC29D

ITEM NO=00275740

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS426 MCN = 95012/22435 TOR = 950121608

OTTSZYUW RUEKJCS3347 0121604-~~SSSS~~--RUEANSS.

ZNY ~~SSSSS~~

HEADER

O 121604Z JAN 95

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//

RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//

RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL

RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA

RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC

RUEALGX/SAFE

O 121557Z JAN 95

TO RUEHGT/USDAO GUATEMALA CITY IMMEDIATE

RHCGSRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2// IMMEDIATE

RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2// IMMEDIATE

RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL// IMMEDIATE

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX// IMMEDIATE

RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~SECRET NOFORN WINTTEL~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] CHIAPAS, ARMY BEGINS
HUGE CHIAPAS DEPLOYMENT, FORMS NEW TASK FORCE (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN WINTTEL~~

SECRET

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~~NOFORN WAINTEL~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

REQS: (U)

SOURCE: ~~(S/NF/NN)~~

TEXT: 1. ~~(S/NF/HH)~~ THE MEXICAN MILITARY ISSUED AN
[REDACTED] ORDER [REDACTED] FORMING A DIVISION SIZED TASK
FORCE TO BE ACTIVATED [REDACTED]

INCLUDED A DIVISION-SIZED COMBAT ARMS ELEMENT

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[REDACTED]

5. (~~S/NF/NN~~) [REDACTED] LISTED MORE THAN TWENTY OTHER EZLN ELEMENTS, OR OTHER GUERRILLA/TERRORIST OPERATING THROUGHOUT MEXICO WHO COULD POSE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN THE CASE OF RENEWED FIGHTING. THE KEY STATES LISTED WERE OAXACA, MICHOACAN, MORELOS, PUEBLA, AND TABASCO.

COMMENTS: (~~S/NF/NN~~) 1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. (~~S/NF/NN~~) [REDACTED] COMMENT. THE PRESS HAS REPEATEDLY REPORTED MASSIVE MILITARY BUILDUPS IN THE REGION; TO DATE, THESE REPORTS HAVE PROVEN INCORRECT. NOW THE MILITARY IS MOVING FORWARD IN AN AGGRESSIVE MANNER AND IT HAS ESCAPED PRESS ATTENTION TO DATE. THIS IS BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF THE DEPLOYMENT HAS TAKEN PLACE NORTH OF CHIAPAS.

3. (~~S/NF/NN~~) THE MILITARY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT A MILITARY OPTION IS THE MOST VIABLE. IT REALIZES THAT HISTORICAL PARALLELS IN THE REGION, HOWEVER STRAINED THEY MIGHT BE, INDICATE THAT MEXICO IS IN FOR A LONG-TERM PROBLEM WITH THE INSURGENCY. THEY PREFER A POLITICAL SOLUTION, MAINLY AS AN EXTENDED CONFLICT WOULD CLEARLY REVEAL MILITARY INCAPACITY TO REACH A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION.

4. (~~S/NF/NN~~) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. (~~S/NF/NN~~) DEFENSE PRESS RELEASES HAVE STRESSED THAT NO OTHER GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS EXIST IN MEXICO. THAT IS GOOD FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~NOFORN UNINTEL~~

PAGE:4859

[REDACTED]

8. ~~(S/NF/NN)~~ THE 12TH OF JANUARY IS AN IMPORTANT DAY; IT IS THE LAST DAY OF AN EZLN SELF-IMPOSED CEASE FIRE EXTENSION. THE MEXICAN ARMY HAS CONTINUED TO OBSERVE THE BASIC GUIDELINES OF THE 940112 CEASE FIRE. THE EZLN BEGAN AN OFFENSIVE 941219 AND ENDED THAT ACTION WITH A CEASE FIRE WHICH INITIALLY RAN THROUGH 950106; THE EXTENSION OF SIX DAYS WAS ANNOUNCED LATER, BRINGING US TO THIS IMPORTANT DATE.

9. ~~(S/NF/NN)~~ [REDACTED]

10. ~~(S/NF/NN)~~ THE POLITICAL SECTOR MAY BELIEVE THAT THE EZLN OFFENSIVE OF LATE DECEMBER, 1994, HAS BEEN THE ONE OF THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT PARTS OF THE CIVILIAN SECTOR MAY BE APPLYING PRESSURE FOR WHAT THEY BELIEVE WILL BE A QUICK MILITARY SOLUTION TO A COMPLEX POLITICAL PROBLEM, WHICH WOULD THEN (HOPEFULLY) HELP PUT AN END TO THE POLITICAL/ECONOMIC PROBLEMS MEXICO CURRENTLY FACES. IF TRUE, THAT PERCEPTION-- THAT THE MILITARY OFFERS AN EASY, SHORT-TERM, QUICK SOLUTION TO CHIAPAS'S WOES-- IS MISGUIDED AND UNREALISTIC.

[REDACTED]

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ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .
COLL: (U) AA; AC.
INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]
PREP: (U) [REDACTED]
ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]
DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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BT

#3348

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INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00478835

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS602 MCN = 95041/32128 TOR = 950411748
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS9569 0411747-~~CCCC~~--RUEANSS.
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

O 101747Z FEB 95
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEALGX/SAFE
O R 101653Z FEB 95
[REDACTED]

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX/INM-FOR GELBARD// IMMEDIATE
RHCGSRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2/AFIN-IC// IMMEDIATE
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2// IMMEDIATE
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL// IMMEDIATE
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2// IMMEDIATE
RUEHGT/USDAO GUATEMALA CITY
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHDC
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] CHIAPAS, PRESIDENTIAL
ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE FEDERAL ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE, SUPPORTED BY THE ARMY, WILL PURSUE AND CAPTURE
EZLN REBEL LEADERS (U).

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FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 950209.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) A. [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NF)~~ IN THE WAKE OF PRESIDENT ((ZEDILLO))'S ANNOUNCEMENT, 950209, THAT THE FEDERAL ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SUPPORTED BY THE ARMY, WILL PURSUE, CAPTURE AND ARREST EZLN REBEL LEADERS. ARMY UNIT DEPLOYMENTS HAVE BEGUN.

TEXT: ~~(C/NF)~~ 1. IN THE WAKE OF MEXICAN PRESIDENT ERNESTO ((ZEDILLO))'S ANNOUNCEMENT, 950209, THAT THE FEDERAL ATTORNEY GENERAL'S POLICE, SUPPORTED BY THE MEXICAN ARMY AND OTHER POLICE WILL PURSUE, CAPTURE, AND ARREST THE EZLN REBEL LEADERS. ARMY UNIT DEPLOYMENTS IN CHIAPAS AND FROM MEXICO CITY HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT TO CAPTURE EZLN LEADERS:

IN A NATIONALLY TELEVISED ADDRESS, THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THAT "...THE CONFLICT IN THE STATE OF CHIAPAS HAS REPRESENTED A CONSTANT RISK TO PUBLIC TRANQUILITY, PEACE, AND JUSTICE..." AND SINCE HE HAD "... CONVEYED TO THE EZLN WRITTEN AND VERBAL MESSAGES, REITERATING (HIS) DISPOSITION TO DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION..." WITHOUT POSITIVE RESULTS, HE WOULD BEGIN AGGRESSIVE ACTION TO BRING THE (EZLN) CRIMINALS BEFORE THE AUTHORITIES FOR JUDGEMENT.

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ ARMS CACHES AND EZLN CONSPIRACY REVEALED.

THE PRESIDENT THEN ANNOUNCED THAT SEVERAL ARMS CACHES HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, AND SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED TWO IN VERACRUZ AND MEXICO CITY.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT THESE ARMS CACHES CONTAINED EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THAT THE "...EZLN WAS ABOUT TO EMBARK ON NEW ACTS OF VIOLENCE."

4. ~~(C/NF)~~ EZLN ORIGINS.

THE PRESIDENT THEN STATED THAT THE ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, AND GOALS OF THE EZLN WERE NEITHER POPULAR, INDIGENOUS, NOR FROM CHIAPAS. THE ORIGINS OF THE GROUP WERE FROM A SMALL GROUP CREATED IN 1969 AND CALLED THE "NATIONAL LIBERATION FORCE".

5. ~~(C/NF)~~ GOVERNMENT TAKES ACTION.

THE PRESIDENT THEN ANNOUNCED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BEGIN TO TAKE DIRECT ACTION, USING EVIDENCE WHICH HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN THE ARMS CACHES.

6. ~~(C/NF)~~ EZLN LEADERSHIP NAMED.

THE PRESIDENT THEN SAID THAT ARREST WARRANTS FOR THE FOLLOWING EZLN LEADERS HAD BEEN ISSUED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE--

RAFAEL SEBASTIAN ((GUILLEN)) VICENTE	A.K.A. MARCOS
FERNANDO ((YANEZ))	A.K.A. GERMAN
JORGE JAVIER ((ELORREAGA)) BERDEGUE	A.K.A. VICENTE
JORGE ((SANTIAGO)) SANTIAGO	A.K.A. UNK
SILVIA ((FERNANDEZ)) HERNANDEZ	A.K.A. SOFIA
	A.K.A. GABRIELA.

THESE NAMES WERE PART OF A LIST OF 18 TOTAL WARRANTS FOR ARREST IN THE CASE.

7. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE ARMY IS ORDERED TO MOVE.

THE PRESIDENT THEN STATED THAT BY AUTHORITY OF FRACTION VI OF ARTICLE 89 OF THE CONSTITUTION HE HAD ORDERED THE ARMY TO ASSIST THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE TO HELP IN THE APPREHENSION OF THE ABOVE CITED PERSONS AND TO CONDUCT PATROLS TO PROHIBIT THE POTENTIAL SPREAD OF VIOLENCE.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD PROPOSE TO A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE CONGRESS TO STUDY AND APPROVE AN AMNESTY PLAN FOR ANY EZLN MEMBERS LAYING DOWN THEIR ARMS IN THE WAKE OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT.

8. ~~(C/NF)~~ SHORTLY AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS BEGAN REPORTING THAT EZLN PERSONNEL HAD BEGUN TO FELL TREES AND MINE ROADS LEADING INTO THEIR JUNGLE STRONGHOLDS. HEAVIER THAN NORMAL MILITARY ACTIVITY AROUND THE KEY HIGHWAY CROSSROADS AT RANCHO NUEVO, 10 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, WAS ALSO REPORTED. FEDERAL POLICE AND THE ARMY JOINED TO HELP LOCAL POLICE IN SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, OCOSINGO, LAS MARGARITAS, AND ALTAMIRANO-- TOWNS OCCUPIED IN THE FIRST OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE 940101. TROOPS WERE ALSO SEEN IN SIMOJOVEL.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ THE INITIAL VIOLENCE IN CHIAPAS OCCURRED ON THE FRINGES OF THE LACANDON JUNGLE AREA ON 940101.

[REDACTED]

THE EZLN THEN BEGAN ANOTHER OFFENSIVE OUTSIDE OF THE CLOSED RING FORMED BY THE ARMY'S RAINBOW TASK FORCE (SO NAMED FOR THE ARC IT OUTLINED AROUND THE NORTHWEST BORDER OF THE JUNGLE AREA). THAT ACTIVITY WAS CONCENTRATED NORTH OF SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS IN SIMOJOVEL AND LARRAINZAR

[REDACTED]

THESE TOWNS ARE AMONG THOSE LISTED AS BEING THE MOST ACTIVE SCENES OF ARMY MOVEMENT AT THIS EARLY TIME. THIS INCLUDES HELICOPTER ACTIVITY WHICH OCCURRED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ARMORED VEHICLE MOVEMENT INTO THE TOWN OF LARRAINZAR.

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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6. ~~(CONF)~~ THE MILITARY WAS FRUSTRATED BY THE CEASE FIRE ANNOUNCED 940112. THE NEW MEXICAN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, GENERAL ENRIQUE ((CERVANTES)) AGUIRRE, MADE THE ANNUAL MARCH OF LOYALTY SPEECH YESTERDAY (950209); IN THE SPEECH THE MILITARY PLEDGED ITS UNSWERVING LOYALTY TO THE PRESIDENT. IT IS INTERESTING THAT THE ARMS CAPTURES, THE REVELATION OF HEAVIER EZLN ACTIVITY, THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF INCREASED

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GOVERNMENT PRESSURE AND ACTION, AND THE MILITARY
MOVEMENT IN THE SITUATION ALL OCCURRED WITHIN EIGHT
HOURS OF THIS IMPORTANT SPEECH.


ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .

COLL: (U) AB.

INSTR: (U) U.S. 

PREP: (U) 

ACQ: (U) 

DISSEM: (U) 

DCSD, OPAD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

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~~DECL: GADR~~

BT

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INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00481389

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS383 MCN = 95042/04471 TOR = 950420148
OTTCZYUW RUEKJCS4360 0420146-~~CCCC~~-RUEANSS.
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

O 110146Z FEB 95
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEALGX/SAFE
O R 110145Z FEB 95
[REDACTED]

TO RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2// IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2// IMMEDIATE
RHCGSRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2/AFIN-IC// IMMEDIATE
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL// IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX/INM-FOR GELBARD// IMMEDIATE
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHDC
RUEHGT/USDAO GUATEMALA CITY

BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] CHIAPAS UPDATE ONE:
ACTIVITIES OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT 950210 IN THEIR
PURSUIT OF EZLN REBEL LEADERS (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -

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NOFORN

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 950210.
REQS: (U) [REDACTED]
SOURCE: (U) A. [REDACTED]
(U) B. RADIO BROADCAST, 1320 (AM) MHZ,
MEXICO CITY BASED SPANISH RADIO
STATION.
(U) C. [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NF)~~ CHIAPAS UPDATE ONE: GOM INITIATED ACTIONS AGAINST EZLN 950210. TROOPS ARE BEING MOVED WITHIN MEXICO CITY. RADIO NEWS BROADCASTS INDICATE THAT CONVOYS OF MEXICAN TROOPS ARE MOVING WITHIN THE STATE OF CHIAPAS.

TEXT: ~~(C/NF)~~ 1. RADIO BROADCASTS WITHIN MEXICO CITY INDICATE THAT THE MEXICAN ARMY IS MOVING LARGE CONVOYS OF TROOPS WITHIN THE STATE OF CHIAPAS. A CONVOY WITH AS MANY AS 2000 TROOPS WAS REPORTED MOVING TOWARD THE REBEL STRONGHOLD OF GUADALUPE TEPEYAC. GUADALUPE TEPEYAC HAS BEEN THE HEADQUARTERS FOR THE EZLN SINCE THE EARLY DAYS OF THE UPRISING WHICH BEGAN 940101.

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ WITHIN MEXICO CITY AND SURROUNDING AREAS THE SITUATION APPEARS CALM. THE FOLLOWING EVENTS OCCURRED IN MEXICO CITY 940210 (ALL TIMES LOCAL):

0730 - CAMPO MILITAR UNO - EXTREMELY QUIET. NO PERSONNEL OBSERVED ENTERING OR LEAVING THE BASE WHICH IS NORMALLY EXTREMELY BUSY AS PERSONNEL ARRIVE/LEAVE FOR WORK. A LARGE FORMATION OF TROOPS WEARING FULL COMBAT GEAR WAS OBSERVED WITHIN THE BASE. IT APPEARED THE TROOPS WERE STAGING FOR DEPLOYMENT.

1100 - MEXICAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS, MEXICO CITY - ACTIVITIES WITHIN MEXICAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS (SEDENA) INDICATE THAT TROOPS ARE BEING MARSHALLED FOR FURTHER TRANSPORTATION TO UNKNOWN LOCATIONS. APPROXIMATELY 5, FIVE-TON TRUCKS WITH APPROXIMATELY 20 PERSONNEL EACH WERE BEING LOADED. TROOPS WERE DRESSED IN FULL COMBAT GEAR, HELMET, RIFLE, WEB GEAR AND RUCK SACK. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

1130 - SANTA LUCIA AIR FORCE BASE, (BASE AERO MEXICANO ONE (BAM-1)) - SITUATION APPEARED CALM.

[REDACTED]

1200 - MEXICO CITY - A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 150 PERSONS CLAIMING TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO THE EZLN CAUSE STAGED A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION NEAR THE U.S. EMBASSY AFTER WHICH THE GROUP MARCHED ALONG "REFORMA" MEXICO CITY'S MAIN STREET SHOUTING THAT THEY WERE ZAPATISTAS.

1300 - BAM

11, MEXICAN NAVAL AIR BASE AND PRESIDENTIAL AIR BASE (LOCATED AT THE MEXICO CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT) - ALL APPEARED CALM, PERSONNEL WITHIN THESE BASES APPEARED TO BE CONDUCTING NORMAL, DAILY ACTIVITIES.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .

COLL: (U) .

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOFORN

PAGE:4294

DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]
DCSD, OPAD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS.~~

~~DECL: OADR~~

BT

#4361

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:4047

INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00497323

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS008 MCN = 95044/31270 TOR = 950442333
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS3797 0442332-~~6666~~--RUEANSS.

ZNY ~~66666~~

HEADER

P 132332Z FEB 95
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUDHSIC/CDRUSASOIC WASHINGTON DC//DI//
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 132327Z FEB 95

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO PRIORITY
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2// PRIORITY
RUEHTG/USDAO TEGUCIGALPA

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT); MEXICO (MX).

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] ACTIVITY ALONG THE GT/MX FRONTIER (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:4048

DOI: (U) 950206-950213.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: A. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

B. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

C. (U) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(S/NF)~~ GT AIR FORCE PERFORMING AERIAL PATROLS OF THE GT/MX BORDER. REPORTS OF EZLN MOVEMENT INTO GUATEMALA OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] POSSIBLE GT/MX COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO BE LAUNCHED TO SEAL COMMON BORDER.

TEXT: 1. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE GT AIR FORCE IS CURRENTLY PATROLLING THE GT/MX FRONTIER IN THE VICINITY OF NORTHERN QUICHE AND HUEHUETENANGO DEPARTMENTS USING SMALL FIXED WING AIRCRAFT. THESE AIRCRAFT FLY OVER THE BORDER APPROXIMATELY EVERY TWO HOURS IN AN EFFORT TO DETECT ANY CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT BY THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (EZLN). [REDACTED]

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ [REDACTED] THERE ARE RELIABLE REPORTS THAT DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS, A NUMBER (NFI) OF EZLN ELEMENTS HAVE CROSSED INTO GUATEMALA BETWEEN THE IXCAN RIVER [REDACTED] AND XALBAL RIVER [REDACTED] IN NORTHERN QUICHE DEPARTMENT. [REDACTED] THERE HAS BEEN NO KNOWN MOVEMENT OF EZLN FORCES INTO GUATEMALA EITHER TO THE WEST OR EAST OF THIS AREA. [REDACTED]

3. ~~(S/NF)~~ IN AN EFFORT TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE BORDER, THE

~~SECRET~~


~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:4049

MEXICAN ARMY PLANS TO MOVE TROOPS INTO THE AREA (ON THE MEXICAN SIDE) BETWEEN THE IXCAN AND XALBAL RIVERS AND ESTABLISH PATROL BASES, POSSIBLY WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. THE GT ARMY ALSO HAS PLANS, COORDINATED WITH THE MEXICAN ARMY, TO ALSO POSITION TROOPS ON THEIR SIDE OF THE FRONTIER.




4. ~~(S/NF)~~  THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF RECENT EZLN MOVEMENT INTO GUATEMALA BETWEEN THE IXCAN AND XALBAL RIVERS BUT NO CONCLUSIVE PROOF EXISTED OF SUCH MOVEMENT.



 THE COMPANY COMMANDER STATED THAT ELEMENTS OF HIS RIFLE COMPANY HAD, DURING THE PREVIOUS TWO WEEKS, COME INTO CONTACT WITH EZLN ELEMENTS.



5. ~~(S/NF)~~ 



~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:4050

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THE PROBLEM WAS AGGRAVATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FEW MEXICAN ARMY TROOPS THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN IN THE REGION PRIOR TO THE JANUARY 1994 EZLN UPRISING. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INDEED, THE GT ARMY HAD SUCH SEVERE PROBLEMS RESUPPLYING CUARTO PUEBLO DURING LATE 1993/EARLY 1994, THAT A SMALL NUMBER OF SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY DIED OF MALNUTRITION THERE.

ADMIN

PROJ: (U).

COLL: (U) AB; AD; AH .

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

~~DECL:OADR~~

BT

#3798

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

PAGE:3377

INQUIRE=DOC30D
ITEM NO=00002312
ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS071 MCN = 95055/08076 TOR = 950550516
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS4905 0550505-~~CCCC~~--RUEANSS.
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

R 240505Z FEB 95
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 232329Z FEB 95
[REDACTED]

TO RUWGTCH/DIRJIATF WEST
RHFJSGG/DIRJIATF EAST
RUEHGT/USDAO GUATEMALA CITY
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUEASRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2/AFIN-IC//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2//
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHDC
RUEHGT/USDAO GUATEMALA CITY
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IAL//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX/INM-FOR GELBARD//
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEABND/COGARD LO EPIC EL PASO
RUEANTX/CJTF SIX
RHLBAAR/JIATF SOUTH
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL/REL TO UK, CAN, AILS~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).

SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] CHIAPAS UPDATE EIGHT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

PAGE:3378

(8). SECRETARIAT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SPONSORED
ATTACHE VISIT TO CHIAPAS (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT
CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~REL UK, CAN, AUS~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 950214.
REQS: (U) 

SOURCE: (U)

SUMMARY: (U) ON 950214 THE SECRETARIAT OF DEFENSE
SPONSORED AN ATTACHE VISIT TO CHIAPAS WHICH INCLUDED A
BRIEFING BY THE VII REGION COMMANDER, A BRIEFING AND
TOUR OF A HOLDING AREA FOR DISPLACED PERSONS
(REFUGEES), AND A VISIT TO THE ONCE EZLN HEADQUARTERS.

TEXT: 1. (~~C/REL UK, CAN, AILS~~) ON 950214 THE
SECRETARIAT OF MEXICAN NATIONAL DEFENSE SPONSORED A
VISIT TO CHIAPAS FOR ALL ACCREDITED ARMY AND AIR FORCE
ATTACHES ASSIGNED TO MEXICO. THE TOUR BEGAN WITH A
FLIGHT IN A TWIN ENGINE TURBO PROP CONVAIR, PURCHASED
BY THE MEXICAN AIR FORCE APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS
EARLIER.

2. (~~CAREL UK, CAN, AUS~~) 

3. (~~CAREL UK, CAN, AUS~~) AFTER RECEIVING BREAKFAST,
THE ATTACHES WERE GIVEN A BRIEFING BY THE VII REGION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

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COMMANDER, LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARIO RENAN ((CASTILLO)) FERNANDEZ. GEN CASTILLO IMPRESSED UPON THE VISITORS THE ACTION IN CHIAPAS IS NOT A WAR, BUT RATHER A CIVIL ACTION WHICH IS NOT FORESEEN TO DEGENERATE INTO WAR. HE FURTHER INDICATED THE ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE IN RESPONSE TO A THREAT TO PUBLIC ORDER THROUGH ACTS OF TERRORISM. HE ASSURED THE VISITORS THAT THE STATE POLITICAL LEADERS HAD NO AUTHORITY OVER THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA. GEN CASTILLO ALSO INDICATED THAT THE MILITARY WILL NOT PURSUE MARCOS INTO THE JUNGLE; HOWEVER, TIME WILL MAKE HIM (MARCOS) DISAPPEAR.

4. ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AUS)~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

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6. (U) AFTER TRANSFERRING TO THE BLACK HAWKS, THE ATTACHES WERE FLOWN TO THE ARMY GARRISON FACILITIES FOR THE 24TH ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION AND THE 91ST SPECIAL FORCES JUNGLE INFANTRY BATTALION LOCATED ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF COMITAN. GEM MORALEZ PROVIDED A DETAILED BRIEFING ON THE ACTIONS OF THE SECRETARIAT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE IN PROVIDING DIRECT SUPPORT TO THE MORE THAN 4094 CAMPESINOS DISPLACED FROM THEIR LAND BY THE ZAPATISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY AND ITS SUPPORTERS. THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE GROUPED BY LOCALITY WITH THE MAJORITY (1,419) LOCATED IN COMITAN, 979 IN LAS MARGARITAS, 886 IN OCOSINGO, 349 IN LA TRINITARIA, 313 IN LA INDEPENDENCIA, AND 148 IN ALTAMIRANO.

7. (U) ACCORDING TO THE BRIEFING, BESIDES SECURING TEMPORARY HOUSING FOR THE DISPLACED CAMPESINOS OF CHIAPAS, THE MILITARY WAS ALSO ENSURING OTHER HEALTH AND WELFARE SERVICES WERE BEING PROVIDED ON A PERIODIC BASIS, TO INCLUDE MEDICAL TREATMENT AND DENTAL CARE, FOOD DELIVERIES, HAIR CARE, AND OTHER SERVICES. THESE SERVICES WERE ALSO BEING PROVIDED TO OTHER COMMUNITIES OF CAMPESINOS AND POOR INDIGENOUS IN THE STATE. [REDACTED]

8. (U) THE ATTACHES WERE TAKEN BY TRUCK TO "LAS INSTALACIONES DE LA FERIA", A TYPICAL MEXICAN MARKET PLACE WHICH HAD BEEN CONVERTED INTO A TEMPORARY DISPLACED PERSONS (REFUGEE) CAMP AND CARE CENTER, TO OBSERVE FIRST HAND THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD, AS WELL AS THE PROVISION OF MEDICAL CARE AND OTHER SERVICES FOR THE DISPLACED POPULATION IN THE AREA.

9. ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AUS)~~ THE ATTACHES WERE THEN FLOWN, VIA BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS, TO GUADALUPE TEPEYAC--THE RECENTLY ABANDONED HEADQUARTERS OF THE EZLN. THROUGHOUT THIS AND THE PREVIOUS LEG OF THE JOURNEY, THE BLACK HAWKS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY TWO ARMED MD-530'S WHICH PROVIDED ESCORT AND COVER FOR THE BLACK HAWKS.

10. ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AUS)~~ GUADALUPE TEPEYAC [REDACTED] IS A SMALL VILLAGE LOCATED IN A SMALL VALLEY NEARLY SURROUNDED BY STEEPLY RISING TERRAIN, WHICH ITSELF IS COVERED BY DENSE TREES AND SHRUBS. BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSE ((MARTINEZ)) NOLASIO, WAS THE COMMANDER OF TROOPS OCCUPYING THIS VILLAGE; HE REPLACED MG RAMON ((ARRIETA)) HURTADO, WHOSE AIRBORNE TROOPS HAD TAKEN THE TOWN.

11. ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AUS)~~ [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

PAGE:3381

12. ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AUS)~~ [REDACTED] WERE THEN TAKEN BY TRUCK TO AGUASCALIENTES, THE SITE OF THE AUGUST EZLN SPONSORED NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION. THIS SITE LOCATED ONLY ABOUT ONE (1) TO TWO (2) KILOMETERS FROM GUADALUPE TEPEYAC, WAS ALSO THE SITE OF A LEFT WING REBEL LIBRARY. THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE LITERATURE IN THE LIBRARY WAS ORIENTED TO MARXIST WRITINGS, POLITICAL RADICALISM, AND LEFT LEANING IDEOLOGY. [REDACTED] ALSO NOTED WRITTEN MATERIALS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR AS WELL AS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. THERE WAS ALSO A COMPUTER LOCATED IN THE LIBRARY AND A SECTION WITH CHILDREN'S LITERATURE.

13. ~~(C/REL, UK, CAN, AUS)~~ [REDACTED]

14. ~~(C/REL, UK, CAN, AUS)~~ THE PARTY WAS THEN FLOWN BY HELICOPTER TO VILLAHERMOSA, TABASCO [REDACTED] WHERE MAJOR GEM ANTONIO ((FERNANDEZ)) PERIDRE, COMMANDER OF THE 30TH MILITARY ZONE, HOSTED A LUNCHEON AND OFFERED A SHORT PRESENTATION ON THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS WITHIN THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 30TH MILITARY ZONE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

PAGE:3384

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AUS)~~

THE
MILITARY WAS INTENT ON PORTRAYING RECENT ACTIONS AS
CONTROLLED, AND PROFESSIONAL, AND AIMED AT PRESERVING
THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF THE INDIGENOUS
POPULATION IN CHIAPAS.

2. ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AUS)~~ DURING THE INITIAL
HOSTILITIES IN EARLY 1994, THE MILITARY WENT INTO
CHIAPAS WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE POWER OF THE PRESS. AT
THE SAME TIME, SUBCOMANDANTE MARCOS USED THE MEDIA TO
PORTRAY THE MEXICAN MILITARY AS BRUTAL, GIVING LITTLE
OR NO REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS. AS A RESULT,
INTERNATIONAL OPINION HAS TURNED AGAINST THE ACTIONS
OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT IN CHIAPAS. TO AVOID A
REPEAT, THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN THE OFFENSIVE
IN PUBLIC RELATIONS. THEIR ACTIONS TO PROVIDE FOOD,
SHELTER AND SERVICES TO THE DISPLACED INDIGENOUS
PERSONS OF THE REGION GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF WORKING
FOR THE BENEFIT OF OTHERS, AND NOT SIMPLY AS SOLDIERS
BUT AS GUARDIANS OF THE PEOPLE.

3. ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AILS)~~ THE MILITARY HAS ALSO WORKED
TO LEGITIMIZE THE ACTIONS IN THE REGION BY PORTRAYING
THEM AS IDENTIFIED DURING THE BRIEFINGS AS MILITARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

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SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION COINCIDENT WITH A
FEDERAL POLICE ACT
ION AGAINST CRIMINALS AND
TERRORISTS.

4. ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AUS)~~ [REDACTED] THE
MILITARY TROOPS GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF BEING VERY
PROFESSIONAL AND COURTEOUS. THE FACT THAT NONE OF
THEM ENTERED THE HUTS IN GUADALUPE TEPEYAC OR
DISRUPTED THEIR CONTENTS, IS A CLEAR INDICATION OF
THEIR ATTENTION TO DETAIL IN ESTABLISHING AN IMAGE AS
PROTECTORS OF THE PEOPLE RATHER THAN VIOLATORS OF
BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.

5. ~~(C/REL UK, CAN, AILS)~~ [REDACTED]

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .

COLL: (U) AH

INSTR: (U) U.S. [REDACTED]

PREP: (U) [REDACTED]

ENCL: (U) TO FOLLOW: 2 ENCLOSURES.

1. PHOTOGRAPHY, CHIAPAS, MEXICO (U), PARTIAL ROLL,
COLOR NEGATIVES, 28 FRAMES (U).

2. PHOTOGRAPHY, CHIAPAS, MEXICO (U), 10 35MM COLOR
PRINTS, NEGATIVES NOT AVAILABLE (U).

ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]

DISSEM: (U) [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

PAGE:3386

~~██████████~~ SENT TO: DIA/SV-5C (W/ENCLS).

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~~UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, AUSTRALIA.~~

~~DECL: QADR~~

BT

#4910

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~REL UK CAN AILS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:2827

INQUIRE=DOC30D
ITEM NO=00178543

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS046 MCN = 95080/39483 TOR = 950802341
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS9735 0802339-~~cccc~~-RUEANSS.

ZNY ~~cccccc~~

HEADER

R 212339Z MAR 95
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN-IDI//
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCBSAA/CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUDHSIC/CDRUSASOIC WASHINGTON DC//DI//
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 212027Z MAR 95

[REDACTED]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2//
BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT); MEXICO (MX).

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] MEXICAN MILITARY PRESENCE ALONG
THE GT/MX BORDER (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:2828

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 950319.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (U) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EZLN COMBATANT
STRENGTH LISTED AS BEING BETWEEN 2-3,000 WITH SOME 12,000
SUPPORTERS.

TEXT: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE
GUATEMALAN ARMY UNITS STATIONED ALONG THE MEXICAN FRONTIER
IN THE PETEN ENJOY AN EXCELLENT RELATIONSHIP WITH
RECIPROCAL VISITS BEING CARRIED OUT ON A REGULAR BASIS
BETWEEN THE VARIOUS BORDER DETACHMENTS.

2. ~~(C/NF)~~ [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

PAGE:2829

4. (C/NF)

THERE ARE SOME TWO TO THREE THOUSAND (2-3,000) WELL-ARMED EZLN COMBATANTS WITH ABOUT TWELVE THOUSAND (12,000) SUPPORTERS IN CHIAPAS. THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN CHIAPAS DO NOT SUPPORT THE EZLN AND ONLY WANT THE GOM TO PROVIDE BASIC SERVICES, E.G., ROADS, HEALTH CLINICS, SCHOOLS, ETC.

COMMENTS: 1. (C/NF)

ADMIN

PROJ: (U).

COLL: (U) AC.

INSTR: (U) U.S.

PREP: (U)

ACQ: (U)

DISSEM: (U)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~DECL: OADR~~

BT

#9736

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

NOFORN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:2198

INQUIRE=DOC30D
ITEM NO=00431846

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS111 MCN = 95118/03032 TOR = 951180208
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS3314 1180207-~~CCCC~~--RUEANSS.
ZNY ~~CCCCC~~

HEADER

R 280207Z APR 95
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
R 271324Z APR 95
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//SV-5C//
TO RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
INFO RUEABNE/COGARD LO EPIC EL PASO TX
RUEANTX/CJTF SIX
RUCKMAA/COMMARFORLANT //G-2//
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHDC
RUWDEAA/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA//00/N2//
RUEASRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ2//
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHINGTON DC//IAL//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//ARA-MEX//

BT

CONTROLS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]
MODIFIED COPY (IIR NUMBER).

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) MEXICO (MX).
SUBJECT: IIR [REDACTED] MEXICAN DEFENSE FORCES RECEIVE
GUATEMALAN JUNGLE OPERATIONS TRAINING.-- MODIFIED COPY (e)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NOFORN~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 950408.
REQS: (U) [REDACTED]
SOURCE: A. ~~CONF~~ [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ~~CONF~~ MEXICAN ARMY OFFICERS HAVE RECEIVED GUATEMALAN JUNGLE
OPERATIONS TRAINING. SOME MEXICAN OFFICERS ARE NOT PHYSICALLY ABLE TO
COMPLETE TRAINING.

TEXT: 1. ~~CONF~~ [REDACTED] DURING THE PERIOD THAT MEXICO
HAS CONFRONTED ITS INSURGENCY IN CHIAPAS (SINCE EARLY 1994), THE
MEXICAN ARMY HAS SENT TWO GROUPS OF OFFICERS TO GUATEMALA TO RECEIVE
KAIBIL (RANGER COMPATIBLE) TRAINING.

2. ~~CONF~~ THE FIRST GROUP, COMPOSED OF TWO MEXICAN ARMY OFFICERS,
SUCCESSFULLY GRADUATED FROM THE KAIBIL COURSE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE SECOND GROUP, COMPOSED OF FOUR MEXICAN ARMY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





NOFORN

PAGE:2199

OFFICERS, WERE RETURNED TO MEXICO WITHOUT COMPLETING THE KAIBIL
COURSE.



ADMIN

PROJ: (U) .
COLL: (U) AB.
INSTR: (U) U.S. 
PREP: (U) 
ACQ: (U) 
DISSEM: (U) 

DCSD, OPAD, POL).

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOT
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~~DECL: OADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

NOFORN

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INQUIRE=DOC31D
ITEM NO=00077351

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS266 MCN = 95150/25115 TOR = 951502112
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS8294 1502109-~~SSSS~~--RUEANSS.

ZNY ~~SSSSS~~

HEADER

P 302109Z MAY 95
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUWSMXI/USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//J2-J//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 301953Z MAY 95

[REDACTED]
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
AIG 6732
RUCBAIC/AIC NORFOLK VA//DI-52//
RUEOAYE/NGIC CHARLOTTESVILLE VA//IANG-RCR//
RUANJTF/DIRJIATF EAST //J2//
RUWGTC/JIATF WEST
RUEANTX/CJTF SIX
RUETIAA/NSACSS FT MEADE MD//B33//
RUDMIFE/ONI IFE SUITLAND MD//2132//
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/STATE DEPT WASHDC //INR-IC-CD//
RUCNFB/FBI WASH DC//INTD/CID-TERRORISM//
RUDGUSD/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC//INTEL//
RUDMGRD/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J233//
RHHJOBV/JICPAC OIC HONOLULU HI
RHHMMC/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHHJDHM/PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
RHHMHAA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEHGT/USDAO GUATEMALA CITY GT
RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
RUEHTG/USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO
RUEHOL/USDAO BONN GM

BT

CONTROLS

S E C R E T NOFORN SECTION 01 OF 02
SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

-

~~SECRET~~

NOFORN

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PASS: (U) NSACSS FOR ZKZK PP DXD RRK DE;
DIA PASS TO DH-5 AND DH-1 FOR INFO.

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT); MEXICO (MX); HONDURAS (HO); GERMANY (GM).

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] MEXICAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING FOREIGN AID TO INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS IN
CHIAPAS, MEXICO (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 950100.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

SOURCE: (~~C~~/NOFORN) [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: (~~C~~/NOFORN) MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS MET IN
COMITAN, MEXICO, TO DISCUSS COLLABORATION BETWEEN MEXICO AND
GUATEMALA REGARDING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT IN BOTH COUNTRIES.
AT THE MEETING HIGH LEVEL MEXICAN MILITARY OFFICIALS REVEALED THAT
[REDACTED] FOREIGN POWERS ARE AIDING
MEXICAN INSURGENTS.

TEXT: 1. (~~C~~/NOFORN) [REDACTED]

THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO FOSTER COLLABORATION BETWEEN MEXICO
AND GUATEMALA IN THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORT AND OTHER RELATED
ISSUES (NFI). ALSO, AS PART OF THE MEXICAN COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT,
THE MEXICAN ARMY HAS SENT INFANTRY OFFICERS TO GUATEMALA'S KAIBILES
MILITARY SCHOOL LOCATED AT POPTUN [REDACTED] GUATEMALA, IN THE
PETEN DEPARTMENT, FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING (NFI).

2. (~~C~~/NOFORN) [REDACTED]


~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

SECRET

NOFORN

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C. (U) ON 24 MARCH 1994, GT NEWSPAPER "LA REPUBLICA" PUBLISHED AN ACCOUNT OF A REBEL ARMED FORCES (FAR) ROADBLOCK IN THE PETEN WHERE THE FAR GUERRILLAS TOLD THE PEOPLE GATHERED AT THE ROADBLOCK THAT THEY WILL UNITE WITH THE EZLN TO CREATE A "FREE STATE" IN CHIAPAS AND THE PETEN.

D. (C/NOFORN)



SECRET

NOFORN

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~~NOFORN~~

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ADMIN

PROJ: (U) 247643.
INSTR: (U) US [REDACTED]
PREP: (U) [REDACTED]
ACQ: (U) [REDACTED]
DISSEM: (U) FIELD: NONE SENT TO: NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ NOT RELEASABLE TO
~~FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

~~DECL:OADR~~

BT

#8295

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~~NOFORN~~